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Preface
by Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director of the Institute for Advanced Sustainability 
Studies, Potsdam
Source: Schulzendorff
Until 2025, about 250 million people will move to cities in China, where by then there will be 
221 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants. They will be clustered in about 11 regions with 
more than 60 million people each. In order to ensure energy supply with reduced impact on 
health and the environment a central element of the Chinese governments’ five year plan is 
developing smart eco-cities. With this, the conservation of energy, water, land and materials, 
reducing pollution, optimizing the transportation, protecting the environment, and improv-
ing building comfort, health and safety should be maximized. This will be a critical moment 
in the acceleration of industrialization, urbanization and rural development providing great 
opportunities in many respects, business opportunities for the economic sector and saving 
potential for millions of households.
As China increasingly embraces clean energy, with newly set renewable energy targets and 
energy efficiency, smart grid capabilities are crucial for achieving and driving the low-carbon 
transition. With increasing shares of power from renewable energy facilities with their specifics 
of intermittency, the transformation of the demand and supply sides towards more flexibility 
is vital. This is recognized in the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Devel-
opment, where the People’s National Congress has set up a goal for the acceleration of smart 
grid developments. Additionally to balancing the demand and supply sides smart grids can 
potentially contribute to a reduction in overall need of energy of up to 25 % and reduce the 
costs of integrating renewable energy into the power system. Doing this will both be useful 
for the economy, opening up new business models and be a challenge for the regulators, who 
need to create a supportive framework. Such a regulatory basis should provide incentives and 
ensure an acceleration of the smart grid development also encouraging competition in order 
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to fuel innovation. Supporting the development of industrial clusters, by creating special in-
dustry funds can be one option to fully realize the potential of the economic opportunity of 
the smart grid development. Considering that China in 2013 for the first time surpassed the 
spending of the United States on smart grid technologies, accounting for more than a quarter 
of the worldwide smart grid spending, it is clear that a massive transformation of the coun-
try’s energy landscape is underway. The potential of being a global leader in the technology 
development and serving as a role model in smart energy system development however still 
implies regulatory challenges in order to balance the energy policy goals of reliability, afford-
ability and sustainability – keeping in mind that the social dimension of energy is central to 
sustainable energy systems.
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus Töpfer
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Preface
by Dr. Werner Brinker, Chairman of the Board of the EWE AG, Oldenburg
Europe is committed to the decarbonization of its economy, driven by the European Union 
(EU) climate and energy policies on renewable energy, low carbon emissions, energy savings 
and energy efficiency. The further development of the energy sector is pivotal to meeting these 
objectives, ensuring the transition towards a more sustainable energy system and driving in-
novation in the energy sector.
While the German energy sector is already well prepared for a successful integration of decen-
tralized power generation from renewable energy sources, Germany is currently heading the 
necessary legal and regulatory steps to build future-oriented electricity networks, complete 
the market integration of renewables and ensure at the same time the functioning of electric-
ity markets. 
Automation as well as information and communication technology (ICT) are playing an im-
portant role in this context. So called smart grids are deemed to improve the efficiency, reliabil-
ity, and sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity. They are able to collect, 
transmit and use information about the behaviors of electricity producers and consumers in 
an automated fashion by means of automation and ICT. 
In Germany, the transition towards smart grids is driven by a large variety of different institu-
tions and companies interacting on well-functioning markets for electricity and associated prod-
ucts. However, despite all the valuable experiences with regard to the build-up of smart grids, 
Germany’s regulatory framework has not yet been adapted completely to the vision of smart 
grids. In China, the transition towards smart grids is mainly pushed forward by the govern-
ment and the politically powerful and vertically integrated grid operators due to the absence of 
competition in many parts of the energy sector and the non-existence of markets for electricity. 
The present study aims to give regulatory recommendations for the deployment of smart 
grids in China based on German and international experiences and ongoing discussions. I 
ix
am convinced that the results can help Chinese policy makers to optimize smart grid regula-
tion in China. I am even more convinced that, based on this study, China and Germany have 
the unique opportunity to link their strengths, overcome weaknesses and withstand threats 
to maximize overall benefits for the society during the build-up of smart grids. As Germany 
is already a very important partner for China in Europe and China is of upmost importance 
for Germany in Asia, it could be important to align and ensure the right legal and regulatory 
framework as a precondition for a more sustainable energy sector in China.
We as the management of the EWE Group are honored that Deutsche Gesellschaft für Inter-
nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH chose experts from our companies to support the 
further development of smart grids in China. It was also a pleasure for us to welcome a group 
of Chinese experts in Oldenburg in April 2013.





by Dr. TONG Guangyi, Deputy Director General of the Electricity Department
National Energy Administration of the P.R. China, Beijing
In light of today’s environmental challenges, in order to meet the requirements of sustainable 
development, economic restructuring as well as flexible transmission, distribution and utiliza-
tion of electricity, optimizing the way we operate our power systems by building a smart grid 
has become an inevitable trend. Therefore, how to rationally and scientifically lay out a road-
map and at the same time design a sound legal and regulatory framework to promote smart 
grid development is a major question. This study gives important insights on modern smart 
grid concepts, policy frameworks and avenues for development in Germany and elsewhere 
providing us with a wealth of ideas and pathways to choose from.
According to an old Chinese saying “advice from others may help one overcome one’s short-
comings”. To study the advanced experiences of other countries and learn from their example 
is of great significance to the development of China’s smart grid. This study on “Regulatory 
Pathways for Smart Grid Development in China” includes an analysis of the current state 
of smart grid development in China and Germany, summarizes the latest discussion on the 
regulatory environment for smart grids in Germany and compares it with the current situation 
in China. Based on this analysis and in accordance with China’s overall energy development 
targets, the study provides seven policy recommendations and three regulatory roadmaps to 
promote smart grid development in China.
I believe this study provides a useful reference for the healthy development, effective guid-
ance and supervision of China’s smart grid. We want to take this opportunity and express our 
appreciation to Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and 
the team of experts led by the German side. We thank all the contributors for their rigorous 
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and prudent research approach as well as their professionalism, hard work and dedication in 
the whole process of writing this report.






by Bernhard Zymla, Head of the Energy Department
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn
The primary driver for smart grid development in Germany is the integration of a rising share 
of electricity generated from variable renewable energies into the power system. The German 
Federal Government’s Energy concept for an environmentally friendly, reliable and affordable 
energy supply of September 2010 and the Package of Energy Laws enacted in July 2011 contain 
guidelines and objectives related to Germany’s future energy system. The government plans 
express a commitment to sustainable development and environmental protection by setting a 
target to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 % compared to 1990 by 2020 and by 80 to 95 % by 2050.
With the German energy transition, the Energiewende, the German government has taken 
ambitious steps and action to tackle the problems related to fossil fuel combustion. To achieve 
the ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions while also gradually phasing out 
nuclear power until 2022, a rapid expansion of renewable energy is essential. In 2025, 40 to 
45 % of gross electricity consumption is to be covered by renewables, with the share planned 
to rise to 80 % by 2050. An increasing share of intermittent renewables requires a fundamental 
restructuring of our electricity system, allowing for an effective synchronization of demand 
with increasingly variable supply, while at the same time maintaining system reliability and 
stability. To achieve this objective, electricity markets have to be reformed to set the right 
incentives for an efficient utilization of the system’s flexibility resources on the supply and 
demand side. For this purpose the development of a future-oriented electric power network 
infrastructure – or smart grid – is indispensable.
Smart grids enable real-time communication between electricity suppliers, grid operators and 
consumers with the help of modern information and communication technologies facilitating 
an intelligent grid operation as well as the efficient utilization of all power system components 
through supply- and demand-side management. Thus, it is possible to integrate a high share 
of variable renewable energies without compromising the reliability of supply, while cutting 
peak loads and reducing the need for so-called baseload power plants. At the same time, 
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the upgrade of the electric power grid with the help of innovative grid technologies helps to 
reduce the need for traditional grid expansion avoiding substantial costs. Smart grids lead to 
the emergence of new business models and new market players together with an increasing 
spectrum of energy services in the years to come.
The development of smart grids requires a sound legal and regulatory basis that sets the 
right incentives and clearly defines the roles of different power system actors, the interaction 
between them and enables a smooth communication between its components. This study 
presents an overview of China’s and Germany’s power system as well as each country’s view 
on smart grid development. Built on this foundation recommendations for the adaptation of 
the policy and regulatory framework were developed aimed at facilitating the development 
of smart grids in China in order to allow the integration of a rising share of renewable energy 
in its power system.





Smart grids – an essential part of China’s future electric power system In the past 15 years, a 
series of reforms have greatly improved the efficiency, reliability, and environmental perfor-
mance of the Chinese power sector. However, significant challenges remain: rapidly rising 
electricity demand, concerns about power system reliability and energy security, environmen-
tal degradation and climate change [1].
China’s government aims at addressing these challenges and set up ambitious development 
targets for the future electric power system: amongst others, generation and grid capacities are 
to be expanded substantially, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the generation 
mix is to increase considerably, the number of power outages and supply interruptions is to 
decrease significantly, and the efficiency of energy and electricity usage is to increase markedly 
[2], [3]. Moreover, China’s government continues to modernize the energy sector regulation: 
it plans to establish a more effective electricity market system, considers downsizing and fur-
ther unbundling the integrated electric grid operators, and aims at optimizing the electricity 
pricing system [2], [4], [5].
The concept of smart grids might help to overcome the technological challenges men-
tioned above. In brief and following the International Energy Agency (IEA), smart grids can 
be defined as:
» An electricity network that uses digital and other advanced technologies to monitor and manage 
the transport of electricity from all generation sources to meet the varying electricity demands 
of end users. Smart grids co-ordinate the needs and capabilities of all generators, grid opera-
tors, end users and electricity market stakeholders to operate all parts of the system as efficiently 
as possible, minimizing costs and environmental impacts while maximizing system reliability, 
resilience and stability. [6] 
The Chinese government already acknowledged the importance of smart grids: in its 12th 
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the People’s National Congress 
explicitly set up the goal of accelerating smart grid developments in China [7]. This goal was 
also explicitly included in the 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development [2]. In addition, the 
most influential power sector companies, in particular the large grid operators, and academic 
institutions are active in promoting their own views on smart grids and developing, testing, 
and deploying smart grid technologies. 
A core motivation for smart grids in China is their intended positive impact on security of 
supply and operational efficiency, especially at the distribution grid level. Moreover, demand 
side management enabled by means of smart grid technologies plays an important role for 
balancing electricity generation and demand. Smart grid technologies are also seen as a means 
to reduce the costs of integrating RES into the power system which is of critical importance 
given the ambitious RES expansion targets of China’s government.
Though the Chinese government acknowledges the importance of smart grids, consider-
able challenges exist in adjusting the regulatory environment of China’s electric power system 
to enable an effective and efficient development of smart grids in China. 
The importance of new market actors in the smart grid development In Europe and the United 
States, the trend towards smart grids is driven by the growing importance of new participants 
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in the value chain of the electric power sector, so-called new market actors or third parties. 
New market actors in this context are non-incumbents; they can be new competitors on the 
electricity markets (e. g. operators of RES plants, new power retail companies, energy service 
companies) or companies from other sectors like the Information and Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) sector. 
The authors of this study are convinced that integrating new market actors in China’s 
electric power sector will significantly contribute to a more rapid and innovative smart grid 
development in China. The main advantage of liberalizing markets and allowing third parties 
to participate in the electricity supply chain is the innovation potential that comes with these 
new actors [8]. In a smart grid context, new market actors create new business models by 
making use of available power system information and infrastructure in an innovative way. 
Additionally, new market actors increase competition which generally leads to greater cost 
efficiency in production, lower price levels and a higher variety of products and services. New 
market actors can only participate in the electricity sector if equal access to essential facilities 
(especially the grid and information from smart metering) is guaranteed [9], [10]. 
One of the main lessons learned from developments in Germany is that liberalization, 
structural reforms, the development towards smart grids, and the transition to more RES 
have triggered a massive increase of market entries of new players in the electricity sector. The 
institutional challenge of smart grids is to facilitate the system-wide interaction of all these 
players to the benefit of economic efficiency, sustainability, and reliability.
Recommended approaches for smart grid development in China at a glance In the light of the 
experiences made in Germany and the ambitious government targets for China’s electric power 
system, seven recommendations to promote smart grid development in China have been de-
veloped in the present study. Figure Summary 1 depicts the seven recommended approaches 
and associates them with different regulatory areas that have been defined in the context of 
this study. It can be seen that the study’s recommendations relate to a broad range of regula-
tory topics.
The seven recommendations are briefly summarized below and reasonable implementa-
tion sequences that take into account the interdependencies between the different recom-
mendations are shortly presented. 
Recommendation 1: Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an inde-
pendent and powerful regulator  A clearly defined strategy with specific long-term targets for 
the development of the electricity sector is necessary in order to reduce uncertainty for smart 
grid investors and manufacturers. Such a strategy should include government targets with 
regard to the development of electricity generation capacities of different technologies (the 
so-called generation mix) and energy efficiency targets. 
Based on German experiences and on recommendations from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), clearly defined roles and responsibilities con-
cerning the regulation of the electricity sector facilitate the development of smart grids. Spe-
cific attention should be paid to the development of an independent and powerful regulator. 
The regulator should supervise the development of the power grid infrastructure in general 
as well as smart grids in particular.
Recommendation 2: Create level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and infor-
mation Chinese grid operators are still integrated as they own and operate the electric power 
grids and are responsible for retail. The management of power system data (e. g. grid status 
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information or metering data on electricity generation and consumption) is currently their 
task. As soon as new market actors are to be integrated in the electric power system, power sys-
tem data management will become more relevant on a broader scale. The non-discriminatory 
and technology-neutral management of power system-related information and its distribu-
tion in smart grids is currently one of the most discussed regulatory topics in Europe and the 
United States. It is an important finding of these discussions that it is beneficial if a regulator 
or another government institution develops a governance system, that will ensure provider 
and technology neutrality and a level playing field for all stakeholders. Non-discriminatory 
access to power system information in smart grids is of particular importance for new market 
actors to be able to develop their business models. 
Recommendation 3: Introduce network regulation for efficient investment incentives for elec-
tricity grid expansion and upgrade At present, there is no explicit price for transmission and 
distribution (the so-called network charge) based on actual costs in China. The source of 
income of grid operators is the difference between the on-grid (generation) and the retail 
price for electricity which are both fixed by the government. In contrast, in Europe and many 
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Executive Summary
parts of the supply chain, i. e. transmission and distribution grids. The other elements of the 
supply chain, i. e. generation and retail, are liberalized and governed by general competition 
law only. This approach is referred to as disaggregated regulation. Its main advantage is that it 
avoids misdirected incentives at the non-monopolistic parts of the supply chain. It also widens 
the profit margin of the commercial businesses (generation and retail) and thus improves the 
business opportunities for new market actors. 
With regard to a network regulation scheme (i. e. a specific method used for calculating 
network charges) suitable for China, the growing share of RES requires a significant upgrade 
and expansion of both transmission and distribution grids. On the one hand, regulation should 
facilitate necessary investments, but on the other, it should also set incentives to avoid unnec-
essary investments and implement least-cost solutions (e. g. smart grid technologies). In all, 
regulation should aim for efficient investment incentives. Based on Italian experiences, rate-
of-return adders are a specifically interesting approach for projects with a special relevance to 
the smart grid development in China (e. g. those projects with a high priority for security of 
supply). It is highly beneficial to analyze their applicability to the Chinese context. Further-
more, profit-sharing mechanisms or innovation bonuses currently applied in the UK could 
be interesting to increase the diffusion of innovative technologies in China’s electricity sector.
Recommendation 4: Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and 
upgrade China faces an urgent need to expand the existing electricity network within the 
next few years driven by growing consumer demand for electricity and the integration of 
RES. Smart grids provide solutions to meet these challenges. With smart grids, the number of 
potential stakeholders that are relevant for the network development increases. So far, only the 
incumbent players have been part of the network planning process in China. Evaluating how 
network development planning could be coordinated in China so that all relevant stakehold-
ers have the possibility of participating in the process is therefore an important step. In this 
context, China could take advantage of German experience with the network development 
planning process for transmission grids and evaluate how this approach could be applied to the 
Chinese context and especially to distribution grids. Clear scenarios about the development 
of RES, the general electricity mix, and electricity demand in China are needed as a basis for 
the definition of a network development plan in China. Such scenarios could then serve as a 
common basis for the network development process. 
The development of smart grids calls for effective coordination. Therefore, a long-term 
network development plan that includes the interests of various stakeholders at an early stage 
would facilitate the smart grid development in China. Based on German experiences, a stake-
holder platform that should be chaired by one of the ministries and serve as a discussion board 
for the relevant stakeholders can further contribute to the smart grid development process. 
The stakeholders can exchange their ideas on grid development in general and smart grids in 
particular at an early stage within the stakeholder platform and jointly provide policy recom-
mendations to the government. 
Recommendation 5: Improve grid integration of RES Transparency and a clear division of re-
sponsibilities between grid operators and RES investors would encourage the deployment of 
RES and incentivize new market actors to invest in RES. Experience in Germany illustrates 
that a fast and efficient grid integration of RES requires a proper definition of grid connec-
tion points and clearly defined, transparent, technically sound, and legally binding grid codes 
(technical standards) for the integration of generation units at all voltage levels. RES need to 
be assigned a grid connection point (i. e. the point in the electricity grid which is at the nearest 
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linear distance from the location of the RES-installation) on request, so that the interconnec-
tion can be installed without delay and according to well-defined technical standards. Whereas 
plant operators have to comply with the technical standards, grid operators have to bear liabil-
ity for the grid connection of RES. This is very important, because liability puts a high priority 
on the establishment of the grid connection and avoids delays on the grid operator’s side.
To ensure grid stability, it is necessary to curtail RES in times of critical grid conditions. 
To provide transparent procedures to the RES operators, detailed processes for curtailment of 
RES (including documentation, transparency rules, timeframes, involved parties, etc.) have 
to be defined and the requirements for information exchange within these measures have to 
be specified.
The integration of RES with regard to ICT is another important aspect in the smart grid 
context. Only by means of ICT, RES generation can be automatically coordinated with grid 
capacities and loads at any time. This is the basis for an economic optimum of the power sys-
tem infrastructure usage and ensures options for action even in times of high wind and solar 
irradiation. An optimum ICT integration of RES is also a prerequisite for monitoring and con-
trolling RES installations, thereby enabling an economically efficient level of grid curtailment.
Recommendation 6: Optimize the balancing of electricity generation and consumption Balanc-
ing generation and consumption of electrical energy is a technical key factor for the stable 
operation of power systems. In power systems with a high growth rate, such as China, peak 
loads may cause shortages on the generation side. Peak shaving, i. e. reducing the electrical 
power consumption during periods of maximum electricity demand, enabled by means of 
smart grid technologies is crucial for stable and efficient system operation in this case. In 
power systems with a high share of intermittent renewables, such as Germany, the residual load 
– the difference between load and renewable generation – is highly volatile. In such systems, 
residual load shaving during peak consumption times is important in order to reduce the use 
of conventional sources to cover the residual load. 
Balancing mechanisms and technologies like demand side management (DSM), supply 
side management (SSM), microgrids, virtual power plants (VPP), and energy storage can be 
employed to facilitate the balancing of electricity generation and consumption. The techni-
cal potential for load management in the industrial sector is comparatively high and easy to 
realize with dedicated ICT solutions. The commercial sector can be included at a later point 
and the residential sector last, because the potential in the residential sector is smaller and 
more distributed. 
China’s government plans to refine the existing time-of-use pricing system and estab-
lish time-of-use pricing for all categories of customers. Within such a framework, sufficient 
differences between peak and off-peak prices for all categories of consumers are of critical 
importance to incentivize the wider introduction of supply-side management, demand-side 
management, and energy storage. With more and more RES being introduced, further applica-
tions like virtual power plants and microgrids, are recommended. Such applications need to 
have a clear focus on the security of supply and on economically efficient system development. 
Recommendation 7: Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids  Due to the dif-
ferent strategies of China’s grid operators and the absence of a Chinese government vision on 
smart grids, there is no unanimously accepted vision on the technological and organizational 
design of smart grids in China. There is accordingly much uncertainty among potential smart 
grid investors. In Europe, standardization eased the development of a unified view of smart 
grids. China’s government traditionally acknowledges the importance of standardization for 
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industrial development and innovation. In this light, it is suggested to promote the establish-
ment of an organizational arrangement (e. g. similar to the Smart Grid Coordination Group 
in Europe) to coordinate smart grid standardization in China. Within this organizational 
arrangement, clear organizational structures and processes to foster the understanding of 
the Chinese smart grid concept should be defined and implemented. In the European smart 
grid standardization process, which is currently still ongoing, a three-dimensional model of 
the European smart grid environment, the so-called Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) 
has been created. It can be thought of as a technological, organizational, and functional map 
showing the boundaries as well as different areas of smart grids. This model has been used 
to identify smart grid use cases which describe requirements and functions of smart grid 
technologies. The use cases contribute to the development of a common understanding of 
smart grids in Europe. Based on this common general understanding of smart grids, a list 
of smart grid standards is currently being developed in Europe. The standardization process 
from Europe might serve as a role model for smart grid standardization in China. In this con-
text, the authors of this study specifically emphasize the importance of integrating additional 
stakeholders (i. e. third parties) into the standardization process.
Regulatory pathways for smart grid development in China There are inherent conflicts between 
the fundamental energy policy goals of reliability, affordability, and sustainability. As a result, 
governments have to be aware of the society’s energy policy priorities to choose an appropriate 
energy sector regulation. 
The implementation sequence of the given recommendations is not arbitrary with respect 
to the energy policy goals. In order to give policy makers an impression of how policy goal 
prioritization influences the timeline in which the recommendations should be implemented, 
the present study outlines three possible regulatory pathways. Each of these pathways priori-
tizes one specific goal of the energy policy triangle and develops an implementation roadmap 
accordingly. These roadmaps are intended to serve as blueprints for policy makers, who have 
to decide about proper regulation based on the individual Chinese prioritization of energy 
policy goals. 
Figure Summary 2 summarizes the implementation sequences for all three policy goals 
with recommendations to be implemented in the short term on the left hand side of the figure. 
Comparing the implementation sequences in all three scenarios reveals that there are two 
recommended approaches with the highest overall priority. The measures subsumed within 
these recommendations shall be implemented independently of the underlying scenario:- Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an independent and powerful regulator, and - Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade.
Three of the remaining five recommendations are relevant in each scenario, though with a 
lower priority: - The Improvement of the grid integration of RES has a very high priority under the Eco-logical Sustainability scenario and is also important for the Reliability/Security of Supply 
scenario. It is somewhat less important in the Affordability/Competition scenario. - The Facilitation of the development of a unified view of smart grids is especially important with respect to the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario. It is somewhat less important 
with regard to the Affordability/Competition and Ecological Sustainability scenarios.
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- The Optimization of the balancing of electricity generation and consumption is particu-larly relevant for the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario. The recommendation has a 
lower relevance in the Ecological Sustainability scenario and is ranked last in the Afford-
ability/Competition scenario.
The two remaining recommendations are not relevant in every scenario. Rather, they contrib-
ute to single energy policy goals. In particular, both of these recommendations are essential 
for migrating towards smart grids focusing on affordability and competition: - The Creation of level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and informa-tion is the first recommendation that should be implemented if the government strives 
to develop smart grids focusing on affordability and competition. It is also important if 
the government chooses to focus on ecological sustainability.
The Introduction of network regulation for electricity grid expansion and upgrade is at position 
four in the implementation sequence of the Affordability/Competition scenario. It is also rel-
evant, though at a later stage, in the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario. 
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Smart grids – an innovative solution for up-
grading the conventional power grid infrastruc-
ture Around the world, power grid operators have 
to cope with several technological challenges rang-
ing from aging grid infrastructures and fluctuating 
load levels to the integration of intermittent1 renew-
able energy sources (RES). These challenges tend to 
result in supply security problems. The traditional 
way to deal with such problems is to invest heavily 
in the conventional (primary) grid infrastructure 
by installing components like new cables, overhead 
lines, transformers with higher capacities, addi-
tional switch panels, or converter stations.2 
Several modern technologies have been or are 
currently being developed which are aimed at reduc-
ing investments in the traditional grid infrastruc-
ture by increasing operational efficiency, making it 
possible to fully utilize the capacity of the existing 
power grid infrastructure and leveraging flexibilities 
in electricity generation and consumption.
Examples of such innovations designed to up-
grade electric power grids3 are modern informa-
tion and communication technologies as well as 
advanced power grid components for metering, 
measurement and control, and automation. Power 
grids incorporating these new technologies are 
commonly referred to as smart grids [1].
Smart grid technologies open up many new pos-
sibilities in power grid management and control, 
e. g. the status of distribution grids can be monitored 
in real-time when sensoring and communication 
networks are added. With the help of the informa-
1 Electricity from an intermittent energy source is not con-
tinuously available due to factors outside direct control 
and cannot be dispatched to meet the demand of a power 
system. Intermittent RES are tidal power, wind power, or 
solar power, while biomass, geothermal, and hydro power 
are dispatchable and non-intermittent RES. Note that the 
term variable RES is used as a synonym for intermittent RES 
in the present study. 
2 The term conventional grid infrastructure refers to pas-
sive electronic components necessary for establishing an 
electric connection between electricity generators and 
consumers [1]. Note that this perspective mainly serves 
an explanatory purpose, because currently no grid is built 
or operated exclusively with passive components [1].
3 The specific term electric power as well as the general term 
power are both used as a synonym for electricity in this 
study. Only if the term energy is used, non-electric power 
forms such as heat or kinetic energies are referred to.
tion gathered, modern automation and control tech-
nologies can be employed to supervise and actively 
control grids increasing their utilization rate and 
preventing overloads via grid capacity management 
[1]. Thus, the need for costly grid expansion may be 
reduced while the stability of the grid and security 
of supply can be improved [1].
Challenges to China’s current electric power sys-
tem China faces tremendous challenges with re-
gard to the development of its electric power system. 
According to China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy 
Development, massive investments in power gen-
eration and grid capacities have to be made to cope 
with the steadily rising power consumption [2].
Different sources point to a low level of equip-
ment sophistication in parts of the electric power 
grid in China, especially at the distribution grid 
level. In some instances, outdated and inefficient 
distribution transformers are still in operation [3], 
[4]. This contributes to a considerable number of 
supply interruptions, despite the fact that signifi-
cant advancements have been made in recent years. 
At the same time, requirements of China’s quickly 
modernizing industry with regard to power quality 
are on the rise and cannot be met at all times [5].
China has to cope with increasing air pollu-
tion problems [6] and is the world’s largest emit-
ter of carbon dioxide (CO2) [7]. Its power genera-
tion sector, which is mainly relying on coal as an 
energy resource, is responsible for a large share of 
CO2 emissions. 
Government targets for China’s future electric 
power system In light of these challenges, the 
Chinese government issued specific targets for 
the physical and technological development of the 
power system up to 2015: power generation ca-
pacities are to increase from 970 gigawatts (GW) in 
2010 to 1,490 GW in 2015 [2] and they are projected 
to attain 1,935 GW in 2020 [8]. Also, the share of 
power generation from RES and nuclear energy is 
planned to be increased significantly, with an offi-
cial target of 11.4 % of total primary energy coming 
from non-fossil sources by 2015 and 15 % by 2020 
[9]. In China, power generation from RES is con-
sidered a key instrument to reduce the dependency 
on coal power, stop the deterioration of air quality, 
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and reduce the growth rate of CO2 emissions [9]. 
The State Council also stipulated that long-distance, 
inter-regional and inter-provincial transmission of 
electricity shall be promoted in order to build a na-
tionally integrated backbone grid. In addition, ur-
ban and rural distribution grids are planned to be 
expanded and renovated [2]. Investments in the grid 
infrastructure are projected to reduce power supply 
interruptions and to increase power quality. Consid-
ering the power consumption side, there are plans 
to significantly increase the efficiency of power use 
and to provide access to electric power even in very 
remote regions of China by 2015 [2], [10].
China’s government also plans to make consid-
erable advancements on the organizational level: a 
modern energy market system is to be established, 
market-related reforms in key energy sectors are 
projected to take place, energy pricing mechanisms 
are to be improved, and the development towards 
an internationally competitive environmental and 
energy industry is to be accelerated [2].
To support accomplishment of the government 
targets for China’s future electric power system, the 
government aims at starting to build up smart grids 
during the next several years. As has been formu-
lated in the 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Develop-
ment, China’s government aims at promoting the 
development of smart grids [2]. Also, the Chinese 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) released 
a special plan for technological smart grid improve-
ments in 2012 [11].
Barriers to the implementation of smart grids in 
China Some aspects of China’s technological and 
regulatory framework may present obstacles to an 
effective and efficient smart grid development:- Overlapping responsibilities between different government institutions affect the govern-
ment’s ability to guide and facilitate the devel-
opment of smart grids [5] [12].- Compared to the electricity sectors in other countries, the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industry, small-sized power 
generation companies, and other non-estab-
lished players like prosumers4 are underrepre-
4 Prosumers are end consumers of electricity which also 
generate electricity, for example by means of rooftop 
photovoltaic installations.
sented in (smart) grid development planning 
in China.- Due to rather low electricity prices, the current tariff system may not offer sufficient incentives 
for saving electricity or for shifting electricity 
demands according to available generation and 
grid capacities [12].- A lack of sufficient incentives for grid integra-tion of RES within the existing regulatory 
framework persists [13].- Similar to all other countries aiming at devel-oping smart grids, some of the key smart grid 
technologies in China are not yet fully devel-
oped and some equipment specifications and 
standards are still inconsistent [3], [4], [14].
Idea of the study The aim of the present study is 
to analyze and discuss regulatory policies support-
ing the build-up of smart grids in China. The work 
is based on experiences gathered in Germany and 
other countries. In the context of the study, the 
term regulation is not restricted to purely regula-
tory issues. Rather, government policies such as the 
promotion of research and development (R&D) or 
standardization issues are also included.
Smart grids follow an evolutionary pathway and 
their realization depends on the status quo of the ex-
isting grid infrastructure. Therefore, this study con-
tains a detailed description of China’s and Germany’s 
electric power systems, their most pressing techno-
logical challenges, and their regulatory environments. 
Based on these descriptions, both countries’ specific 
technological views on smart grids are presented.
Regulatory smart grid pathways designed to 
meet the specific challenges in China are presented 
subsequently. The pathways include dedicated rec-
ommendations that are based on regulatory best 
practices from Germany and other countries. The 
recommendations build upon the current situation 
in China proposing achievable changes to the regu-
latory framework and relevant policies to promote 
smart grid development in China.
The structure of the study The structure of the 
study is visualized in . Fig. 1.1 and briefly outlined 
below:- ▶ Chapter 2 presents the conceptual frame-work of the study. The chapter also introduces 
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the so-called energy policy triangle covering 
the three main energy policy goals reliability, 
affordability, and sustainability. Fundamen-
tal premises highlighting the importance of 
smart grids and explaining the role of the 
government in the smart grid development 
process are presented as well. The chapter also 
discusses the importance of electric power 
markets and third parties, i. e. new participants 
in the value chain of the electric power sector, 
for smart grids. - ▶ Chapter 3 presents China’s electric power system, its recent historical development, 
its regulation, government targets for 
China’s future electric power system, and 
the role of smart grids in this context. A clear 
focus is placed on technological and regula-
tory challenges for China’s electric power 
system. - ▶ Chapter 4 contains a description of the Ger-man situation focusing on lessons learned and 
sharing the German experience (correspond-
ing to challenges presented in ▶ Chap. 3). - ▶ Chapter 5 presents recommendations designed to meet the specific challenges in 
China. Where appropriate, the recommenda-
tions refer to best practices from Germany.- ▶ Chapter 6 presents three different regulatory pathways (roadmaps) each focusing on a dif-
ferent objective of the energy policy triangle. 
This offers policy makers an insight of the 
effects different policy priorities may have on 
















 . Fig. 1.1 Structure of the study
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Chapter at a glance
– The study’s conceptual framework is presented.
– This chapter illustrates the role of regulation and 
technological progress for the development of the 
electric power system and introduces the energy 
policy triangle covering the three main energy 
policy goals reliability, affordability, and sustain-
ability.
– The concept of and the motivation for smart grids 
are introduced.
– Fundamental premises highlighting the role of the 
government and new market actors in the smart 
grid development process are presented.
2.1 The power sector supply chain 
and regulatory environment 
of smart grids
The supply chain model of the electric power 
sector The delivery of electricity from generation 
sources to end consumers involves a multitude of 
technologies, actors, and processes, especially in the 
context of the development of an intelligent future-
oriented power grid infrastructure. Therefore, it is 
useful to employ a supply chain model of the electric 
power sector (or electricity system) to structure the 
debate on smart grids. 
In this study, a smart grid supply chain model 
(see . Fig. 2.1) is used to structure the discussion 
on China’s and Germany’s power systems along with 
their most pressing problems and challenges as well 
as their particular approach of how to promote the 
development of smart grids. The model subdivides 
all activities/processes, technologies, and actors of 
the power sector supply (or value) chain into four 
basic elements:1- Power Generation: the technical generation of electricity using various kinds of primary en-
ergy sources (such as coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, 
1 The smart grid supply chain model being referred to in this 
study is based on the so-called Energy Process Management 
(EPM) model [16].
wind, and solar energy) and corresponding 
ancillary services.2- Power Logistics: the transmission, distribution, storage, and metering of electricity.- Power Trade & Retail: purchasing, trading, and selling electricity, as well as retail and billing 
services for end consumers.- Power Consumption: the end use of electricity by different end-user segments, e. g. rural and 
urban households, industrial and commercial 
consumers.
To capture the importance of ICT for transform-
ing the traditional power sector into a smart grid, a 
corresponding fifth element is added to the model: - Information & Communication: operating, monitoring, and controlling power system 
components, as well as power system-related 
information exchange between various market 
actors with the help of ICT along all four stages 
of the power sector supply chain. 
The government plays a pivotal role in the smart 
grid development process (see ▶ Sect. 2.3) as a guid-
ing and supervising key player affecting processes 
and businesses across all five supply chain elements.
The regulatory environment of smart grids In 
the remainder of this study, six regulatory areas will 
be used to describe the regulatory environments of 
China’s and Germany’s power systems. 
The six regulatory areas are:- Policy Setting and Fundamental Institutions: Government leadership in form of policies, 
laws, and regulation is essential to promote 
smart grid development. To practice such a 
leadership, a governance structure with clearly 
assigned roles and responsibilities for the field of 
(smart) grid regulation is of crucial importance. - Market Structure: The (market) structure of the electric power sector is characterized by all 
2 Ancillary services are functions performed by the equip-
ment and people generating, controlling, transmitting, 
and distributing electricity with the intention of support-
ing basic services of generating capacity, energy supply, 
and power delivery [17]. Examples are load following, 
scheduling and dispatch, real-power loss replacement, and 
voltage control (e. g. by means of reactive power supply).
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the companies involved in the various stages 
of the power sector supply chain from Power 
Generation and Power Logistics to Power Trade 
& Retail (vertical market structure), the mar-
ket composition and competitive conditions at 
different stages of the supply chain (horizontal 
market structure), and the roles and responsi-
bilities of the market actors. - Market Design and RES Integration: Electric-ity prices (for generation and retail) are of 
crucial importance with regard to the utiliza-
tion of different sources of power generation, 
investment decisions for new generation 
capacities, power consumption patterns, and 
investments in power saving technologies. By 
setting monetary incentives for investments 
into power generation capacities, generation 
electricity prices contribute particularly to the 
long-term coordination of power generation 
and consumption. At the same time, retail 
electricity prices have the power to directly 
affect the patterns of electricity consumption of 
end users. The formation of electricity prices is 
heavily affected by the market structure and the 
underlying market design, the latter of which is 
generally defined by the government. Feed-in 
tariffs for RES and associated regulations are 
also part of the market design because they 
represent nothing less than prices for electricity 
generation fixed by the government.- Development of Infrastructure and Network Regulation: The regulatory domain explains 
how investments in the (smart) grid infrastruc-
ture can be incentivized through power grid or 
network regulation. These regulatory practices 
directly impact the stable and affordable opera-
tion of the current grid infrastructure and the 




 . Fig. 2.1 Electric power sector supply chain model
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balancing electricity generation and consump-
tion in the short term are described. Many 
smart grid-related technologies facilitate the 
balancing of generation and consumption.- The Role of Information and Communication: Integration of ICT with power system compo-
nents across the supply chain is a key factor in 
smart grid development. This regulatory area 
covers the relevance of ICT companies, stan-
dardization issues, cyber security, and funding 
of smart grid research.
2.2 The role of regulation 
and technological progress 
for the development of electric 
power systems
Regulation in the electric power sector Competition, 
where feasible free from government intervention, is 
generally considered as a very effective way of reduc-
ing production costs, improving quality of supply, and 
increasing product diversity [1], [2]. Yet, competition 
is not always feasible. Especially where natural mo-
nopolies prevail, competition cannot exist and gov-
ernment regulation is necessary [3]. 
Transmission and distribution grids are such 
natural monopolies. Having an infrastructure of 
overlapping power grids from different competitive 
suppliers would be economically inefficient. Due to 
economies of scale, a single supplier (the monopo-
list) is able to offer the services of the electric power 
grid at lower costs. However, the monopolistic grid 
operator has a strong incentive to set high prices for 
its services or to scrimp on quality. Thus, the price 
and quality of service of the monopolistic grid oper-
ator must be regulated to protect grid users against 
the monopolist’s market power [3].3
3 Note that, at the beginning of the electrification process, 
the power generation sector was also recognized as a 
natural monopoly: in the absence of power transmission 
lines, competition between power generation units from 
different cities or regions was not possible. With the rather 
small electricity demand in separated cities or regions, one 
larger power plant was able to provide the electric power at 
lower costs than many small competitive power plants due 
to economies of scale. However, the gradual deployment 
of transmission lines allowed competition between large 
power plants to evolve in such a manner that power genera-
tion is no longer considered to be a natural monopoly [3]. 
It is common to distinguish two related goals of 
monopoly regulation [3] which are both typically 
tasks for the regulator, like the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post 
and Railway (BNetzA) in Germany:- Control of revenues and prices of the networks (i. e. network charges)- Secure access to the monopolistic infrastruc-ture (i. e. the network) to facilitate competition 
among market actors in the commercial parts 
of the electricity value chain (e. g. generation, 
trade and retail).
Moreover, the internalization of so-called externali-
ties is a frequently cited argument in favor of gov-
ernment intervention even in the non-monopolistic 
parts of the electric power system:- Negative externalities: the generation of elec-tricity is often connected to emissions of en-
vironmental pollutants. Without government 
intervention, neither producers nor consumers 
of electricity are sufficiently incentivized to 
behave in an environmentally friendly manner. 
Therefore, actions of the government such as 
pollution control laws, energy taxes, and subsi-
dies for environmentally friendly technologies 
are used to reign in commercial activities and 
advance the overall societal objectives like en-
vironment protection and sustainable develop-
ment [1]. - Positive externalities: technological progress critically depends on the creation of new 
knowledge. After its creation, knowledge can 
be used over and over by various actors with 
almost no extra costs. From the perspective 
of the whole society, companies often do not 
invest enough in knowledge creation because 
a significant portion of the benefits related to 
knowledge creation accrues to outside stake-
holders, e. g. other companies, institutions, or 
citizens. In this light, government actions such 
as a patent law, a stringent protection of intel-
lectual property rights, or the subsidization of 
R&D can be employed to incentivize companies 
to invest in knowledge creation and innovation.
This study adopts a broad understanding of regula-
tion and does not only focus on network regulation 
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but also upon aspects such as RES integration, in-
novation policies, and standardization. 
A stylized history of power system develop-
ment The historical development of electric power 
systems dates back to the last decades of the 19th 
century in the world’s most advanced countries of 
that era. The electrification process in these coun-
tries was mostly accomplished by the mid-20th cen-
tury, when almost the whole population had access 
to electric power. In less developed regions, the elec-
trification process started somewhat later and pro-
gressed at a considerably slower pace. Differences in 
onset and pace of the electrification process between 
countries can be explained mainly with technologi-
cal, economic, political, and regulatory reasons [4].
In developing their electric power systems, 
many countries followed a similar stylized pathway. 
At the beginning of the electrification process, the 
emergence of new technologies and appliances con-
suming electric power led to a rapidly increasing de-
mand for electricity. Thus, the main objective was to 
connect a growing number of consumers as quickly 
as possible to the electric power grid. The build-up 
process took place in a rather uncoordinated man-
ner with only little government intervention. Thus, 
various small-sized companies set up overlapping 
infrastructures such as small-sized power plants and 
distribution lines. This uncoordinated set-up phase 
was often associated with low power quality and 
reliability as well as high costs. Therefore, govern-
ments started to regulate the electricity sector with 
the intention of making power supply more reliable 
and affordable. Formally assigning monopoly rights 
to power generation companies and grid operators 
created economies of scale, which reduced the over-
all production costs of electric power generation 
and distribution. After this assignment of monopoly 
rights, electricity market regulation became a deci-
sive factor to protect consumers against the market 
power of the newly installed monopolies. 
When a certain level of wealth and economic 
development had been achieved, the awareness of 
environmental protection increased in many societ-
ies.4 Therefore, more emphasis was put on ecological 
4 The positive correlation between economic development 
and environmental preferences has been well docu-
mented during the last two decades [18]. 
sustainability of the electric power system and many 
governments introduced environmental protection 
policies. 
The energy policy triangle The schematic his-
tory presented above reveals that different objec-
tives and regulations were prioritized at different 
development stages of the power system. Whereas 
the provision of widespread and reliable access to 
electricity was often the initial motivation, afford-
ability of electric power emerged as a second driver 
of energy policy after the initial build-up phase. 
Finally, the ecological sustainability of the electric 
power system has often been formulated as a third 
important priority.
Today, governments strive to incorporate all 
three objectives in their power sector regulation. 
They (1) want to provide a reliable and secure elec-
tricity supply for their economies, (2) simultane-
ously promote economic development by ensuring 
affordable electricity prices while (3) also achieving 
ecological sustainability. The three goals reliability, 
affordability, and sustainability are commonly re-
ferred to as the energy policy triangle (see . Fig. 2.2). 
Conflicting nature of the energy policy trian-
gle There are inherent conflicts between the goals 
of the energy policy triangle. A government forcing 
owners of fossil-fuel power plants to install filter 
technologies for the sake of improving air quality, 
for instance, is accepting that costs of power genera-
tion increase. Another government using expensive 
domestic resources for electricity generation instead 
of lower-priced resources available on world mar-
kets accepts higher generation costs for the sake of 
independent and predictable energy supply.
The complete and simultaneous achievement 
of all three policy goals is virtually impossible. 
Therefore, most countries place a priority on one 
or sometimes two policy goals, trying to achieve or 
maintain acceptable levels with regard to the non-
prioritized policy goals. In recent years, the Chinese 
government, for example, prioritized (1) provid-
ing a reliable and secure electricity supply and (2) 
keeping electricity prices for the population at an 
affordable level. On the other hand, it has accepted 
high levels of environmental pollution. The German 
government, in contrast, has been placing a strong 
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emphasis on ecological sustainability since the end 
of the 20th century. A prominent strategic decision 
in this context was the build-up of RES genera-
tion capacities so that currently approximately one 
fourth of Germany’s electricity comes from RES [5]. 
The high share of RES in Germany currently leads 
to increasing challenges with regard to the policy 
goals of reliability and affordability. However, both 
conflicts may be mitigated by means of technologi-
cal progress as well as smart design of policies and 
regulatory framework:- In most cases, electricity generated by means of RES, so-called RES-E, is still more expensive 
than electricity generated in fossil fuel-fired 
power plants. This difference in generation 
costs has contributed significantly to climbing 
end consumer prices for electricity in recent 
years. Nonetheless, RES-E is often already 
cheaper than electricity retail prices (known as 
grid parity) depending on the characteristics 
of location and end-user segment. The costs 
of RES-E have decreased considerably dur-
ing the last few decades and are projected to 
decrease even more with further technological 
advancement and economies of scale through 
worldwide deployment [6]. Someday, the costs 
of renewably generated electricity will conse-
quently fall below those of electricity gener-
ated in conventional power plants. From that 
time on, investments in RES will increase both 
sustainability and affordability of the power 
system provided that the power system and 
market design allow for a minimizing of grid 
integration costs. - With a rising of electric power generated by variable RES, more and more efforts have to 
be undertaken to guarantee the high stabil-
ity and reliability of the power system. Below, 
two examples of temporary RES penetration 
in Germany, a power system with electricity 
loads commonly ranging from 40 to 80 GW, 
are presented: on December 5th 2013, a par-
ticularly windy day, roughly 27 GW of feed-in 
was generated by means of wind turbines in 
Germany [7]. On March 9th 2014, a very sunny 
day, photovoltaic (PV) installations alone fed a 
Sustainability
Reduce detrimental 
consequences for the 
environment and the ecosystem 
Affordability
Achieve a low level of electricity 
prices, for example by means of a 
high degree of compeveness
Reliability
Promote a widespread, reliable, 





 . Fig. 2.2 Energy policy triangle
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peak power of almost 22 GW into the grid [7]. 
Technological progress as well as adaptations 
to the existing design of the electricity market 
in Germany are essential to limit the cost of 
the ongoing transition towards a low carbon 
economy.
2.3 Smart grids – promising 
technological innovations
The concept of smart grids The capabilities of con-
ventional power grids to cope with many of today’s 
technological challenges, e. g. the integration of a 
large share of electricity generated by means of in-
termittent RES, are limited or can only be maintained 
with significant investments. In this light, smart grids 
represent a promising new technological concept. To-
day, the general understanding regarding the concept 
of smart grids seems to converge on a global level. A 
definition of smart grids which has found widespread 
acclaim in the professional community comes from 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) [8]:
» An electricity network that uses digital and other 
advanced technologies to monitor and manage 
the transport of electricity from all generation 
sources to meet the varying electricity demands of 
end users. Smart grids co-ordinate the needs and 
capabilities of all generators, grid operators, end 
users and electricity market stakeholders to oper-
ate all parts of the system as efficiently as possible, 
minimizing costs and environmental impacts 
while maximizing system reliability, resilience and 
stability.
Another explanation of the smart grid concept 
comes from the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) [9]: 
» The general understanding is that the Smart Grid 
is the concept of modernizing the electric grid. The 
Smart Grid comprises everything related to the 
electric system in between any point of generation 
and any point of consumption. Through the addi-
tion of Smart Grid technologies the grid becomes 
more flexible, interactive and is able to provide 
real time feedback.
 It is an electricity network that can intelligently 
integrate the actions of all users connected to it – 
generators, consumers and those that do both – in 
order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic 
and secure electricity supplies.
Irrespective of the common general understanding 
of smart grids, the specific vision of smart grids dif-
fers substantially from case to case and from coun-
try to country. Technologies that are included in one 
smart grid concept are not necessarily included in 
another. 
Motivation for smart grids Smart grids are gener-
ally expected to cope with the most pressing prob-
lems and challenges of many power systems more 
effectively and efficiently than conventional grid 
technologies. Smart grids primarily aim at deliv-
ering enhanced levels of reliability and security of 
supply, facilitating the balancing of electricity gen-
eration and consumption, increasing the utilization 
rate of power system components, and reducing 
investments in the conventional (primary) grid in-
frastructure. Smart grid technologies can be used, 
for example, to- monitor and control electric power grids more effectively, - facilitate the grid connection and operation of generators of all sizes and technologies,- help to integrate electricity generated from intermittent RES, - allow industrial, commercial, and residential consumers to play a part in optimizing the 
operation of the system by adjusting electric-
ity consumption behavior according to supply, 
and- provide consumers with greater information on their electricity consumption enabling 
electricity conservation [9].
The evolutionary character of smart grids Smart 
grids are not built from scratch. Rather, they evolve 
from conventional power grids which are upgraded 
with different kinds of innovative technologies and 
components. These technologies and components 
will be deployed at different periods in time depend-
ing on commercial attractiveness, compatibility 
with existing technologies, regulatory policies, and 
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investment frameworks. The evolutionary pathway 
of smart grid technologies is similar to that of other 
innovations: after major R&D efforts, smart grid 
technologies are developed further in specific dem-
onstration projects, tested in model cities or regions, 
and finally deployed on a larger scale.
Today’s smart grid technology landscape is highly 
diverse with some technologies reaching already 
high levels of maturity and others still in a devel-
opment process. Smart grid-related technologies 
with high levels of maturity are, for example, power 
plant communication and control modules, grid 
control systems, and advanced metering infrastruc-
tures (AMI). On the other hand, technologies such 
as wide area monitoring and control, distribution 
management, or electric vehicle charging infra-
structure require more progress before they are 
mature enough for large-scale deployment [8].
. Figure 2.3 visualizes a stylized evolutionary 
pathway of smart grids: in the past (left part of the 
illustration), electric power was mainly generated in 
thermal power plants. The status of high, medium, 
and low voltage grids was not remotely monitored. 
System operators were able to supervise substations 
at different voltage levels via rudimentary telecon-
trol or by means of manual patrol teams. 
In the present (middle part of the illustration), 
large wind farms complement thermal power plants 
feeding in electricity at the high voltage (HV) level. 
The status of transmission grids and the associated 
substations is remotely monitored. The resulting 
status information is received in the transmission 
control center and can be used to monitor and con-
trol the grid. Medium voltage (MV) and low volt-
age (LV) grids, however, are not yet equipped with 
sophisticated monitoring technologies. The distri-
bution control center only monitors the associated 
substations via telecontrol or by means of manual 
patrol teams. For the first time, small-sized wind 
farms and PV installations are being connected to 
distribution grids. 
In the future (right part of the illustration), 
power grids at all voltage levels are expected to be 
equipped with sophisticated monitoring and control 
technologies. Status information, e. g. on electricity 
generation and consumption, will also be available 
for distribution grids. RES, energy storage installa-
tions, and electric vehicles will become an integral  . Fig. 2.3 Development of smarter power systems (© OECD/
IEA [8])
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part of the future electric power system and will be 
able to exchange status information with the grid.
The role of governments in the smart grid devel-
opment process Given the evolutionary character 
of smart grids and the low maturity levels of some 
smart grid technologies, both a systematic guidance 
and specific government support policies are es-
sential to promote the development of smart grids. 
Exemplary government policies in this context are: - Setting up a government long-term strategy for the development of the future electricity 
system to reduce investment risks for potential 
investors in R&D and deployment of smart 
grid technologies. - Establishing network regulation for transmis-sion and distribution grid operators which 
incentivizes them to invest in smart grid tech-
nologies.- Promoting a non-discriminatory and tech-nology-neutral management of and access 
to power system data to enable companies to 
develop innovative business models making 
use of this data.- Partial government funding of R&D to increase the maturity level of smart grid tech-
nologies.- Supporting smart grid-related standardization, defining technical guidelines and regulations 
to reduce the costs for deployment and inte-
gration of different smart grid components by 
ensuring interoperability.- Promoting the exchange and collaboration between different government organizations, 
power sector companies, academia, associa-
tions, and other relevant actors to create a 
common understanding of smart grids. 
The role of new market actors in the smart grid 
development process In Germany and many other 
countries, one important trend associated with the 
migration towards smart grids and the transition to 
an electricity system relying to an increasing extent 
on RES-E is a rise in the number of market actors 
in the electricity sector. New market actors (third 
parties or non-incumbents) can expand the hori-
zontal market structure by entering into competi-
tion with established companies (incumbents) with 
regard to existing products or services (e. g. opera-
tors of renewable energy plants or new power retail 
companies). New market actors can also expand the 
vertical market structure by being pioneers offer-
ing products and/or services in new market sectors 
or niches (e. g. energy service companies or virtual 
power plant operators5) or in using existing knowl-
edge and/or infrastructure from other sectors in an 
innovative way upgrading products and services in 
the electric power sector (e. g. ICT companies). 
New market actors offer innovative products 
and services that were not supplied by established 
market actors before. In a smart grid context, non-
incumbents create new business models and offer 
new products and services by making use of avail-
able power system information and infrastructure in 
an innovative way. To give some tangible examples 
for the power sector innovations that may be driven 
by third parties, ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 highlights how non-
incumbents in Germany create new business mod-
els in the smart grid development process. Note that 
the German evidence elaborated in ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 also 
demonstrates that new market actors might emerge 
due to government policies aimed explicitly at the 
promotion of competition. 
In expanding the horizontal market structure, 
third parties contribute to an increased level of 
competition. Higher competition levels are usually 
considered to drive innovation, enable greater ef-
ficiency in the allocation of resources, increase cost 
efficiency of power sector enterprises with regard 
to their operations and investments, contribute to 
lower retail price levels, and stimulate innovation 
resulting in a higher variety of competitively priced 
products and services offered to the customer: - With regard to the electric power sector, IEA analyzed the market liberalization process in 
several of its member countries and came to 
the conclusion that higher competition levels 
in the electric power sector contributed to a 
reduction of electricity prices for industrial 
consumers [10]. - With respect to the telecommunication sector, various empirical studies (including data from 
industrial and developing countries) found 
5 Both new market actors are introduced in more detail in 
Sect. 4.4.2. 
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that high competition levels significantly 
increased the overall sector performance and 
led to more landline and mobile telephone 
connections, lower tariffs, and more connec-
tion capacity [11], [12], [13]- In the general economic literature, the rela-tionship between competition and innovation 
has been examined in many theoretical and 
empirical studies. It is usually found that there 
is a kind of optimal market structure for R&D-
spending, innovation and diffusion. Neither 
very low nor very high competition levels 
are an innovation-friendly environment. A 
competitive market with a limited number of 
companies seems to promote innovation best 
[14]. 
Economic efficiency of smart grids The economic 
evaluation of smart grids is still ongoing. How-
ever, early evidence suggests that smart grids are 
an attractive solution compared to conventional 
grid expansion measures. A recent study summa-
rizes the results of twelve smart grid cost-benefit 
analyses published between 2004 and 2012 in the 
United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and the Czech Republic [15]. This overview shows 
that benefits of the investigated smart grid concepts 
outweigh costs in ten of twelve cases (with costs out-
weighing benefits in Denmark and the Czech Re-
public). Only four of these studies compared their 
results to costs and benefits of conventional grid ex-
pansion measures (increasing the grid capacity by 
traditional network expansion). These studies come 
to the conclusion that, from an economic point of 
view, investments in smart grid technologies are 
preferable to conventional expansion measures.
Key findings- Governments strive to provide a reliable, afford-able, and sustainable electricity supply for their 
economies. Yet, there are inherent conflicts be-
tween these three energy policy goals. - Smart grids can be seen as an advanced way of operating grids supported by a broad set of new 
technologies in the areas of communication, me-
tering, control, and automation. Smart grid-related 
operation concepts, technologies, and compo-
nents can be used to upgrade the existing grid 
infrastructure and offer many new possibilities in 
grid management and control. Smart grids will be 
deployed at different periods in time depending 
on requirements of the particular power system, 
compatibility with existing technologies, regula-
tory policies, and investment frameworks.- Recent evidence has shown that investments in smart grid technologies are economically prefer-
able to conventional grid expansion measures. 
Moreover, smart grids represent a promising con-
cept that could increase reliability and security of 
supply, facilitate the balancing of electricity gen-
eration and consumption, ease the grid integra-
tion of electricity generated from variable RES, and 
increase the utilization rate of power grid assets. - Given the evolutionary character of smart grids and the still low maturity levels of some smart 
grid technologies, both systematic guidance and 
specific government support policies are essential 
to promote the development of smart grids. - New market actors in the electric power sector are of crucial importance to promote innovation in the 
electric power sector and speed-up the develop-
ment of smart grids. 
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Chapter at a glance
– The chapter gives an overview of the existing 
electric power system, the envisaged develop-
ment of smart grids, and the regulatory environ-
ment in China. The main aspects emphasized in 
this chapter serve as a guideline for the descrip-
tion of the German background in ▶ Chap. 4 and 
the recommendations and regulatory pathways in 
▶ Chaps. 5 and 6.
– ▶ Section 3.1 gives an overview of the more recent 
development of the power sector to lay a solid 
foundation for identifying the challenges currently 
facing the sector.
– ▶ Section 3.2 presents an overview of the physical 
structure of China’s current electric power system 
and discusses in detail the main technological 
challenges in this context.
– ▶ Section 3.3 introduces the Chinese smart grid vi-
sion resulting from the specific technological chal-
lenges. In this respect, the role of the government 
and the ICT industry in developing the Chinese 
smart grid vision is especially emphasized. 
– ▶ Section 3.4 describes the regulatory framework 
of the electric power system in China on the basis 
of the regulatory areas defined in ▶ Sect. 2.3. A 
clear focus is thereby on regulatory circumstances 
representing a barrier to smart grid development 
in China.
3.1 Historical perspective
Towards a reform of the power sector In the past 
15 years, a series of reforms have greatly improved 
the efficiency, reliability, and environmental perfor-
mance of the Chinese power sector. However, sig-
nificant challenges remain: rapidly rising electricity 
demand, concerns about power system reliability 
and energy security, environmental degradation 
and climate change [1].
Historically, all stages of China’s power sector 
value chain – from generation, transmission and 
distribution to retail – were owned and operated di-
rectly by the central government. By the mid-1980 s, 
in the wake of China’s opening up policy, a first set 
of reforms allowed new market actors, mostly pro-
vincial and local governments, to invest in power 
generation. This created a boom of so-called inde-
pendent power producers (IPP), thereby alleviating 
power shortages. Today, IPP make up more than 
half of China’s power generation assets. 
In 1997, the former Ministry of Electric Power 
(MoEP) was dissolved and the generation, transmis-
sion and distribution assets previously under direct 
government control were transferred to the newly 
formed State Electric Power Corporation (SEPC). 
This marked a significant step towards the separa-
tion of market functions fulfilled by state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and government regulatory au-
thority.
In 2002, the State Council of the People’s Repub-
lic of China promulgated a landmark reform for re-
structuring the Chinese power sector by separating 
power generation from grid operation (transmission 
& distribution). In the course of the reorganization, 
the vertically integrated SEPC was dismantled and its 
assets divided into eleven new SOE: two grid opera-
tors, five power generation companies, also known 
as Big Five (China Huaneng Group, China Datang 
Corporation, China Huadian Group, China Guodian 
Corporation, China Power Investment Corpora-
tion), and four power service companies providing 
advisory and ancillary services. At the same time, 
the State Council established a ministerial regulatory 
authority, the State Electricity Regulatory Commis-
sion (SERC), to oversee the developing competitive 
market structure and further push power sector lib-
eralization and market-based reform. The aim of this 
major power sector reform was to:- break-up the power sector monopoly and introduce fair competition (mainly on the 
generation side) within the framework set by 
the regulator,- improve economic efficiency and reduce costs,- rationalize the electricity tariff system and optimize resource allocation,- promote the development of the power indus-try and push ahead nationwide interconnec-
tion,- set up an open, orderly and well- developed power market based upon the principles of 
separation of governmental oversight and 
power sector enterprises.
In retrospect, the reforms are considered a sig-
nificant step towards the diversification of Chi-
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na’s power sector market structure. However, the 
market-oriented reform of the power sector – as it 
had originally been envisaged by the State Coun-
cil – stalled after these initial steps. No progress 
was made in unbundling the grid operators’ trans-
mission and distribution assets or in introducing 
more market-based electricity prices. This lack of 
progress despite ambitious plans for further re-
forms may be attributed in part to a lack of power 
and independent decision-making authority of 
the newly established regulator SERC, which suf-
fered from very limited jurisdiction, capacity and 
resources. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) is a successor to the State 
Planning Commission (SPC), which was renamed 
to State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) 
in 1998. In March 2003 the SDPC merged with the 
State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic 
System and parts of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission to form NDRC, which remained the 
most powerful policymaker for the power sector, 
retaining competence over electricity pricing and 
major energy project approval. The emergence of 
the newly formed State Grid Corporation of China 
(SGCC, in charge of 80 % of China’s electricity 
grid) as a powerful influence in national energy 
policies further hampered the stride towards liber-
alization of the sector. In the most recent govern-
ment restructuring in March 2013, the SERC was 
integrated into the National Energy Administration 
(NEA), an institution responsible for energy plan-
ning under the NDRC.
The trend towards low carbon development For 
a long time, progress in the electrification process 
together with the provision of a reliable and afford-
able power supply were the main priorities of Chi-
na’s government in its efforts to promote industrial 
and economic development. In the last two decades, 
questions relating to the sustainability of the electric 
power system have steadily gained increasing im-
portance in China.
Energy efficiency and environmental protec-
tion were first put forward as a prominent policy 
objective for power sector development in China’s 
general energy law – the 1995 Electric Power Law 
[2]. On the one hand, the law aimed at legalizing 
the status of power generation companies as com-
mercial entities and at establishing the legal basis 
for private ownership [3]. On the other hand, the 
law stressed the importance of the environmental 
sustainability of the development of the power sys-
tem by stipulating that
» the construction, production, supply and utiliza-
tion of electric power shall protect the environ-
ment according to law, adopt new technologies, 
minimize discharge of poisonous waste, and pre-
vent pollution and other public hazards. The state 
encourages and supports electricity generation by 
using renewable and clean energy resources. [4]
The shift towards environmental protection was re-
iterated in the 1998 Energy Conservation Law and 
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law, which respectively 
aim at promoting energy efficiency and deploying 
RES. The Renewable Energy Law has laid a solid 
legal foundation that has since been followed by a 
number of key implementation guidelines detail-
ing national renewable energy targets, a mandatory 
connection and purchase policy, a national feed-in 
tariff system for wind and solar energy as well as 
arrangements for cost-sharing and funding of re-
newable energy incentives.
China put forward aggressive measures to re-
duce the energy intensity of its economy: in its 11th 
(2006–2010) Five-Year plan, China set a target of re-
ducing its energy intensity, measured as energy con-
sumption per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), 
by 20 %. At the world climate conference in Copen-
hagen in 2009, China complemented this target with 
an overarching goal to reduce carbon intensity, the 
measure of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
GDP, by 40 % to 45 % by 2020 compared to 2005 
levels. The targets are backed up by comprehensive 
plans featuring numerous measures to facilitate in-
creased energy efficiency and reduced emissions 
across different sectors. One of these efforts is the 
Small Plant Closure Program established in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. It focused on closing down small 
and inefficient power plants and replacing them 
with larger state-of-the-art facilities. In the period 
from 2006 to 2010, more than 70 GW of coal-fired 
power generation capacity was shut down in the 
context of this program [5]. The program not only 
targeted power plants, but also facilitated the shut-
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down and replacement of a large number of out-
dated small factories of energy-intensive industries, 
e. g. in the iron and steel and cement sectors. More 
recently, small coal mines and inefficient pulp and 
paper mills have been subject to this government 
policy promoting consolidation and modernization 
of its heavy industry.
The Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Saving Program 
was another measure of the 11th Five-Year Plan to 
improve industrial energy efficiency by targeting 
China’s largest energy consuming companies, which 
accounted for almost half of total industrial energy 
consumption and one third of total primary energy 
consumption in China. The program reportedly re-
alized total energy savings of 150 million tons of 
coal equivalent, 50 % more than originally planned 
[6]. The ambitious targets and extensive efforts to 
promote energy efficiency and adjust China’s energy 
mix through the deployment of renewable energies 
are evidence of China’s commitment to decouple its 
economic growth from the growth of energy de-
mand and emissions – to reduce the carbon inten-
sity of its economy and fight pollution.
An increasing factor influencing China’s energy 
and industrial policy is the increasing public aware-
ness of environmental pollution and its detrimental 
effects on the ecosystem and on people’s health. In 
particular, the extreme levels of air pollution in ma-
jor Chinese cities may be seen as a potential source 
of social unrest and has thus been given great at-
tention by the Chinese government, especially after 
the serious pollution events in Beijing in January 
2013 saw particulate matter air pollution levels rise 
to figures exceeding the 24-hour mean level recom-
mended by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
by more than 30 times.
3.2 Today’s power system and 
its most pressing challenges
3.2.1 Power generation
Compared to international averages, China’s per 
capita reserves of coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
are rather low, a situation which in recent years has 
resulted in an increasing dependence on the import 
of fossil fuels [7]. In contrast, China is endowed 
with large renewable energy resources – estimated 
at 250 GW and 750 GW for onshore and offshore 
wind respectively, plus significant solar energy re-
sources [8]. Since the 1980 s, China’s power gen-
eration capacity has been steadily expanding (see 
. Fig. 3.1). From 2006 to 2012, total installed ca-
pacity almost doubled, increasing from 621 GW to 
1,147 GW [9].
Coal is currently the primary source of elec-





































 . Fig. 3.1 China’s power generation capacities from 1980 to 2012, data from [10]
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for close to 80 % of total electricity generation [9]. 
This massive reliance on coal for power generation 
and industry makes China the biggest CO2 emitter 
worldwide [11]. The second pillar of China’s elec-
tricity generation mix is hydro power, which has 
a share of roughly 17 % of total electricity genera-
tion. Nuclear and wind power contribute a share of 
roughly 2 % each. Other sources, such as gas, solar, 
and biomass power, with shares of less than 1 % 
each, currently play no more than a minor part in 
China’s power mix [9]. 
Although China’s generation mix has been rela-
tively stable over the past two decades, the compo-
sition of the country’s coal-fired power plants has 
undergone a significant shift toward larger and more 
efficient units, especially during the 11th Five-Year 
Plan. By implementing the policy of replacing small-
size units by large and efficient plants, the share of 
units with 300 MW and above rose from 42.67 % of 
total thermal generating capacity in 2000 to 89.1 % 
by the end of 2010. As a result, the standard coal 
consumption per kWh generated has been reduced 
significantly (see . Fig. 3.2).
With the introduction of the Renewable Energy 
Law in 2006, China triggered a boom in the expan-
sion of renewable energy development (. Fig. 3.3). 
China has since become the world’s largest pro-
ducer of wind power, with approximately 13 GW 
installed in 2012 reaching a total installed and grid-
connected capacity of 61.4 GW. With the introduc-
tion of financially attractive feed-in-tariffs in 2013, 
China has also recently become the world’s biggest 
market for solar PV with record installations of 
around 14 GW, more than 11 GW of which is grid-
connected [9].
China’s electricity system, however, is not well-
prepared for such a rapid increase of intermittent 
wind and solar generation units. Due to the lack of 
gas-fired power plants in China, coal-fired power 
plants are mainly employed for load-following and 
peak generation. These activities require a signifi-
cant cycling reducing the operational efficiency of 
coal-fired power plants [12]. Also, limited inter-
regional transmission capacities often complicate 
the usage of hydro power plants for load-following 
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 . Fig. 3.2 Standard coal consumption (2002–2012), data from [10]
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integration costs for wind and PV power in China 
[12].
Another challenge of the rapid build-up of re-
newables is that grid connection is lagging behind. 
Wind turbines are erected much faster than power 
lines are built. Realizing this problem, the govern-
ment has made efforts to slow wind power expan-
sion in order to reduce the share of wind power 
capacity which is installed but not grid-connected 
(by year-end) from 30 to 20 % in 2012. Due to the 
heavy concentration of wind power in remote re-
gions with rich wind resources and in so-called 
wind power bases with 10 GW and more capacity, 
curtailment due to grid congestion has become an 
important issue: 20 TWh of wind power had to be 
curtailed in 2012 [13], representing about 20 % of 
total electricity generation from wind [14]. Since fi-
nancial losses due to curtailment are not reimbursed 
to RES owners, wind power developers exposed to 
the negative impact of curtailment are increasingly 
building wind farms in lower wind speed regions 
with less network congestions. 
Challenges in China’s power generation 
sector- China is not particularly well endowed with fossil energy resources in per capita terms. 
A system relying on fossil-fueled generators 
may create an increasing dependence on 
foreign energy sources. - China’s heavy reliance on coal for power generation and industrial processes is 
contributing to high air pollution levels and 
CO2 emissions.- Employing coal-fired power plants for load-following and peak generation reduces the 
efficiency of their operation.- Renewable energy deployment is poorly coordinated with grid development, so 
that grid connection is lagging behind the 
construction of renewable power plants and 
significant quantities of wind power are be-
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 . Fig. 3.3 Installed capacities of renewable energies (2005–2012), data from [10]
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- The high proportion of large coal-fired power plants and lack of gas-fired genera-
tors makes the Chinese power system less 
flexible. At the same time, an increasing 
share of electricity generated from intermit-
tent renewable energy is increasing the 
demand for system flexibility.
3.2.2 Power consumption
Since the 1980 s, the increase in China’s power 
consumption has been mainly driven by industrial 
growth. In 2011, more than 70 % of China’s electric-
ity was consumed by the industrial sector [15]. The 
residential sector accounted for approximately 12 % 
and the commercial sector for 3 % (see . Table A.1 
in the appendix). One reason for the high propor-
tion of industrial loads in China is the focus on 
producing and exporting energy-intensive materi-
als and goods [7]. While it is still relatively high in 
comparison to countries with a focus on less energy-
intensive sectors [16], China’s overall energy inten-
sity of production (defined as energy consumption 
per unit of GDP) has been decreasing consistently 
due to a number of government measures to pro-
mote energy efficiency (see . Fig. 3.4).
China’s economy is gradually shifting away from 
heavy industry towards high value-added industries, 
such as information technologies and the service sec-
tor [12]. The composition of the electricity consump-
tion is projected to change in the coming decades. 
Shares of residential and commercial electricity con-
sumption are expected to increase. As a consequence, 
a predicted increase in load variability and range of 
fluctuation will soon require a higher flexibility of 
electric power generation [12]. In addition, industrial 
demand for reliable and high-quality electricity is ex-
pected to increase due to the growing importance 
of information technology in all economic sectors.
Challenges in China’s power consumption 
sector- The efficiency of energy and electricity use is low.  - Future energy demand from high value-added industries will require high power 











 . Fig. 3.4 Energy intensity per unit of GDP (1991–2011), data from [10]
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will be more variable in nature, thus requir-
ing a higher degree of flexibility in the 
Chinese power system.- There is a mismatch between the current power generation system with its limited 
flexibility and an increasing demand for 
flexible generation due to a projected shift 
in electricity consumption patterns towards 
more variability in demand.
3.2.3 Power logistics
Disparity between power generation and con-
sumption Coal supplies are mainly located in the 
northwestern, northern, and northeastern parts of 
China (sometimes referred to as “Three Norths”). 
Similarly, wind resources are concentrated in the 
three northern regions as well as along China’s coast. 
Solar energy resources are abundant in the west and 
north of China. Hydro power is concentrated in the 
southwest and in the upstream areas of the Yellow 
River. While energy resources are most abundant 
in China’s north and west, regions that are typically 
remote and less economically developed, the load is 
concentrated in the economic and industrial centers 
along China’s eastern coast. This discrepancy pres-
ents a major challenge for power logistics (transmis-
sion) as well as for the physical transportation of 
fossil resources and puts a heavy strain on power 
grid and road/railway infrastructure.
Grid infrastructure The regional disparity between 
energy resource distribution and load profile on the 
one hand and between the geographical location of 
electricity generation facilities and major centers 
of consumption on the other means that electricity 
has to be transported from north to south and from 
west to east. However, China does not have a na-
tionally integrated electricity network. Its network 
is fragmented into six regional grids with limited 
interconnection operated by three grid companies: 
SGCC, China Southern Power Grid (CSG) and the 
Inner Mongolia Grid Company (for a more compre-
hensive overview of China’s power lines please refer 
to . Table A.2 in the appendix).
Aside from the limited capacity of interconnec-
tors between the regional networks, interregional 
electricity trade is also heavily impeded by ad-
ministrative barriers. Regional grids are made up 
of provincial grids, where dispatch decisions are 
made with the aim of balancing supply and demand 
within the boundaries. For cross-border power trad-
ing, provinces have to conclude bilateral contracts 
specifying the annual amount of electricity trans-
mitted in each direction typically netting close to 
zero [17]. This way of restricting interregional trade 
makes it difficult to leverage the power system’s in-
herent flexibility potential across regional borders, 
e. g. the use of dispatchable hydro power capacities 
for peak generation and ancillary services in other 
regions [12]. 
Around the turn of the century, in an effort to 
speed up nationwide grid integration and to con-
nect regions with significant hydro power, solar, and 
wind capacities with the load centers on the east 
coast, China started to construct Ultra High Voltage 
(UHV) power transmission lines. Today, China is 
considered a global leader in UHV transmission and 
transformation technology [18]. Specifically, UHV 
alternating current (AC) lines are used for transmit-
ting electricity generated in coal-fired power plants 
or by means of RES from China’s northern and west-
ern regions to the load centers. UHV direct current 
(DC) lines are used for transmitting hydro power 
from South and Central China to the east coast.
Asset utilization and supply security Compared 
to other countries, for instance the United States, 
average utilization rates of the grid infrastructure 
in China are low in spite of the rather flat load 
curve [19]. Major transmission lines, for example, 
seldom reach a high utilization rate. In 2011, for in-
stance, two 800-kV lines for which data are available 
reached utilization rates of less than 35 %. Only five 
of eleven trans-regional lines with 500- and 660-kV 
achieved utilization rates above 50 % [20]. At the 
level of distribution grids, average utilization rates 
of 10-kV lines and transformers are even lower and 
only seldom reach values above 30 % [19]. 
In principle, low utilization rates point to a large 
margin for grid operation often resulting in a high 
level of system stability and security. In the specific 
case of China, average annual outage times of urban 
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users during the last years exceeded seven hours (see 
. Table A.3 in the appendix) and those of rural users 
even ten hours [19]. In Germany, to give a reference 
value from an industrialized country, average an-
nual outage times were only approximately 15 min-
utes in 2010. This evidence points to low levels of 
equipment maturity in parts of the electric power 
grid (see also [21], [22]). In recent years, invest-
ments in distribution grids have been considerably 
smaller than those in transmission grids [12]. Most 
line losses and power outages in China occur in the 
distribution grid [19] pointing to less sophisticated 
equipment in the distribution grid compared to the 
transmission grid (see also [21]). 
Investment needs in the grid infrastructure In the 
coming years, massive investments will have to be 
made in the electric power grid in order to cope 
with the steadily rising power consumption, in-
crease supply security, and facilitate the integration 
of wind and PV power. It is projected that, in 2020, 
the total length of power lines of 110 kV and above 
will reach 1.76 million kilometers with an associ-
ated transformer capacity of 7.9 billion kVA [23]. 
This represents a considerable increase compared to 
line length and transformer capacities in 2010 (see 
. Table A.2 in the appendix).
Challenges in China’s power logistics 
sector:- The regional disparity between power gen-eration and consumption in combination 
with barriers to interregional electricity ex-
change imposes a constraint on the efficient 
use and delivery of energy resources.- The barriers to interregional electricity exchange make it difficult to fully exploit the 
flexibility potential inherent in the power 
system.- Asset utilization rates of China’s electric power grids are below those of highly indus-
trialized countries such as the United States 
in spite of China’s rather flat load curve. - Supply security in China is considerably lower than in highly industrialized countries. 
There is evidence that a large part of power 
outages and line losses in China originate 
from distribution grids. This indicates that 
distribution grid equipment is less mature 
and sophisticated than transmission grid 
equipment. 
3.3 Smart grid development 
in China
3.3.1 Motivation for smart grids 
in China
Smart grids for increasing supply security A core 
motivation for smart grids in China is their sus-
pected positive impact on supply security. In China, 
especially distribution grids with voltage levels 
of 10-kV and less are limiting reliability for urban 
end-user’s, causing roughly 80 % of all power black-
outs [19]. Due to missing sensoring and monitoring 
technologies, it often takes a long time to analyze 
the respective line, locate and isolate the fault, and 
re-establish electricity supply [19]. 
Enhancing distribution grids with smart grid 
technologies such as advanced sensoring and con-
trol technologies is often seen as a means to improve 
the reliability of the whole electric power system in 
China (see e. g. [19]).
Smart grids for facilitating peak shaving The 
rapid growth of electricity consumption reflected 
in very high peak loads may cause shortages on 
the generation side and network congestions. 
Also, the rising importance of residential electric-
ity consumption compared to industrial electricity 
consumption will lead to a more pronounced load 
curve. This trend could be further accentuated by 
China’s continuing urbanization process [24]. With 
low gas generation capacities and limited transmis-
sion capacities, coal-fired power plants are mainly 
employed for load-following and peak generation 
in China. This reduces their operational efficiency. 
Peak shaving is of critical importance as it contrib-
utes to a reduction of peak loads and thus helps to 
avoid peak generation. Peak shaving might also re-
duce potential network congestions when demand 
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peaks occurring in periods of network congestions 
are reduced via demand side management. As such, 
it should be seen as an important factor towards a 
more reliable power system in China. In addition, 
by reducing the maximum grid load, peak shaving 
helps to increase average utilization rates of the grid 
infrastructure, thus reducing investment needs and 
increasing the affordability of electricity supply.
To enable peak shaving and demand side man-
agement it is necessary to deploy an ICT infrastruc-
ture for two-way communications between end-
users – or so-called prosumers if they also generate 
electricity – and grid operators. Together with other 
smart grid technologies facilitating real-time data ex-
change, visualization of information as well as control 
of devices, this infrastructure enables the grid opera-
tor to have a clear picture of electricity consumption 
and generation at any given time, while allowing end-
users to receive price signals to adapt their electricity 
consumption to the variable supply.
Smart grids for preparing extensive integration 
of RES China has aggressively expanded RES gen-
eration capacities within an extremely short time 
frame. Grid connection of RES is currently lagging 
behind and a considerable amount of RES-E is cur-
tailed. In this context, smart grid technologies are 
often seen as a means to reduce RES integration 
costs: - Large-capacity battery storage systems facili-tate the integration of centralized large-scale 
intermittent RES generation capacities of the 
type that are currently focused upon in China.1- Due to frequent network congestions at the lo-cal level, a considerable quantity of electricity 
generation from RES has to be curtailed. More 
effective grid capacity management using 
smart grid technologies could reduce curtail-
ment of RES.- Smart grid technologies such as microgrids and virtual power plants ease the integration of 
RES at the local level.
1 One example for the trend towards large-capacity battery 
storage are the activities of BYD. The Chinese manufacturer 
of automobiles and rechargeable batteries built one of the 
world’s largest lithium-ion battery energy storage systems, 
a 36-megawatt-hour system, located in Zhangbei, Hebei 
[52].
- The grid connection itself might be more effec-tive with smart grid technologies. One aspira-
tion expressed in this area is that RES might 
be integrated into grid operation via standard-
ized ICT connectors so that the integration of 
standard RES plants might become as easy as 
connecting external devices with computers 
via universal serial bus (USB) interfaces (plug-
and-play integration) [25].
3.3.2 China’s technological view 
of the smart grid
The development of smart grids in China An 
early form of smart grids was proposed in 1999 by 
Lu and Mei [26] in their article Basic research on 
vital scientific problem with collapse prevention and 
optimal operation of large scale power systems [27]. 
Five years later, distributed computing was applied 
in a research project for a real-time simulation of 
the entire power grid [27]. In 2007, the East China 
Grid Company, a subsidiary of SGCC, carried out a 
feasibility study on smart grids that examined the 
promotion of digital substations and build-up of a 
unified enterprise platform for power system data 
[27]. 
The grid operator’s view on smart grids Since 
then, China’s smart grid development has mainly 
been pushed forward by China’s grid operators, 
SGCC and CSG. In 2009, SGCC proposed the stra-
tegic goal of building strong and smart grids with 
Chinese characteristics. SGCC focuses on the na-
tionwide integration of provincial and regional grids 
by means of a strong UHV AC backbone. The first 
objective of this backbone grid is to ease the balanc-
ing and power exchange between different regions, 
the second to integrate large-scale generation from 
RES. CSG, on the other hand, envisages a smart 
grid with a more decentralized focus using pri-
marily high voltage direct current (HVDC) links as 
backbone systems. CSG intends to integrate remote 
energy sources, especially hydro power. HVDC 
development will lead to separated asynchronous 
provincial grids. The nationwide synchronization of 
China’s power grids is not one of CSG’s main goals. 
Comparing both strategies reveals that the two grid 
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operators pursue different approaches with regard 
to the type of transmission technology and the na-
tionwide synchronization of China’s power grids.
In spite of this disagreement, the smart grid vi-
sions of both grid operators concentrate mainly on 
the upgrade of transmission grids: a look at the total 
annual smart grid revenues from the most impor-
tant smart grid technologies in China reveals that 
currently more than 50 % of revenue is related to 
upgrades of transmission grids. Substation and dis-
tribution automation technologies are responsible 
for no more than a low share of overall smart grid 
revenues (see . Fig. 3.5). According to markets 
forecasts for 2020, the absolute increase in smart 
grid revenues related to transmission upgrades is 
significantly higher than the increases of revenues 
from substation automation, distribution automa-
tion, and AMI (see . Fig. 3.5).
The government’s view on smart grids China’s gov-
ernment has already acknowledged the importance 
of smart grids for China’s future energy system. In 
its  12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development, the People’s National Congress 
explicitly set the goal of accelerating smart grid de-
velopments in China (see [27]). In the Decision of the 
State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and De-
velopment of Strategic Emerging Industries, the State 
Council also underlined the importance of speeding 
up the development of smart grids (see [27]). 
In addition to the general commitment to smart 
grids, NEA also issued a general definition of smart 
grids:
» Smart grid technologies have the purpose to 
integrate new energy, materials and equipment 
as well as advanced technologies in information, 
automatic control and energy storage for realizing 
digital management, intelligent decision-making 
and interactive transaction in power generation, 
transmission, distribution, consumption and 
storage. Furthermore, smart grid assets optimize 
the resource allocation and satisfy diverse needs 
of customers as well as ensure the safety, reliability 
and cost-efficiency of power supply. Finally, the 
new technology [in the sense of smart technology] 
bridges the constraint of environmental protec-
tion and the development of the power market.
Moreover, the Chinese government supports the 
technological development of main smart grid 
technologies by means of innovation policies 
 . Fig. 3.5 Annual overall smart grid revenue of main smart grid technologies in China (© Navigant Research [28])
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such as standardization and R&D funding (see 
▶ Sect. 3.4.6). However, in contrast to both grid op-
erators, the Chinese government has not yet devel-
oped a perspective of its own on the technological 
and organizational design of China’s smart grids. As 
a result, the discussion of such aspects is still domi-
nated by the grid operators and there is currently 
no unanimously accepted comprehensive view of 
smart grids in China. 
This lack of common understanding among the 
main stakeholders is the cause of many controver-
sies and basic disagreements on the key aspects of 
smart grid development [27]. The absence of such a 
common vision increases uncertainty for potential 
smart grid investors because the profitability of their 
investments critically depends on whether a strong 
and smart or a decentralized smart grid will be real-
ized. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive smart grid 
vision has to be viewed as an obstacle towards the 
development of smart grids in China [27].
Main challenges with regard to the 
technological view of smart grids- Due to the contrary strategies of China’s grid operators on the subject of smart grid 
development and the absence of a Chinese 
government view on smart grids, there is 
still no unanimously accepted vision on the 
technological and organizational design 
of smart grids in China. As a result, there is 
much uncertainty among potential smart 
grid investors regarding the future develop-
ment. 
3.3.3 This study’s view on smart 
grids in China
The present study has a clear focus on proposing 
regulatory policies supporting the evolution of 
smart grids in China. The creation of a widely ac-
cepted technological smart grid vision is beyond 
the study’s scope. Nonetheless, a common under-
standing of desirable smart grid developments 
during the next years is necessary to determine the 
general direction of the regulatory recommenda-
tions. Given the missing unanimously accepted 
smart grid vision in China, a pragmatic three-sided 
approach was employed to develop such a common 
understanding:- Following a bottom-up approach, China’s future smart grid is considered to comprise a 
broad portfolio of ICT together with vari-
ous modern technologies for power genera-
tion, transmission, distribution, storage, and 
consumption.2 This also includes modern 
grid technologies such as UHV transmission 
grids or heat-resistant wires. A recent litera-
ture review supports this view by underlining 
that smart grids in China focus on all sections 
of the power system, including smart power 
generation, transmission, deployment, usage 
and storage. Specifically, the integration of RES 
should also be understood as part of the topic 
of smart grids in China [27].- The smartness of the current electric power grid as well as the desirable smartness of the 
power grid in 2020 was assessed. In particu-
lar, the current levels of system integration of 
single power system components as well as the 
projected levels in 2020 were described. In this 
context, system integration refers to the extent 
to which power plants, wind farms, trans-
mission grids, distribution grids, and power 
consumers are expected to be remotely moni-
torable, controllable, or even autonomously 
controllable (self-healing).3 - Given the government’s will to establish energy markets, the study compares market elements 
used in China today with those projected for 
2020.4
This three sided-approach has led to the following 
conclusions:- China has in recent years made important breakthroughs in the development of smart 
grid technologies. Examples for such technolo-
2 Please refer to appendix B for a complete overview of all 
modern technologies that are subsumed under the smart 
grid label in this study.
3 Please refer to appendix C for a complete overview of the 
results. 
4 Please refer to appendix C in for a complete overview of 
the results of this discussion.
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gies are UHV transmission grids and large-
capacity battery energy storage technology.5 - On the other hand, a big leap forward with regard to many smart grid technologies is 
indispensable at all stages of the smart grid 
supply chain.6 Like in many other countries 
engaged in the development of smart grids, 
some of China’s key smart grid technologies 
are still immature and have somewhat incon-
sistent component specifications and standards 
[21], [22], [27].- In 2020, market elements such as regional energy marketplaces and virtual power plants 
are intended to be used much more intensively 
than today. They will be introduced at least on 
provincial level. 
With the study’s focus on regulatory issues in mind 
and in light of the conclusions described above, the 
regulatory pathways presented in this study aim 
specifically at:- facilitating the widespread deployment in 2020 of those smart grid technologies which have 
already achieved high maturity levels today. 
In this context, smart grid technologies also 
include modern grid technologies which are 
not necessarily included in smart grid concepts 
of other countries;- promoting technological innovations of rather immature smart grid technologies and increase 
their maturity;- promoting the development of so-called smart markets (see ▶ Sect. 4.3.2 for more details on 
smart markets). In this context, an important 
prerequisite is the integration of third parties. 
They are seen as key players in smart markets. 
5 Please refer to appendix B for a complete list and descrip-
tion of these technologies. 
6 Please refer to appendix C for an overview of the necessary 
technological advancement during the next years.
3.4 The regulation of China’s 
electric power system
3.4.1 Policy setting and fundamental 
institutions
Policy Setting 
Government leadership is essential to promote 
smart grid development. The general strategy of 
policy-makers towards the development of the fu-
ture power system, often containing quite specific 
targets for short-term and long-term development, 
is important for companies and other stakeholders 
in the electric power sector: indeed, this govern-
ment strategy serves as an important basis for smart 
grid investment decisions of both companies and 
households. 
The Chinese government has set quite specific 
targets with regard to the development of the energy 
system until 2015. However, there are no explicit 
targets beyond this point in time. The most impor-
tant government targets for 2015 are briefly sum-
marized below:- From 2010 to 2015, generation and grid capacities are planned to increase by roughly 
50 % in order to cope with the steadily growing 
demand. - RES generation capacities are expected to increase out of proportion – their share in the 
electricity mix will increase significantly.- Average utilization rates of the grid infra-structure and supply security are targeted to 
increase. Specifically, power outages on the 
level of distribution grids, are expected to be 
reduced.- The efficiency of energy use and particularly of electricity use is planned to improve consider-
ably.
A detailed overview of government targets for 
China’s future electric power sector is given in 
▶ Sect. 6.1 in the context of the regulatory pathways. 
Fundamental institutions 
To realize the government agenda, ministries and 
other government institutions issue laws and ordi-
nances, monitor compliance with these laws and or-
dinances, propose major technological standards, 
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and promote innovations. The question regarding 
whether the different government practices can be 
executed effectively largely depends on the gover-
nance structure of ministries and government in-
stitutions.
Governance structure The governance structure of 
China’s energy system, and in particular the power 
sector, has been subject to frequent reorganization 
and currently comprises a broad variety of minis-
tries and institutions. The fragmentation of respon-
sibilities among a multiplicity of different stakehold-
ers makes conflicts of competence inevitable and a 
coherent and continuous governance of the power 
sector difficult [2].
. Figure 3.6 presents a graphical overview of 
the main authorities of China’s power sector gov-
ernance (. Table A.4 in the appendix further speci-
fies influences, roles, and responsibilities of main 
governmental institutions). There are four main 
government authorities involved in China’s power 
sector policy:- The State Council (SC) is the highest executive organ of the People’s Republic of China. With 
regard to the electricity sector it sets the politi-
cal agenda, takes the lead for major reforms 
and is in charge of promulgating major plans 
like the Five-Year Plan for energy develop-
ment.- The NDRC is an agency under SC exerting broad administrative and planning control 
over the Chinese economy. It is the most im-
portant government authority for power sector 
regulation. Its powers include the regulation 
and setting of energy and electricity prices, 
the approval of major power sector projects, as 
well as energy efficiency policy.- The NEA proposes the energy development strategy, drafts energy development plans as 
well as energy-related policies, provisions and 
laws to be adopted by NDRC or SC. NEA also 
advises on power system reform and market 
regulation. In addition to these political func-
tions, NEA is the regulatory authority for the 
power sector in charge of regulating power sys-
tem construction, power safety, power supply 
and service, as well as tariff and information 
disclosure.
- The State-owned Asset Supervision and Ad-ministration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) supervises the performance of SOE 
such as the grid operators and the major power 
generation companies. SASAC exerts its power 
through the right to appoint, dismiss and eval-
uate the performance of executives, the right to 
audit as well as to approve key decisions.
The existing literature on China’s governance struc-
ture in the electric power sector (see for example 
[2], [3], and [30]) often stresses several regulatory 
challenges potentially preventing an effective devel-
opment towards smart grids in China: - There is a significant fragmentation as well as overlap of responsibilities of the various 
government bodies involved in power system 
regulation, negatively affecting the efficiency of 
the sector’s governance.- In international comparison, China’s major institutions governing the energy sector have a 
rather low number of employees, staff numbers 
not always being adequate to fulfill the respon-
sibility of regulating an electricity system the 
size of China.- The importance of the previous aspect even in-creases when the size and the power of China’s 
major grid operators are taken into account. 
The grid operators’ stakes are so high that it 
always pays off for them to hire consultants, 
lawyers, and lobbyists to argue their case. To 
address these claims, the regulator needs to be 
equipped with a sufficient number of highly 
qualified employees.- Essential instruments to steer power sector development, like electricity pricing, remain 
under the authority of NDRC. The concentra-
tion of power within NDRC limits the ability 
of NEA to drive power sector reform.
Regulatory challenges in the area of policy 
setting and fundamental institutions- Efficient governance of the power sector is impeded by overlapping responsibilities 
and conflicts of interests between different 
government authorities.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 . Fig. 3.6 Key Actors of China’s Power Sector Governance, (© GIZ [29])
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- In international comparison, NEA is under-staffed, underfunded and without sufficient 
power to make independent decisions. The 
lack of independence and law enforcement 
authority has a negative effect on regulatory 
performance.- The concentration of power within NDRC limits the ability of NEA to drive power sec-
tor reform.
3.4.2 Market structure
The market structure and especially the involve-
ment of new market actors is a critical factor with 
regard to the innovation potential in the smart grid 
development process. The following paragraphs 
will describe the governance structures between the 
companies at the various stages of the supply chain 
(vertical market structure) and the competitive con-
ditions for the companies in each part of the supply 
chain (horizontal market structure).
Vertical market structure The competences and 
responsibilities of China’s power system supply 
chain have been tightly bundled over a long period 
of time. The main electricity sector reform of 2002 
mandated the separation (or unbundling) of the 
state-owned vertically integrated utility into five big 
power generation companies, two major grid opera-
tors handling transmission, distribution and retail 
as well as four power service corporations. 
All of them are SOE. Under this market struc-
ture, the grid operators are assigned regional mo-
nopolies acting as single buyers from generation 
side as well as being the only seller with the elec-
tricity retail monopoly within their geographic area.
Horizontal market structure In the field of power 
generation, the five major power generation com-
panies, the so-called Big Five are responsible for 
roughly 50 % of China’s electricity generation. By 
means of its project approval process, NDRC tries 
to balance generation capacities between them [31]. 
Due to their size, the Big Five have a significant lob-
bying force contributing to China’s power system 
governance together with the government and the 
grid operators. The remaining part of China’s power 
is generated by thousands of smaller local and re-
gional generation companies. In addition, there are 
specialized generation companies mainly focusing 
on power generation from one energy source, e. g. 
hydro or nuclear power. China’s power generation 
sector can be described as liberalized, as it poten-
tially allows competition between the different com-
panies. However, compared to local governments 
or state-owned companies, private and foreign in-
vestors still face significant legal and administrative 
barriers restricting the development of a diverse 
ownership structure [2].
Power transmission, distribution and retail are 
currently vertically integrated and operated by two 
major SOE with geographical monopolies includ-
ing electricity retail: SGCC controls the eastern, 
central, northwestern, northern and northeastern 
grids; while CSG is in charge of the southern grid. In 
the sparsely populated province of Inner Mongolia, 
an independent grid operator, the Inner Mongolia 
Electric Power Corporation, controls the western 
part of the grid while SGCC controls the eastern 
part. Due to their importance for the development 
of China’s power system, both SGCC and CSG are 
briefly introduced below:- State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), an SOE, is the 7th biggest company in the world 
according to the 2012 Fortune Global 500 list, 
with almost 1.6 million employees [32]. SGCC 
is responsible for power transmission, distri-
bution, and retail in all five major regions of 
China with the exception of South China. Its 
operations cover 26 provinces, autonomous re-
gions and municipalities – 88 % of the national 
territory – and 83 % of the national power 
consumption [33] (see . Table A.5 in the ap-
pendix for a list of affiliated grid operators). 
The company has ministry-like status and is 
a powerful force in power sector governance 
[34]. - China Southern Power Grid (CSG), also an SOE, ranks at position 152 on the Fortune 
Global 500 list and has roughly 300,000 em-
ployees. CSG is responsible for power trans-
mission, distribution, and retail in the five 
provinces of South China, covering 12 % of 
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the national territory and 17 % of the national 
power consumption [33].
Both grid operators are currently expanding their 
business portfolios across the value chain: SGCC 
has taken over domestic engineering firms and lead-
ing electric power equipment manufacturers, raising 
concerns about conflicts of interests and a threat to 
competition due to the concentration of multiple 
roles within one company (i. e. roles standard set-
ting, manufacturing equipment, transmitting and 
selling electricity). 
At the same time, SGCC is pursuing a “going 
global” strategy targeting the acquisition of assets 
abroad [35]. The advancing vertical integration of 
SGCC has caused discussion as to whether its merg-
ers and acquisitions go against China’s power sector 
reform policies of downsizing and unbundling grid 
operators. Recently a potential separation of grid 
operators into transmission and distribution com-
panies or into smaller, regional businesses has been 
subject of debate [34].
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of market structure- Transmission, distribution and retail of China’s electricity are in the hands of two 
grid operators. There is no competition in 
the power retail sector.- The acquisitions of grid operators in other segments of the value chain (e. g. equipment 
manufacturing and services) threaten fair 
competition in these sectors.- The size and power of grid operators makes it difficult to regulate them.
3.4.3 Market design and RES 
integration
The question regarding how electricity markets are 
designed is highly important for the development of 
smart grids because market design affects electric-
ity pricing. Pricing mechanisms, including feed-in 
tariffs for RES, are of crucial importance with regard 
to the utilization of different generation sources, 
investment decisions for new generation and grid 
capacities, day-to-day power consumption patterns, 
and investments in power saving technologies. 
General market design Prices for energy resources, 
power system equipment and electricity were fixed 
by the government for a long period of time. In the 
1980 s, the government started to gradually liber-
alize coal prices. Coal is currently at least partly 
traded at variable market prices, either depending 
on spot market rates or on individually negotiated 
contracts [31]. 
Irrespective of market liberalization tendencies, 
China still lacks a formal and transparent mecha-
nism for linking real costs and prices of electricity 
[12]. Electricity markets with prices based on supply 
and demand do not exist in China. Two types of 
electricity prices exist in China:- On-grid prices are the prices power generators receive from their grid operator for each kWh 
generated.- Retail prices are the prices grid operators (which are also responsible for retail) charge to 
end consumers for each kWh consumed.
Both prices are fixed by the price department of 
NDRC and adjusted every 18–24 months.7
Setting on-grid prices NDRC determines on-grid 
prices for power generation using two different ap-
proaches: - On-grid prices for thermal generators are set using a price benchmark for generators within 
the same technology class. Each power plant 
is contractually guaranteed a certain capacity 
factor (number of full load hours) equal to 
comparable facilities. The equal capacity factor 
is based on an estimate of annual power output 
as well as on average fixed and variable costs.- On-grid prices assigned to owners of hydro power and nuclear power plants differ from 
facility to facility. They are the sum of the 
7 Jointly with local and provincial price bureaus, the price 
department of NDRC is responsible for the formulation, 
inspection, approval and establishment of the tariff, as well 
as for the supervision and inspection of the tariff imple-
mentation. In addition to NDRC, the NEA may put forward 
suggestions to the price department of NDRC.
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plant’s generation costs, governmental taxes 
and surcharges, and profits attributed to the 
plant owner [2] [12]. 
To give a short overview of the results of these 
price-setting mechanisms, the following list shows 
on-grid prices for electricity stemming from differ-
ent conventional generation technologies in 2012 
(prices from [31]):- Gas-fired power plants: 0.395–0.710 RMB/kWh- Coal-fired power plants: 0.311–0.520 RMB/kWh- Nuclear power plants: 0.414–0.471 RMB/kWh- Hydro power plants: 0.145–0.411 RMB/kWh
Consequences of on-grid price setting Both price 
setting approaches ensure that plant operators usu-
ally earn revenues sufficient for the repayment of 
their investment costs within one decade [2]. That 
is, in principle, both approaches are sufficient to in-
centivize investments in power generation capaci-
ties. However, such price setting approaches based 
on costs are often viewed quite critically in the eco-
nomic literature (see e. g. [36], [37], and [38]): for 
example, they are quite time-consuming for the reg-
ulator. In China, the following aspects have to be em-
phasized with regard to the setting of on-grid prices: - Due to the fact that coal prices are flexible while on-grid electricity tariffs for coal-fired 
power plants are strictly regulated and adjusted 
rather infrequently, power companies are not 
able to directly pass on changes in fuel costs. 
During periods of high coal prices, power 
companies have seen their revenues squeezed 
to such an extent that they have restricted 
generation in order to limit their losses. This 
behavior further aggravates the problem of 
missing generation capacities and contributes 
to the emergence of power outages.- The approach used to set on-grid prices of hydro power and nuclear power plants gives 
few incentives to save costs, because potential 
cost savings in one specific power plant would 
lead to lower on-grid prices for the plant within 
18–24 months. Even more, such approaches 
give an incentive to exaggerate generation costs 
by means of creative financial accounting to 
receive higher on-grid prices [38].
Setting of retail prices Retail prices are amended 
from province to province to account for policy 
goals and status of economic development. They are 
also differentiated according to end user groups. The 
current national averages of electricity retail prices 
for different consumer groups are: - Commercial: 0.863 RMB/kWh,- Non-residential lighting: 0.791 RMB/kWh,- Industrial use: 0.698 RMB/kWh,- Residential: 0.498 RMB/kWh,- Agriculture: 0.419 RMB/kWh,- Irrigation in poor areas: 0.201 RMB/kWh.
Retail tariffs are subject to cross-subsidization in 
certain market segments to account for differences 
in income and to ensure social stability. Tariffs for 
residential, agriculture, irrigation and drainage use, 
together reflecting about 20 % of the Chinese power 
consumption, are lower than average generation 
costs. It is notable that industrial users generally pay 
higher tariffs than households. 
Consequences of retail price setting The main 
disadvantage of low retail prices is that a low price 
level does not incentivize consumers to use power 
more efficiently. There is evidence that residential 
electricity consumers in China are quite sensitive to 
changes in electricity price levels [39]. Thus, increas-
ing electricity prices would probably lead to signifi-
cant reductions of electricity consumption among 
Chinese households. However, increasing electricity 
prices for residential consumers is not a political op-
tion in China given the government’s intention to 
keep prices for residential consumers low. Therefore, 
China currently employs a number of other retail 
pricing policies that serve to align economic and 
environmental targets of the electricity sector [1]:- A three-tiered pricing system has been applied to residential consumers since mid-2012. Elec-
tricity prices are set in blocks with higher rates 
for customers with a large electricity consump-
tion (referred to as inclining block pricing).- In addition, China has implemented a policy differentiating the electricity tariffs based on 
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the energy efficiency of industrial processes. 
The policy, which is applied to eight energy-in-
tensive industries, aims at phasing out outdated 
industrial capacities or incentivizing upgrades.
Promotion and integration of RES Feed-in tariffs 
have proven to be an efficient instrument to pro-
mote RES in China. They are paid to RES genera-
tion installations depending on the type of renew-
able energy and location of the installations. Feed-in 
tariffs for RES generation are considerably higher 
than on-grid prices for hydro power and coal-fired 
power plants. In 2012, the ranges for feed-in tariffs 
of different RES generation types in 2012 were [31]:- Solar: 1.00 RMB/kWh- Biomass: 0.56–0.77 RMB/kWh- Wind: 0.51–0.61 RMB/kWh
The Renewable Energy Law obliges grid operators 
to feed in renewably generated electricity. The re-
sulting costs are socialized through a renewable 
energy surcharge levied on all electricity users in 
China [31].8 Since the initial publication of the 2006 
Renewable Energy Law, the renewable energy sur-
charge has been adjusted three times, with the last 
increase from 0.008 to 0.015 RMB/kWh taking place 
in September 2013. To ensure that the grid compa-
nies do not misuse the surcharge, it is turned over 
to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in a first step. The 
grid companies then apply to MOF and NEA for 
the disbursement of these funds with supporting 
documentation [40]. This procedure causes a delay 
in the reimbursement of grid operators’ expenses 
for purchasing power generated from renewables, 
which in turn results in a lack of operating capital 
with serious effects on the whole supply chain. Grid 
operators delay payments to wind power develop-
ers, who in turn are unable to pay renewable energy 
equipment manufacturers (e. g. wind turbines), re-
sulting in delayed payment of component suppliers. 
This situation is expected to be alleviated with the 
recent doubling of the renewable energy surcharge. 
From the grid operator’s perspective, delays in reim-
bursement may be seen as a reason to delay the grid 
connection of renewable energy generators.
8 Note that agricultural uses and power consumers in Tibet 
are excepted from the surcharge [43]. 
Regulatory challenges in the area of 
market design and RES integration- On-grid and retail electricity prices do not reflect actual costs and are adjusted only 
infrequently. - The approach used for setting on-grid prices of hydro and nuclear power plants gives 
only few incentives for cost savings. Rather 
it gives incentives to exaggerate costs to 
achieve a higher on-grid price.- Although a system of tiered prices has been introduced for residential consumers, the 
low overall level of retail electricity prices 
does not provide sufficient incentives for 
consumers to use power more efficiently.- Delays in the disbursement of RES funds leads to a lack of operating capital along the 
renewable energy value chain and provides 
a disincentive for grid operators to connect 
RES plants to the grid.
3.4.4 Development of infrastructure 
and network regulation
This section explains how grid planning is done 
in China and how investments in the (smart) grid 
infrastructure are incentivized. The pertinent regu-
latory practices directly impact the stable and af-
fordable operation of the current grid infrastructure 
and the investments in the prospective smart grid 
infrastructure.
Network expansion planning The government’s 
key target is cost-efficient extension and develop-
ment of the power grid in order to cope with the 
steadily increasing electricity consumption and 
minimize supply interruptions.
Targets on the development of grid infrastruc-
ture and grid operators’ performance are specified 
by the government in a top-down process. However, 
little information is publicly available on official grid 
expansion plans [41]. As a result, the document 
Framework and Roadmap for Strong and Smart Grid 
Standards, published by SGCC in 2010 [42], serves 
as an unofficial (smart) grid development plan in 
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China [41]. With respect to grid expansion plan-
ning, there is little guidance from the government 
and little coordination among existing power sys-
tem stakeholders. 
Network regulation At present, there is no ex-
plicit price for transmission and distribution (net-
work charge) based on actual costs. The source of 
grid operators’ income is the difference between 
the on-grid and the retail price for electricity. This 
amount covers all costs of the grid operators: grid 
operation and maintenance, grid upgrade and ex-
pansion, management, metering and billing, etc. 
The remainder makes up the profits of the grid op-
erator. The government targets a rate-of-return for 
the grid operators in the range of about 8 to 10 % 
[43]. This practice, in combination with the rather 
infrequent adjustments of the retail electricity tar-
iffs, has an impact on the ability of grid companies 
to quickly and predictably recoup costs. In turn, 
the grid companies may exhibit little motivation to 
invest and assume costs related to the implementa-
tion of government policies and regulations, e. g. for 
investments related to renewable grid connection 
and integration, investments in end-use energy ef-
ficiency or distributed generation [1]. Moreover, 
the cost structure of power sector companies lacks 
transparency and power sector data and informa-
tion available to the public is very limited. Opaque 
costs affect the government’s ability to regulate and 
inform the setting of electricity prices.
There are no clear rules for accounting of costs, 
revenues, and profits and no transparent adminis-
trative process for setting allowed revenues. Without 
this foundation the government is unable to audit 
companies’ accounting records or exact penalties for 
noncompliance with reporting obligations, informa-
tion requests or other government requirements [1].
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of development of infrastructure 
and network regulation- Grid expansion planning is organized in a top-down process with low transparency 
and little involvement of players other than 
government authorities and grid operators.
- The price-setting mechanism with respect to wholesale and retail prices together with the 
rather infrequent adjustments of retail prices 
reduces the ability of grid companies to 
quickly recoup costs. This might reduce their 
willingness to incur costs related to other 
government policies (for instance related to 
RES integration).- A lack of transparency of costs impedes the efficient and informed regulation of power 
sector companies.
3.4.5 Coordination of generation 
and consumption
The following paragraphs describe general respon-
sibilities for coordinating electricity generation and 
consumption. Government measures implemented 
in this context are also presented.
Long-term coordination of generation and con-
sumption China’s rapid economic growth has 
resulted in a steadily increasing electricity con-
sumption. The Chinese government promotes the 
expansion of generation and grid capacities. In 
addition, the role of energy efficiency as an instru-
ment to decouple the rise of power consumption 
from economic growth has been recognized. Nu-
merous policies to promote energy efficiency have 
been promulgated: for instance, national targets for 
energy intensity, differential pricing for energy-in-
tensive industries and energy efficiency obligations 
requiring Chinese grid companies to realize energy 
conservation targets (e. g. through end-user energy 
efficiency programs).
Short-term coordination of generation Histori-
cally, dispatch of power plants in China is orga-
nized by means of a so-called equal shares dispatch 
or generation quota system. China allocates oper-
ating hours equally among the coal-fired genera-
tors that constitute the bulk of China’s generating 
capacity. This system is intended to give each gen-
erator an equal chance to recover capital costs and 
achieve a reasonable return-on-investment, but it 
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largely ignores the fact that plants within the coal 
fleet vary significantly in terms of efficiency and 
environmental performance [44]. Annual operat-
ing hours for generators are set administratively 
by Provincial Economic and Trade Commissions 
(PETC) and approved nationally by NDRC. As a 
result, the overall performance of the power sys-
tem has suffered significantly in terms of cost, 
environmental performance, and distorted invest-
ment decisions. The dependence of each coal-fired 
generator on running a similar guaranteed number 
of hours has become a major barrier to reforming 
dispatch in China.
In 2007, China started to pilot a so-called energy 
efficient dispatch system. This system sets a dispatch 
order prioritizing generators on the basis of heat and 
emissions rates favoring renewable and low carbon 
generation sources, with coal-fired power plants dis-
patched according to their thermal efficiency. This 
order is based on the priority order table created by 
PETC and is updated quarterly based on changes in 
generator parameters and the addition of new units 
[45]. Hence, the power generation quotas of power 
generation facilities are no longer guaranteed [46]. 
Since on-grid prices are calculated on the basis of a 
fixed estimate of annual operating hours, genera-
tors will face a revenue shortfall if average operat-
ing hours fall below the projected level [44]. One 
of the main drawbacks of the policy was a lack of 
compensation of power and grid companies for lost 
revenues due to the changes in dispatch. The pilot 
has proved to be difficult to implement and has not 
spread to the whole country [47].
Regardless of whether a generation quota or an 
energy-efficient dispatch system is used, the specific 
day-to-day dispatching is in the hand of dispatch 
centers under the authority of national, regional, 
provincial, or local grid companies. The dispatch 
centers take into account factors like load forecasts, 
the availability of power plants, and constraints for 
system reliability. On this basis, the dispatch cen-
ters set day-ahead commitment plans for the power 
plants. Power generation companies are subse-
quently obliged to supply power as required [44].
Short-term coordination of consumption Like 
in all other regions of the world, China’s intraday 
power generation follows intraday power demand. 
However, early attempts have been made to influ-
ence the hourly pattern of China’s power consump-
tion and to shift power consumption from peak 
times to off-peak times: since the 1990 s, many prov-
inces have started to coordinate power consump-
tion by means of interruptible loads and time-of-use 
prices:- Interruptible loads refer to a pricing mecha-nism in which large industrial consumers are 
paid for curtailing their loads in times of net-
work congestions. This demand response (DR) 
mechanism has been piloted and regionally 
applied in China [12].- Time-of-use pricing means that the electric-ity price varies depending on the time-of-day 
when electricity is provided. In times of net-
work congestions prices tend to be high to in-
centivize electricity consumers to reduce their 
consumption. With the 2005 Interim Provisions 
for the Administration of Power Selling Prices, 
the Chinese government stressed the role of 
time-of-use prices to reflect real costs at dif-
ferent day times [2]. Time-of-use pricing has 
been implemented mainly for industrial and 
commercial users [48]. In some regions, time-
of-use pricing is also applied to residential cus-
tomers. The Chinese government has recently 
announced that it will introduce time-of-use 
pricing for residential consumers on a national 
level by the end of 2015 [49]. Overall, it is still 
questionable whether the existing incentives 
are actually sufficient to induce customers to 
shift electricity consumption to off-peak times 
[2]. 
Regulatory challenges in the area 
of coordination of generation 
and consumption- The generation quota system ignores the fact that power plants within the coal fleet 
vary significantly in terms of efficiency and 
environmental performance. As a result, 
the overall performance of the system 
has suffered significantly in terms of cost, 
environmental performance and distorted 
investment decisions.
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- The dispatch model is closely linked to the electricity pricing mechanism; no dispatch 
reform can be introduced without a reform 
of electricity pricing, and such a reform 
would have to compensate coal power 
plants whose revenue is calculated on the 
basis of the existing dispatch model. - China has made remarkable progress with re-gard to the introduction of time-of-use pric-
ing. Such pricing mechanisms are planned 
to be applied to all categories of customers 
in 2015. However, it is unclear whether the 
specific design of time-of-use prices actually 
sets sufficient incentives for shifting electric-
ity use among all groups of customers. 
3.4.6 The role of information 
and communication
The government’s role in promoting smart grid-
related ICT The Chinese government promotes in-
novations surrounding smart grids mainly by focus-
ing on the supply of smart grid technologies: on the 
one hand, the Chinese government counts on public 
enterprises as main drivers of smart grid innova-
tions. On the other hand, it allocates significant fi-
nancial funds to promote R&D activities or to build 
up demonstration sites [50]. Specifically, in 2012 the 
MOST released a special plan for smart grids fo-
cusing on R&D and considering the 12th five-year 
period (from 2011 to 2015). The smart grid special 
plan focuses on three main strategic goals:- It is forward-looking and sets the agenda for the Chinese smart grid development after 
2015. It promotes the development of so-called 
cutting-edge smart grid technologies which 
might be deployed after 2015.- It aims at ensuring that existing modern tech-nologies such as those listed in appendix B are 
introduced very fast into the Chinese energy 
system.- It highlights that China must keep up with world-class smart grid research developments 
and should carry out cutting-edge smart grid 
technology research.
The general idea behind the smart grid special plan 
is that the development of smart grids should be 
business-orientated and primarily rely on the inno-
vation capacity of domestic companies, which are 
intended to achieve international technical domi-
nance by 2020. This will require a more profound 
and more effective involvement in international re-
search cooperation and standardization processes.
The promotion of smart grid standards is an-
other important channel for the government to in-
fluence the evolution of Chinese smart grids. One 
example for such activities is the work of the State 
Council, which has issued a plan for modifying and 
promoting the power equipment manufacturing in-
dustry [50]. Another example is the China Electric 
Power Research Institute directly emitting standards 
on Low Voltage Power Line Carrier Communication 
or Intelligent Control Network Data Terminal [50]. 
Policies focusing on the demand for smart grid 
technologies are of rather low importance for the 
Chinese government in its efforts to promote smart 
grids [50]. Note that this prevalence of supply-side 
policies together with the rather low importance of 
demand-side policies in China are a sign that, much 
like the situation in other countries, China’s smart 
grid industry is still in the initial phase of its devel-
opment [50].
The role of the ICT industry in promoting smart 
grids China’s ICT sector is representative of the 
massive changes in China’s industry and economy. 
Since the economic reforms in 1978, it has been 
growing rapidly with large inward and outward 
foreign direct investment flows and export-led ac-
tivities [51]. Today, most of China’s ICT companies 
are private companies that are not owned by the 
state. Many of them have been founded by foreign 
investors or companies. The Chinese strategy of 
building national champions has already yielded 
the creation of several ambitious companies which 
became global players [51]: Huawei Technologies, 
Lenovo, and ZTE are good examples of such com-
panies. Huawei and ZTE are major players in the 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Optical and 
Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM) 
equipment markets. Huawei Technologies in par-
ticular has emerged as a leading provider of tele-
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communications networks that increasingly chal-
lenges established competitors like Siemens, Cisco, 
and Alcatel [51].
Irrespective of the increasing importance of 
China’s ICT sector, most ICT companies have few 
stakes in the strategic development of China’s smart 
grid vision. Even though these companies act as 
component and technology suppliers, they are less 
engaged in the strategic development process, which 
is mainly pushed forward by the government, the 
grid companies, and the power generation compa-
nies.9 
Regulatory challenges in the area of the 
role of information and communication- There is a need for cutting-edge smart grid technology research to keep up with inter-
national level smart grid research develop-
ments. - China’s ICT industry consists of many ambi-tious and competitive companies, some of 
them global players. However, ICT industry is 
currently underrepresented in the strategic 
development of smart grids in China. There-
fore, the large innovation potential of the ICT 
sector risks not being fully integrated in the 
Chinese smart grid development. 
Key findings- In the past 15 years, a series of reforms have greatly improved the efficiency, reliability, and environ-
mental performance of the Chinese power sector. 
However, significant challenges remain: rapidly 
rising electricity demand, concerns about power 
system reliability and energy security, low average 
utilization rates of the grid infrastructure, environ-
mental degradation and climate change.- A core motivation for smart grids in China is their suspected positive impact on supply security and 
operational efficiency, especially on the distribu-
tion grid level. Peak shaving enabled by means of 
9 They seem to show even less engagement in China’s smart 
grid development than international players such as Cisco 
or IBM.
smart grid technologies plays an important role 
to increase supply security and operational effi-
ciency. Smart grid technologies are also seen as 
a means to reduce RES integration costs, which is 
of critical importance given the Chinese govern-
ment’s aggressive RES expansion targets.- Due to the absence of a common smart grid view in China and the contrary strategies on smart grid 
development among China’s grid operators, there 
is still no unanimously accepted technological and 
organizational concept of smart grids in China. As 
a result, the uncertainty of potential smart grid 
investors regarding the future technological de-
velopment is high.- Some regulatory aspects of China’s electric power system represent barriers for the effective and ef-
ficient development of smart grids in China:
– The absence of government guidelines for the 
long-term development of the electric power 
sector, overlapping responsibilities and conflicts 
of interests between different government au-
thorities, and the lack of independence and law 
enforcement of the regulatory authority point 
to insufficient government leadership with re-
gard to smart grid development. 
– The market structure is dominated by China’s 
grid operators, who are responsible for transmis-
sion, distribution, and retail. Innovative and new 
market actors, and specifically the ICT industry, 
are hardly involved in the smart grid develop-
ment process.
– On-grid prices, retail prices, and the operating 
hours of power plants are fixed by government 
authorities. Grid operators’ income depends on 
the difference between retail and on-grid prices 
– network charges are not explicitly calculated. 
Such a market design sets only few incentives 
for operational efficiency and does not incentiv-
ize investments in an efficient way. 
– Grid expansion planning is organized in a top-
down process with low transparency and little 
involvement of players other than government 
authorities and grid operators.
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Chapter at a glance
– This chapter gives an overview of Germany’s elec-
tric power system, its physical infrastructure, the 
regulatory environment, and the vision for smart 
grid development. The main topics presented were 
selected with the intention of providing examples 
of lessons learned and of sharing the German ex-
perience in the area of the main technological and 
regulatory challenges presented in the previous 
chapter. 
– The chapter contains a detailed description of the 
historical development and current design of Ger-
man electricity markets with a special emphasis 
on market liberalization policies. It also focuses on 
the effects of aggressively expanding RES genera-
tion capacities in the context of such markets. The 
evidence presented here might be insightful for 
Chinese policy-makers given their will to promote 
the establishment of electricity markets and to in-
crease RES generation capacities. 
4.1 Historical perspective
Reliability and affordability as the first policy 
goals In the first decades of the electrification 
process, Germany’s electricity system developed 
rather independently from governmental regula-
tion. Power generation units and electric power 
grids were built up in a decentralized manner and 
operated by a variety of local and regional compa-
nies. After World War I, 220-kV transmission grids 
were constructed to interconnect local and regional 
power grids. The trend towards a nationally inte-
grated electric power grid contributed to increasing 
competition between companies from different re-
gions which in turn resulted in a pronounced mar-
ket consolidation.
The time of little government interference ended 
in 1935, when the German government issued the 
Energy Industry Act (EnWG). The main objective 
of this law was to pave the way for the effective and 
efficient development of a nationally integrated and 
reliable electricity grid. This goal was supposed to 
be achieved by incentivizing investments in genera-
tion units and in the grid infrastructure by formally 
assigning monopoly rights to predominant compa-
nies. Monopolistic structures were deemed more 
suitable to guarantee a reliable power grid and to 
operate the grid in a cost-efficient manner taking 
advantage of economies of scale.
As a result of regional monopoly rights, EnWG 
created an electricity system with a high degree of 
vertical integration and a low degree of competition. 
Electricity generation and transmission assets were 
owned and operated by integrated utilities, while 
electricity distribution and retail was in the hand of 
integrated municipal utilities. The municipal utili-
ties were owned either by local governments or by 
the integrated utilities responsible for generation 
and transmission, which then combined all stages 
of the electricity supply chain into a single company. 
To protect consumers against the market power of 
the newly installed monopolies, EnWG obliged 
the companies to provide electricity to every end 
consumer; the Act also regulated construction and 
expansion of power plants in order to ensure system 
stability.
Sustainability as a more recent policy goal One 
important shift in Germany’s electricity market 
regulation regime had its origin in the 1970 s, when 
environmental protection gained momentum as a 
new policy goal [1]. Due to high levels of local and 
regional air pollution caused by the combustion of 
fossil fuels for electricity generation, the German 
government issued the Federal Pollution Control 
Act (BIMSchG) in 1974. This law and its ordinances 
obliged power plants to install filter technology in 
order to reduce, for instance, sulfur dioxide (SO2) or 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions. In the 1990 s, the 
German government further strengthened the role 
of environmental protection:- The 1991 Act on the Feed-In of Electricity from Renewable Sources into the Public Grid and 
its more prominent successor, the Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG) of 2000, had the objective to 
incentivize investments in renewable energies 
by guaranteeing investors financially attractive 
feed-in tariffs.- Another example of Germany’s regime shift to environmental protection is the Electricity Tax 
Act (StromStG) of 1999 which, amongst other 
objectives, had the aim of inducing consumers 
to consume less electricity by raising electricity 
prices. 
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Public acceptance – towards a fourth energy pol-
icy goal The increasing importance of sustainabil-
ity is generally supported by the German popula-
tion. However, citizens are more frequently opposed 
to new energy infrastructures near residential areas 
if these infrastructures are related to visible, audible, 
or olfactory effects. In the light of Germany’s rather 
high population density, the build-up of distributed 
and renewable energy sources has of late entailed 
rising public opposition. An increasing number 
of citizens disapprove of investments in new wind 
farms, biomass power plants or transmission lines 
[2]. During the last few years, a certain number of 
energy projects – for instance new transmission 
lines or demonstration sites for carbon capture and 
storage – have failed to be realized owing to public 
opposition against them [3], [4]. As a consequence, 
public acceptance has recently gained prominence 
in the discussion as a fourth general energy policy 
goal in Germany, since it is only with a high level 
of public acceptance that the government and the 
companies are able to realize their investment plans 
[2]. Experiences in Germany reveal that three ele-
ments are important to ensure the support of the 
population for investments in energy infrastructure:- There has to be transparency on costs, benefits, and risks of new investments and technolo-
gies while the underlying motivations of the 
stakeholders involved in a project have to be 
communicated to the public. - The public has to be included in the entire planning process of new projects. Private 
citizens and other public stakeholders must be 
able to communicate their position and may 
also be allowed to invest financial funds of 
their own in the project. - Given that some conflicts cannot be solved unanimously, specific institutions or proce-
dures for mediation and reconcialiation of 
interest are necessary to reduce number of 
court-cases [2].
A short summary of market liberalization tenden-
cies since 1996 For a long time, Germany’s electric 
power system was characterized by a high degree of 
vertical integration and a low degree of competi-
tion. Today, the different stages in the supply chain 
are in a state of far-reaching unbundling, and com-
petition has been established in the generation and 
retail sectors.
The market liberalization process on the Euro-
pean level began in 1996 with the First Electricity Di-
rective [5], which was issued by the European Union 
(EU) and motivated by two main objectives [6]:- To open the electric power sector for third parties and to prevent discriminatory behavior 
towards generation companies by grid opera-
tors. - To allow end consumers to choose their retailer in an effort to increase the affordability 
of electricity through more competition. Thus, 
the protected supply areas (regional monopo-
lies) of the incumbent retail companies were 
abandoned in favor of retail competition.
Based on this directive, the German government in 
1998 revised EnWG and started to liberalize Ger-
many’s electricity sector. After a short period of 
promising results with market entries of indepen-
dent retail companies and decreasing retail prices, 
retail prices increased again. In addition, the market 
concentration did not decline significantly. Ques-
tions emerged regarding whether competition in 
generation and retail could be achieved as long as 
grid operators still had ownership in generation. Ac-
cordingly, the Second Electricity Directive issued by 
the European Union in 2003 contained a package 
of requirements to achieve legal unbundling. Legal 
unbundling can be described as an unbundling of 
accounts, operations, and information. It requires 
that transmission and distribution grid operators 
are independent from each other, as well as from 
generation and retail. In practice, legal unbundling 
requires a functional unbundling by guaranteeing 
independence in terms of legal form, organization/
management and decision-making.
Based on the 2007 inquiry into the energy sec-
tor, the European Commission (EC) stated that, in 
spite of legal unbundling, the level of competition 
in the European energy market was still too low 
[7]. Major challenges were identified with respect 
to market concentration and vertical foreclosure.1 
1 Vertical foreclosure refers to a situation in which a company 
buys a supplier that supplies both the company and its com-
petitors in order to discriminate against the competitors.
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This document criticized the fact that with legal 
unbundling, a utility might still be able to discrimi-
nate against competitors or even restrict access of 
new market actors to the infrastructure. In addition, 
the Commission Paper stated that a grid operator 
involved in competitive sectors might be able to 
cross-subsidize its activities in the market with the 
revenues generated from the monopoly part of its 
business [8]. Furthermore, the European Commis-
sion was concerned about insufficient incentives 
for network investments, especially across borders. 
Generally speaking, markets for electricity were or-
ganized on a national basis and there was only a 
weak relation between the various national markets, 
as shown by grid congestions at most borders. The 
Commission argued that incumbents might post-
pone investments into interconnector capacities in 
order to protect their own market against cheaper 
electricity imports. This behavior is known as stra-
tegic investment withholding by locally integrated 
utilities [9]. 
In 2009, the EU’s Third Electricity Directive in-
troduced a compromise with three different options 
for unbundling on the transmission level. Basically, 
the aim of this rule was to separate the transmission 
grid from the other stages of the supply chain. The 
three options were:
- Full ownership unbundling prohibits owner-ship of network and generation or retail assets 
by one and the same firm.- A model based on an Independent System Operator requires that an entity independent 
from the transmission grid owner takes over 
grid operation. With an independent system 
operator, network ownership can remain 
within an integrated company which also owns 
generation assets.- A model based on an Independent Transmis-sion Operator (ITO) allows companies to retain 
both network ownership and management, 
but it puts strong limitations on cross involve-
ment of employees in order to ensure network 
independence (please refer to [10] for further 
explanations on this model). In effect, the ITO 
model is similar to legal unbundling, though 
in a stronger form. 
In Germany, the ITO model was applied. It had to be 
ensured that the transmission system was owned and 
operated by the ITO, which is legally independent 
from the commercial businesses of electricity genera-
tion and retail. Currently three out of the four trans-
mission system operators (TSO) in Germany apply full 
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 . Fig. 4.1 Electricity generation in Germany from 1993 to 2013 in TWh, data from [11]
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Distribution grids are currently subject to legal un-
bundling requiring administrative separation similar 
to the ITO model though in a less restrictive form. 
The objective is to ensure that no commercially sen-
sitive information is exchanged between the power 
grid and other parts of the supply chain within one 
integrated company. Note that administrative unbun-
dling is only applied for distribution system operators 
(DSO) with more than 100,000 customers. DSO with 
fewer customers do not have to unbundle and can 
remain an integrated part of a utility. This exception 
is known as the de-minimis rule.
4.2 Today’s power system and 
its most pressing challenges
4.2.1 Power generation
In 2013, Germany’s gross electricity generation 
amounted to roughly 634 TWh. Coal is currently 
Germany’s predominant primary energy source, ac-
counting for more than 45 % of total electricity gen-
eration.2 Nuclear power and gas are the second and 
2 In the German context, coal refers to both hard coal and 
lignite. These two fuels are used in roughly equal amounts.
third most important generation sources, accounting 
for approximately 15 % and 11 % of overall electricity 
generation respectively. Roughly 24 % of total elec-
tricity generation comes from RES, with wind ac-
counting for 8.4 %, biomass for 6.7 %, solar for 4.7 %, 
hydro for 3.2 %, and household waste for 0.8 % [11].
During the last 20 years, overall electricity gener-
ation increased only slightly (see . Fig. 4.1). However, 
the composition of the electricity mix has changed 
significantly owing to two specific governmental 
policies: the promotion of RES initiated in the 1990 s 
and the nuclear phase-out promulgated in 2002. As 
a consequence, there has been a steady decline in 
the proportion of electricity generated by means of 
nuclear power from 29.2 % in 1993 to 15.4 % in 2013, 
and coal, from 55.7 % in 1993 to 45.2 % in 2013, while 
the share of RES in the electricity mix has increased 
from 4.0 % in 1993 to 23.9 % in 2013 [11].
The rise in the share of RES generation went 
along with a considerable shift of the importance 
of different RES generation sources. While hydro 
power was by far the most important RES generation 
source in 1993, it plays no more than a minor part 
in 2013. Wind, biomass, and solar power, virtually 
non-existent in 1993, are the most important RES 
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tricity generation from PV has seen large growth 
in recent years (from 4.4 TWh in 2008 to 30 TWh 
in 2013).
A large part of Germany’s RES installations are 
distributed generation sources such as small rooftop 
PV installations, single wind turbines, or biomass 
plants. A look at PV installations, for example, re-
veals that more than 60 % of all installations feed 
in electricity in a decentralized manner at the level 
of low voltage grids [12]. The focus on distributed 
energy sources is reflected in a diverse ownership 
structure. More than 40 % of all RES installations 
in Germany are owned by private investors, with 
project developers and financial institutions follow-
ing with 14 % and 13 % respectively [13]. Note that 
only roughly 12 % of RES installations are owned by 
power generation companies [13].
4.2.2 Power consumption
Germany’s electric power consumption amounted 
to about 528 TWh in 2013 [14]. The difference be-
tween gross electricity generation and consumption 
results from power plants’ own consumption, from 
electricity exports to other countries, and from line 
losses. Industry is the main consumer of electric-
ity and is responsible for approximately 46 % of na-
tional electricity consumption (see . Table 4.1). The 
residential sector follows with 26 % while the com-
mercial and public sectors consume about 14 % and 
10 % respectively. The transport and agricultural 
sectors play no more than minor roles with shares 
of roughly 2 % [14].
In comparison to China, the shares of residen-
tial and commercial loads are significantly higher 
in Germany. This results in a load curve with more 
pronounced peaks and valleys. The ancillary ser-
vices necessary to cope with this pronounced load 
curve are mainly offered by gas-fired power plants 
in Germany. Neither total electricity consump-
tion nor the relative importance of different types 
of consumers has changed significantly in recent 
years. 
The increasing share of electricity generated 
from intermittent sources like wind and PV led 
to the question of how power consumption can 
adapt to fluctuating generation. The potential for 
load shifting, which is relatively easily accessible at 
reasonable costs, lies in Germany’s industrial sec-
tor with its large electricity consumers. . Table 4.2 
presents the maximum power which can be discon-
nected (neg.) or connected (pos.) for a short period 
of time in the residential, commercial, or industrial 
sectors according to different studies. The numbers 
have to been seen in relation to the German overall 
peak load of 80 GW.
4.2.3 Power logistics
Disparity between generation and consump-
tion Power generation and consumption are not 
equally distributed in Germany. The load centers 
are situated in western and southern Germany, 
both regions with strong industrial bases. Since 
the amount of electricity generated in nuclear and 
coal-fired power plants in these regions is generally 
not sufficient, they often have to import electricity 
from other parts of Germany or from neighboring 
countries. In contrast, Germany’s north and east, 
with their significant wind capacities, quite regu-
larly generate more electricity than they consume. 
Thus, both regions frequently transfer electricity to 
southern and western Germany.
Grid infrastructure Germany’s electric power grids 
can be classified into four different categories:- Extra high voltage grids (220-kV to 380-kV) form the German transmission grids. In ad-
 . Table 4.1 Electricity consumption in Germany in 
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Total
Mining and Industry 241 45.6




Public Sector  51  9.7
Transport  12  2.3
Agriculture   9  1.7
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dition to the transmission of electricity, they 
are responsible for the electricity feed-in of 
large generators such as nuclear and coal-fired 
power plants, or offshore wind farms. The 
transmission grid is mainly characterized by 
suspended above-surface cables with visible 
electricity pylons. There are currently approxi-
mately 35,000 km of transmission grids with 
1,100 electricity transformers in Germany [19], 
[20]. - High voltage grids (35-kV to 110-kV) are the highest voltage level of distribution grids. They 
act as a redistribution system at the regional 
level. Furthermore, high voltage grids provide 
electricity to large industrial consumers and 
are also employed to feed in electricity from 
smaller power plants, wind farms, and large 
PV parks. There are approximately 95,000 km 
of high voltage grids and 7,500 electricity 
transformers at this level [19] [20]. - Medium voltage grids (10-kV to 30-kV) repre-sent the subordinate level of distribution grids. 
They distribute electricity to the connected low 
voltage levels, provide electricity to connected 
bulk consumers, and feed in electricity from 
small PV parks or single wind turbines. The 
medium voltage level is characterized by un-
derground cables; it is roughly 507,000 km in 
length and contains 560,000 local substations 
[19] [20].- Low voltage grids (230-V to 400-V) are typi-cally also characterized by underground cables 
and distribute electricity from local substations 
to households and collect electricity from roof-
top PV modules. It has an approximate length 
of 1,150,000 km [19].
An increasing amount of network congestion at 
times of peak generation is caused by small distrib-
uted rooftop PV installations on the low voltage 
level and rising feed-in from large wind farms at 
the high voltage level [21]. Due to the rapid build-
up of RES generation capacities, grid capacities are 
not always sufficient to absorb RES-E. As a result, 
grid curtailment rates of solar and wind power have 
increased significantly within the last few years. In 
Schleswig-Holstein, a windy region in the north of 
Germany, 3.5 % of the total wind generation had to 
be curtailed in 2012 [22]. 
The curtailment of RES-E at times of peak gen-
eration can reduce the need for network invest-
ments. A recent study suggests that curtailing 30 % 
of PV peak production and 20 % of wind peak pro-
duction could reduce infrastructure investments by 
10 % between now and 2030 while a total of only 2 % 
of the annual electricity production from RES would 
be curtailed [23].
Through the transmission grid, Germany’s elec-
tric power system is well interconnected with those 
of neighboring countries (please refer to . Fig. A.1 
in the appendix for a snapshot of Germany’s trans-
mission grids). All German TSO are members of the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Electricity (ENTSO-E), which was established in 
2011 in order to
» promote the completion and functioning of the 
internal market in electricity and cross-border 
trade and to ensure the optimal management, 
coordinated operation and sound technical 
evolution of the European electricity transmission 
network [24].
 . Table 4.2 Demand side management potential according to German studies and sector
Study Residential Commercial Industrial
Stadler [15] −68 GW (pos.)/28 GW (neg.)
Klobasa [16] 20 GW – 2.8 GW


































Supply security in Germany In comparison with 
other European countries, Germany’s electric power 
system is characterized by a very high level of secu-
rity of supply with, on average, only about 15 min-
utes of annual interruptions on the household level 
[25] [26].
The increasing feed-in of RES generation im-
poses challenges for the stability and reliability of 
Germany’s distribution grids. Three technical chal-
lenges for network stability caused by RES integra-
tion into distribution grids in Germany are pre-
sented in . Table 4.3, together with the measures 
most frequently used to overcome them.
Investment needs in the grid infrastructure Se-
curing a high level of supply security in spite of the 
increasing share of electricity generated by variable 
RES requires significant investments in transmission 
and distribution grids. On the transmission grid 
level, it is estimated that roughly 3,600 km of 380-KV 
AC overhead lines will have to be installed between 
now and 2023 [23]. This represents a total invest-
ment of EUR 21 billion [28]. On the distribution grid 
level, the pressure is even higher: between 135,000 
and 193,000 km will have to be added to the existing 
network by 2030. In addition, between 21,000 and 
25,000 km of the existing distribution grid will have 
to be modernized in the same period of time. Ac-
cording to a recent study, these numbers add up to 
a total investment need of roughly EUR 42.5 billion 
on the distribution grid level [18].
4.3 Smart grid development 
in Germany
4.3.1 Motivation for smart grids 
in Germany 
The rising importance of intermittent RES gen-
eration is the main smart grid driver in Germany. 
Today, the general opinion of most energy market 
experts in Germany is that building a smart grid, es-
pecially a smart distribution grid, is a cost-efficient 
way of ensuring security of supply in the presence 
of large-scale integration of intermittent RES [29], 
[30].
The challenge of fluctuating RES in extra high 
voltage grids Germany’s transmission grids 
(380-kV/220-kV grid) have already achieved a 
high degree of smartness and are equipped with 
sophisticated real-time monitoring and control 
technologies. The increasing amount of wind power 
from large wind farms creates a need for more grid 
control. Sophisticated generation forecasts, for ex-
ample, are needed to adequately react to the pools 
of fluctuating generators and maintain the 50 Hz 
grid frequency within its narrow tolerance range of 
± 0.2 Hz.
The challenge of fluctuating RES in high voltage 
grids The 110-kV high voltage grid also requires 
high availability and near-real-time monitoring and 
 . Table 4.3 Frequently used measures to maintain supply security in the presence of RES, data from [27]
Supply Security Issue
Measure Grid Overload Critical Voltage 
Variation
Power Quality 
Direct connection of RES to a substation X X
Upgrade of grid circuit conductors X X X
Upgrade of upstream transformer capacity X X X
Reduction of the grid circuit length X X
Set point adjustment of transformer automatic 
voltage control
X
Using reactive power capabilities of RES X
Construction of a new substation X
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control. The main challenge within high voltage 
grids is to maintain voltage levels and loads within 
a technically viable band. In the event of overloads, 
for example arising from a high volume of RES-E, 
electricity has to be transferred to the higher voltage 
level. Bidirectional flows of electrical power are an 
additional challenge at the level of 110-kV high volt-
age grids. If overloads cannot be transferred to the 
higher voltage level, generation has to be curtailed 
or additional loads have to be activiated.
The challenge of fluctuating RES in medium volt-
age grids Supply quality, specifically with regard to 
voltage maintenance, constitutes a major technical 
challenge in medium voltage grids due to the fluc-
tuating and distributed generation from RES. The 
degree of utilization of ICT in medium voltage grids 
is limited. Continuous load measurement, for ex-
ample, is used only for customers with consumption 
levels exceeding 100 MWh/a. As prescribed by the 
Electricity Network Access Ordinance (StromNZV), 
these customers’ average power consumption must 
be measured in periods of 15 minutes and this infor-
mation delivered to the distribution grid operator 
which then uses the measurement data to compute 
a specific load profile. The measurement equipment 
is operated by the DSO or by the metering system 
operator. Like at the 110-kV level, wind and PV 
plants may result in inverted flows of electricity to 
the higher voltage level in order to avoid an overload 
of grid assets, especially in rural areas with a more 
limited infrastructure. 
The challenge of fluctuating RES in low voltage 
grids Today, ICT-based grid operation is very 
rarely installed at the level of low voltage grids, 
where rooftop PV represents a major challenge in 
terms of voltage maintenance and can cause a more 
rapid aging of grid assets. Grid operators currently 
handle these challenges by expanding the grid in-
frastructure with new cables or local substations. 
In the future, electric mobility may further increase 
the necessity for active control of low voltage grids. 
It should be noted that the control of assets in low 
voltage grids is especially difficult due to the large 
number and high heterogeneity of the connected 
assets (e. g. households, rooftop PV modules, local 
substations, electric vehicles). Thus, standardization 
of control interfaces is viewed as one of the key is-
sues for assets being installed in low voltage grids 
[31].
4.3.2 Germany’s technological view 
of the smart grid
The development of smart grids in Germany In 
Germany, smart grid technologies have been de-
scribed, combined, tested, and implemented in a 
bottom-up process by research institutions, com-
panies from the electric power sector, component 
suppliers, and ICT companies. 
The primary driver for smart grid development 
was the integration of RES into the operational 
environments of grid operators. Their integration 
mainly relies on large monolithic supervisory con-
trol and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Small 
amounts of renewables were controlled in parallel 
to the overall grid operations, often in so-called 
distributed energy management systems (DEMS). In 
terms of communications, the systems used existing 
communication infrastructure and heterogeneous 
proprietary data models and protocols. The need 
to integrate RES in daily grid operations led to a 
change in the paradigms on how to design and con-
trol RES. Aspects relating to the connection between 
different assets were the first to be focused upon 
– general packet radio service (GPRS), GSM, uni-
versal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), 
and currently long term evolution (LTE) or IP-based 
open networks such as the internet have been used. 
After this initial focus on connectivity, more empha-
sis was put on the semantics and syntactical aspects 
of communication.
The government’s view on smart grids As in 
China, different stakeholders in Germany have de-
veloped different views on smart grids. The primary 
goal of the German government, especially via the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi) and BNetzA, is to guide the debate and 
support convergence of the various stakeholders’ 
smart grid visions. BNetzA, in late 2011, published 
a position paper called Smart Grid and Smart Mar-
ket [32] (see [33] for an English summary of this 
document).
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The main objective of this document was to 
introduce a clear-cut criterion on how smart grids 
and so-called smart markets can be differenti-
ated and to discuss the regulatory consequences. 
BNetzA points out that electricity volumes and 
related services have traditionally been traded on 
electricity markets independently from the avail-
able grid capacity.3 In a power system based on 
smart grids, however, information on current grid 
status can be taken into account in market trans-
actions. Markets allowing the trade of electricity 
volumes and related services based on available 
grid capacities are referred to as smart markets. 
Depending on the available grid capacity, smart 
markets can either operate without restriction – 
in case of sufficient grid capacity, or – in case of 
grid congestion – the grid operator has the right to 
intervene in the market to ensure grid stability and 
e. g. shut down power plants or cut off consumers 
[33]. One example for smart markets are regional 
energy market places.4 Within a specific region, 
industrial, commercial, and domestic customers 
are given the option of trading electricity volumes 
and/or ancillary services in a market place. By 
trading ancillary services, power consumption 
schedules, and power generation (feed-in) sched-
ules, market participants are exposed to price sig-
nals serving as an economic incentive to balance 
electricity supply and demand and thus stabilize 
the grid.
The position paper Smart Grid and Smart Mar-
ket discusses relevant topics along six key concepts:- The first key concept, named Grid capacity and energy volumes as distinguishing criteria for 
grid and market, explains how grids and mar-
kets can be separated by identifying the main 
topics involved. All aspects relating to grid 
capacity (as measured in kW, MW, GW, etc.) 
refer to the grid whereas all topics relating to 
3 However, system operators have the possibility of correct-
ing market outcomes in the case of insufficient grid ca-
pacities. Nonetheless, grid capacity itself is not taken into 
account in the decisions of the market participants. 
4 Regional energy markets have been tested in several dem-
onstration projects in Germany, e. g. in the eTelligence proj-
ect. A detailed overview of the results from eTelligence can 
be found in [62]. 
energy volumes (as measured in kWh, MWh, 
GWh, etc.) refer to the market.- The second key concept, Clarification of the discussion about the energy future through the 
terms of smart grid and smart market, follows-
up on the first key concept. It clarifies that 
the term smart grid can be related to network 
issues while the term smart market can be 
related to energy volume issues. - The third key concept has the somewhat cumbersome title The energy future requires 
more responsibility on the market and more 
negotiated solutions. The grid should play a pre-
dominantly service role and should be separated 
from competitive activities as far as possible. 
It discusses the importance of new market 
actors in smart markets and underlines that 
competitive functions, especially those in 
smart markets, should not be attributed to 
grid operators. Grid operators are considered 
responsible only for the (smart) grid itself. 
Smart grids are seen as a platform for smart 
markets. Grid operators are consequently 
viewed as playing a supporting role for smart 
markets.- The fourth key concept, entitled Smart meters are part of, but not an absolute prerequisite for, 
the energy future, states that grids can be made 
smart without a widespread rollout of smart 
meters. The main argument is that it is suf-
ficient to measure data on grid conditions in 
local substations or to install only some smart 
meters at potentially critical junctures in the 
grid.- The fifth key concept, named The smart grid is a part of an evolutionary, not a revolution-
ary, process, emphasizes that smart grids are 
not built from scratch but evolve in a gradual 
process. In the light of the heterogeneity of the 
various grid operators in Germany, BNetzA 
consequently stresses that a kind of uniform 
smart grid concept applicable to every grid 
operator does not exist and should not be 
promoted by means of regulation. - The sixth key concept is named If targets for the use of renewable energy are to be met it is 
essential that these producers, too, respond to 
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market signals and grid exigencies. It under-
lines the importance of integrating RES more 
effectively in wholesale markets, potentially by 
redesigning the feed-in priority for RES.
Smart grids according to a recent study by the 
German Academy of Science and Engineer-
ing In 2012, under the guidance of the German 
Academy of Science and Engineering (acatech), 
representatives of the electric power sector, equip-
ment manufacturers sector, ICT sector, and from 
academia and research institutions developed a 
smart grid model for Germany: the Future Energy 
Grid (FEG) model [30]. The model complements 
the BNetzA view on smart grids by developing a 
conceptual and technological foundation for the 
separation of smart grids and smart markets. In 
particular, FEG can serve as a best practice ex-
ample of how to develop and formulate a com-
prehensive smart grid vision. FEG is a systematic 
and comprehensive top-down approach that can 
be used to evaluate the current smartness of grids 
and to define a smart grid vision. It systematically 
addresses specific problems and challenges in 
Germany’s electric power system and introduces 
a model of system layers (see . Fig. 4.3) and tech-
nology areas (see . Fig. 4.4). The system layers 
represent different functions and requirements 
regarding the application of ICT in the power 
system. They were chosen in reference to a model 
adapted by the European Electricity Grid Initiative 
(see [34]).
In total, FEG comprises the following three sys-
tem layers (see . Fig. 4.3): - The innermost layer, referred to as the closed system layer, contains the critical infrastructure 
and power system equipment that serves as 
the backbone of the system and requires a high 
level of security and safety. Therefore, exter-
nal access to the resources within this layer is 
restricted and may be limited to the grid op-
erator or to an equivalent actor. Central (bulk) 
power generation, transmission and distribu-
tion grids, and the corresponding ICT-based 
control systems are components of this layer.- The outermost layer is referred to as the net-worked system layer. It contains heterogeneous 
power system components (distributed power 
generators, power storage units, consumers, 
marketplaces, meters, control applications, 
etc.) which are characterized by a high level of 
communication and information exchange. In 
contrast to the closed system layer, much of the 
value within this layer is created by interac-
tions between the different participants on 
smart markets. As the exchange of sensitive 
power system information, e. g. real-time data 
on power generation and consumption, is of 
particular importance in this context, strict 
ICT and data security protocols have to be 
applied to ensure individual privacy rights are 
respected and overall power system security is 
guaranteed.- The ICT infrastructure layer enables com-munication within and between the two 
other layers. It contains the communication 
networks and associated components that 
provide ICT interface functionalities. In order 
to ensure that different components of each 
layer can communicate with each other, in-
teroperability is a key factor. Interoperability 
is achieved with the help of standardization of 
system interfaces and communication proto-
cols.
In the study Future Energy Grid, a smart grid vi-
sion based on the three system layers described 
above and nineteen technology areas is outlined 
(see . Fig. 4.4, for a detailed description refer to ap-
pendix D).
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 . Fig. 4.3 Abstract smart grid system model regarding the application of ICT within three distinct layers, translated from [30]
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4.4 The regulation of Germany’s 
electric power system
4.4.1 Policy setting and fundamental 
institutions
Policy setting The Federal Government’s Energy 
concept for an environmentally friendly, reliable and 
affordable energy supply of September 2010 and The 
road to the energy of the future – safe, affordable and 
environmentally friendly (Key Elements of an energy 
policy concept) of June 2011 [35] contain guidelines 
and objectives relating to Germany’s future energy 
system. In particular, the trend towards more envi-
ronmental protection is explicitly expressed by gov-
ernment plans to reduce CO2 emissions to 60 % of 
the 1990-level by 2020. It is planned to further reduce 
emissions to 20 % of the level of 1990 until 2050 [35]. 
These cuts in CO2 emissions are to be achieved 
by reduced energy use for transport and heating (see 
. Fig. 4.5): e. g. energy consumption for room heating 
purposes should be reduced by 20 % between 2008 
and 2020 and 80 % by 2050. For the power sector, the 
government’s objective is to generate 35 % of electric-
ity with RES in 2020 and to increase the share to 80 % 
by 2050 [35] as shown in . Fig. 4.5. At the same time, 
in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, 
the German government decided to completely phase 
out nuclear power generation by 2022 [35].
Many specific objectives with regard to the 
development of Germany’s power system are sub-
ordinated to the general goal of achieving more 
sustainability and the specific goal of increasing 
the importance of RES: for instance, the German 
government wants to expand transmission grids in 
the north-south direction, thus allowing a more ef-
fective transport of wind power from the north to 
the load centers in the south of the country. Other 
government goals such as improving energy effi-
ciency and promoting energy storage technologies 
Domains in the energy sector
Technology areas in the ICT infrastructure layer
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 . Fig. 4.4 Technology areas regarding ICT aspects of smart grid implementation in Germany, translated from [30]
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and electric vehicles are also related to the broad 
government plan of increasing the sustainability of 
Germany’s power system.
General governance structure The governance 
structure of Germany’s energy system comprises 
several ministries and independent institutions. 
The ministries are responsible for enacting laws 
and ordinances that then have to be applied by in-
dependent institutions. This means that the ministry 
concerned can neither interfere in day-to-day busi-
ness nor expand or restrict the competences of the 
institutions. Nonetheless, these institutions and the 
ministries cooperate closely.
Ministries responsible for Germany’s energy pol-
icy There are currently two ministries at the core of 
the governance structure of the German electricity 
system: 
- The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) has the main responsibility for 
formulating and implementing energy policy, 
including renewable energy, and is responsible 
for issues related to security of supply and 
competition policy. - The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Na-ture Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety 
(BMUB) is responsible for those energy policy 
issues which are directly related to environ-
mental protection, e. g. CO2 reduction, and 
energy efficiency in the building sector. 
The market design of the electricity sector is a re-
sponsibility shared by BMWi and BMUB. Other 
relevant ministries in the context of energy and 
electricity sector policy and smart grids are: - The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI) takes responsibility for 
 . Fig. 4.5 Long-term targets for Germany’s energy sector (© Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e. V. [36])
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transportation and mobility issues as well as 
for the expansion of digital communication 
infrastructure, which is especially important as 
a backbone for smart grids.- The Federal Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMAS) focuses on 
social issues related to energy.
Institutions responsible for Germany’s energy 
policy The following three government authorities 
are of particular relevance with regard to the regula-
tion of Germany’s electric power system:- The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway 
(BNetzA) is responsible for regulation of 
the networks which are natural monopolies, 
including the electricity grid (see . Fig. 4.6). 
The existence and competences of BNetzA 
are laid down in laws such as EnWG and the 
Grid Expansion Acceleration Act for Transmis-
sion Networks (NABEG).5 While BNetzA is in 
charge of national and interstate regulation it 
cooperates closely with regulatory counterparts 
on the level of the federal states. State regula-
tors are responsible for DSO with less than 
100,000 customers and BNetzA for all TSO and 
for DSO with more than 100,000 customers or 
with operations in more than one state.
5 The NABEG describes the precise steps and more impor-
tantly the timing of these steps to be fulfilled after a con-
nection request. With this, it avoids unjustified delays with 
network connection. The role of BNetzA within this process 
is specified, for example, in paragraphs 5, 7, 8, and 9 of this 
law.
- The Federal Cartel Office is responsible for general competition matters (see . Fig. 4.6). 
If competition problems are related to natural 
monopoly networks, the Federal Cartel Office 
can authorize BNetzA to handle the issue. 
The existence and competences of the Federal 
Cartel Office are laid down in the Act Against 
Restraints of Competition (GWB).- The Monopoly Commission advises on com-petition and monopoly issues. Its advice is 
non-binding and it does not have decision-
making powers. Nonetheless, the Monopoly 
Commission plays a vital role in checking and 
evaluating the regulator’s work. The tasks of 
the Monopoly Commission are also laid down 
in GWB.
A brief history of BNetzA The liberalization of Eu-
ropean electricity markets began with the EU’s First 
Electricity Directive of 1996. A so-called negotiated 
Third Party Access (nTPA) was allowed as an option 
alongside regulated Third Party Access (rTPA). nTPA 
meant that access to the electricity networks, includ-
ing network charges, had to be negotiated between 
network owners (grid operators) and network users 
(power companies). The directive did not explicitly 
prescribe a regulator and ultimately this approach 
failed to secure non-discriminatory network access 
and to deliver fair and reasonable network charges (cf. 
e. g. [37], [38] for an analysis and further literature).
The EU’s Second Electricity Directive of 2003 
contained significant changes: rTPA became the 
only option making non-discriminatory network 
access conditions a requirement by law. The Direc-











 . Fig. 4.6 Responsibilities of BNetzA and of the Federal Cartel Office
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ity sector regulator and the creation of a regulatory 
framework for fair and reasonable network charges. 
In Germany, EnWG was amended to satisfy these 
demands, resulting in the establishment of BNetzA 
as a federal regulator for monopolistic networks 
and the development of incentive regulation (see 
▶ Sect. 4.4.4 for more information on incentive 
regulation). The regulatory competences of BNetzA 
were based on the competences of its predecessor, 
which was the Regulatory Agency for Telecommuni-
cations and Post Services. Competences relating to 
electricity and gas were added, and the agency was 
renamed to BNetzA. Later on, the task of regulating 
the railway infrastructure was added as well.
The EU’s Third Electricity Directive of 2009 did 
not change the arrangements on rTPA or regulation. 
Instead, it strengthened the arrangements relating 
to unbundling rules. For the TSO, this led to the 
ITO approach while for DSO the unbundling rules 
stayed as they were in the Second Electricity Direc-
tive (see ▶ Sect. 4.1). BNetzA is also responsible for 
implementing the unbundling rules and monitoring 
compliance with them. Lastly, the Third Electricity 
Directive led to the creation of an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). In a nut-
shell, ACER is responsible for cross-border issues 
and provides a platform for cooperation between 
various European regulators.
Main tasks and competences of BNetzA The mis-
sion of BNetzA is to regulate the monopolistic part 
of the supply chain – the grid or network infrastruc-
ture by: - guaranteeing an affordable, consumer-friendly, efficient and environmentally friendly supply 
of electricity and gas,- ensuring an effective and undistorted competi-tion in the supply of electricity and gas as well 
as securing a reliable operation of electricity 
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= Focus on energy-related topics
 . Fig. 4.7 BNetzA organization chart, adapted from [40]
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the needs of a rising share of renewable energy 
[39].
In this context, the two main tasks of the BNetzA are:- to secure non-discriminatory access to the network and- to regulate network charges.
This is reflected by the organizational structure of 
BNetzA (see . Fig. 4.7). BNetzA consists of several 
departments. Two of them (Department 6 and De-
partment N) focus on energy and network regu-
lation. The decision process within BNetzA takes 
place within so-called ruling chambers. BNetzA has 
nine ruling chambers with decision-making pow-
ers, with five of these relating to electricity and gas:- network development and approval of indi-vidual network charges (ruling chamber 4 in 
. Fig. 4.7), - access to electricity networks (ruling cham-ber 6 in . Fig. 4.7), - access to gas networks (ruling chamber 7 in . Fig. 4.7), - regulation of electricity networks (ruling chamber 8 in . Fig. 4.7), and - regulation of gas networks (ruling chamber 9 in . Fig. 4.7). 
Note the focus on and restriction to networks as the 
core monopoly part of the supply chain. BNetzA is 
not responsible for the markets, where these are not 
related to the networks. Strictly speaking, BNetzA is 
not responsible for general competitive conditions, 
for example merger policy, which is one of the tasks 
of the Federal Cartel Office. In practice, however, 
the Federal Cartel Office and BNetzA cooperate 
closely. Moreover, BNetzA monitors market devel-
opment in a so-called Monitoring Report, which is 
published on an annual basis.
Additional tasks of BNetzA In addition to securing 
non-discriminatory access to the network and regu-
lating network charges, further BNetzA tasks are:- ensuring consumer protection in retail issues (e. g. rules for switching the power retail com-
pany), - implementing and monitoring unbundling rules, - evaluating the network development plan (NDP),
- approving network expansion plans and helping to accelerate licensing procedures for 
network expansion, as arranged by NABEG, - exchanging information with other European regulators, formally or informally, and cross-
border issues (e. g. the interconnectors), - providing support for technical standards, and- providing data on power plants and electricity networks to the public.
Competences of BNetzA It is of critical importance 
for the regulator to be powerful enough to impose 
sanctions on the grid operators. In Germany, this is 
regulated in § 29 to § 33 EnWG, which define the 
competences of BNetzA and the possible range of 
penalties it can impose:- § 29 EnWG lists all discriminating behaviors of grid operators which can be penalized by 
BNetzA. - According to § 30 EnWG, BNetzA can force grid operators to stop any discriminating 
behavior against other market participants.- According to § 31 EnWG, information on discriminatory behavior of a grid operator can 
be provided to BNetzA by any legal or natural 
person. - § 32 and § 33 EnWG specify how fines and compensation payments are to be settled in 
case of misconduct by a grid operator.
4.4.2 Market structure
Vertical and horizontal market structure As de-
scribed in ▶ Sect. 4.1, the stages in the supply chain 
of Germany’s electric power sector are in a state of 
far-reaching unbundling: transmission grids, for ex-
ample, are owned and operated by fully unbundled 
companies that are independent from other parts 
of the supply chain. Distribution grid operators are 
legally unbundled from generation and retail com-
panies so as to ensure that, within the same utility, 
no commercially sensitive information is exchanged 
between the power grid and other parts of the sup-
ply chain. 
Competition in power generation has been in-
creasing significantly in Germany since the EU’s First 
Electricity Directive. Before 1996, generation was mo-
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nopolized by four major companies (RWE, E.ON, 
Vattenfall Europe, and EnBW). Meanwhile, these 
four companies together represent a market share of 
no more than roughly 44 % of total installed electric-
ity generation capacities [41]. The decreasing market 
share of the former monopolists is also a result of the 
nuclear phase-out and the increasing share of distrib-
uted generation from RES. The growing importance of 
RES in particular has served as a key driver for com-
petition in the generation sector. While investments 
into conventional power plants are a capital-intensive 
business, investments into RES have become profit-
able for small investors due to the guaranteed feed-in 
tariffs for renewables. As a result, there are currently 
some 300 smaller generation companies with capaci-
ties starting at 1 MW up to hundreds of MW.
The situation is similar in the retail sector. The 
market share of the four former monopolists has 
been continuously decreasing from 50 % in 2008 
to 45 % in 2011 [19]. Most German retail compa-
nies have a regional focus with a high market share 
within their established service areas. Consumer 
switching rates to other retailers are still quite low 
due to the end consumers’ tendency to remain with 
the incumbent regional suppliers. In 2012, for ex-
ample, only about 7.8 % of all households in Ger-
many changed their electricity supplier [19]. 
The ownership structure on the transmission 
and distribution level is as follows: on the transmis-
sion level, four TSO own the infrastructure while 
roughly 900 DSO own parts of the distribution grid. 
Since electricity networks are a natural monopoly 
with network charges regulated by BNetzA, there is 
no competition for markets and customers between 
the different grid operators.
The emergence of new market actors The un-
bundling process, the legally enforced trend to-
wards more competition, as well as the migration 
towards smart grids and RES have contributed to 
the emergence of new market actors in Germany. 
Their growing importance can be considered as the 
most profound change in Germany’s electricity mar-
ket structure during the last few years. A consider-
able number of new players have entered the sup-
ply chain of the electric power system: . Figure 4.8 
shows that the number of companies active in the 
German energy sector (including electricity, gas, 
heat, etc.) increased from 15,666 in 2006 to 48,292 
in 2011 [42]. This represents an increase of more 
than 200 % within five years. Especially companies 
with less than nine employees, often innovative 
start-ups and energy service providers, have con-
tributed to this increase. Their number increased 
from 14,545 in 2006 to 46,967 in 2013 [43].
. Figure 4.9 presents an exemplary overview of 
established and new market actors in smart grids, 







































 . Fig. 4.8 Number of companies active in the German energy sector, data from [43]






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 . Fig. 4.9 Examples of established and new market actors in smart grids in Germany
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fied into the different smart grid supply chain areas 
Power Generation, Power Logistics, Power Trade and 
Retail, Power Consumption, and Information and 
Communication. In the following, some examples 
of new market actors depicted in . Fig. 4.9 are de-
scribed together with a brief explanation on their 
role in the smart grid development process:
 z Power Generation:- RES operators:  Traditionally, power plants in Germany were exclusively owned and operated by large utili-
ties. Due to the financial support codified in 
EEG (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.3), a number of more than 
1,500,000 RES plants, especially onshore wind, 
PV and biomass plants, has been installed so 
far. The largest part of these plants is operated 
by households as well as small and medium-
sized companies: in 2013 for example, 6 % of all 
German households had their own RES genera-
tion units, especially small rooftop PV installa-
tions [44]. Companies in the manufacturing in-
dustry have also long since started to build their 
own RES generation units. By 2005, roughly 5 % 
of all German manufacturing companies owned 
RES. This number has more than tripled since, 
reaching roughly 18 % in 2012 [45].- New energy cooperatives:  In the tradition of cooperatives founded in Germany in the beginning of the 20th century to 
develop the first power supply systems, new en-
ergy cooperatives have emerged in recent years. 
These associations allow individual citizens or 
civil society to pool their financial resources 
and jointly invest in power system components 
otherwise exceeding the financial resources of 
their individual members. In Germany, 650 en-
ergy cooperatives with roughly 130,000 mem-
bers invested more than one billion euros in 
power plants based on RES until 2012 [46].
 z Power Logistics:- Grid operations service providers:  This type of company specializes in offering services to operate smart grids for small-sized 
or municipally owned German DSO. The busi-
ness model of grid operation service providers 
works out, since the small DSO often do not 
have the highly specialized personnel required 
for smart grid operation (i. e. with deep knowl-
edge of ICT capabilities and with the required 
level of grid automation knowledge). A single 
grid operation service provider may operate 
the smart grids of several small DSO.
 z Power Trade & Retail:- VPP operators:  A virtual power plant is a network of decentral-ized, small to medium-scale power generating 
units such as biomass plants, combined heat and 
power (CHP) units, wind farms and solar parks. 
The interconnected units are partly operated 
through central control of the virtual power 
plant but nevertheless remain independent in 
their operation and ownership. Virtual power 
plants (VPP) deliver electricity products, such as 
balancing power, that can be traded on electric-
ity market places. Product requirements, e. g. the 
minimum volume of the delivered power, are 
restrictive and usually cannot be met by single 
small scale power plants, like e. g. a single wind 
farm. VPP therefore bundle (aggregate) several 
small scale power plants and often even add 
other generation capacities and/or flexible loads, 
to fulfil the product requirements of the energy 
market places. Thus, the power generation of the 
units in the virtual power plant is bundled – or 
aggregated – and sold by a single trader on the 
energy exchange or other energy market places 
(e. g. market for balancing power). As a result, 
VPP can gradually take over the role of tradi-
tional power plants – selling their output in the 
wholesale markets. Today, in Germany, about 
20 medium sized companies operate VPP.- Specialized marketplace operators:  These market actors operate market places e. g. for ancillary services or for electricity from 
well-defined sources. The concept of special-
ized market places has been piloted in several 
research projects of the German E-Energy 
program (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.6 for more informa-
tion on the E-Energy program).- Power traders:  A person or entity that buys and sells energy goods and services in an organized electricity 
market (electricity or power exchange) or over-
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the-counter (OTC). Power traders offer dedi-
cated electricity wholesale services to other 
market actors, e. g. industry companies or 
power retailers companies or larger end-users 
(like energy-intensive industry). Due to the 
complex nature of electricity markets, trading 
requires specialist knowledge and expertise, 
comparable to financial service providers. In 
Germany, power trading services are offered by 
some 50 companies [19]. - Independent retailers:  Liberalization of the energy market in Europe led to the establishment of mostly medium-sized 
power retail companies that are independent 
from the established utilities. These companies 
offer their customers heterogeneous energy-
based retail products, e. g. regional tariffs, time-
of-use pricing or electricity with a low CO2-
footprint. These products are widely accepted 
both by the population and by enterprises. 
 z Power Consumption:- Smart appliance contractors:  Households as well as enterprises operate a growing multitude of power-consuming appli-
ances like heating equipment, cooling devices 
or home electricity storage (so-called smart 
appliances). For these clients, smart appliance 
contractors offer individual services such as fi-
nancing, installation, operation, maintenance, 
support and appliance replacement. Other 
contractors act as full-service providers and 
offer volume-based heating, cooling or load 
management services. - Prosumers:  The term prosumer is merged from the terms producer and consumer. Besides consuming 
power, these new market actors deliver surplus 
power to the grid, e. g. through small-scale 
rooftop PV or combined heat and power (CHP) 
plants.- Energy management service providers:  Energy management service providers deliver energy monitoring and controlling services 
to industry and large commercial companies. 
With their service portfolio they contribute to 
continuous improvement of energy procure-
ment and use in smart grids. 
- Energy efficiency consultants:  These typically small-sized companies analyze the energy consumption of private households, 
enterprises, industry and municipalities in 
order to identify potentials for energy sav-
ings and energy efficiency improvements and 
consult the clients in efficient power usage. In 
a typical business model the advisory is paid 
for with a share of the savings generated from 
energy efficiency improvements. In Germany, a 
number of nearly 12,500 companies carried out 
more than 400,000 consulting projects in 2011 
[47].- E-Vehicle infrastructure operators:  Electric vehicles need charging stations. These are built and/or operated by a growing number 
of infrastructure operators.- E-Vehicle service providers:  These new market actors are typically big-sized or mid-sized companies. E-Vehicle service 
providers operate pools of electric vehicles and 
rent them to companies and private consumers.
 z Information & Communication:- Metering system operators:  These companies install and operate electricity metering equipment. Metering system opera-
tors are an example for a new market role that 
has been created by the German government. 
Their role is described by EnWG (§ 21) and 
the Metering Access Ordinance (MessZV).- Metering service providers:  Metering service providers offer the service of reading out meter systems and delivering the 
gathered data to power retailers as a basis for 
billing. Their role is also described by EnWG 
(§ 21) and the Metering Access Ordinance. - Energy information service providers:  All market actors in smart grids require energy-related information to carry out their 
tasks and businesses, e. g. current or histori-
cal grid status data, metering data or weather 
data. Energy information service providers 
collect raw data from multiple sources, analyze 
and refine the data and then offer specialized 
information services to their customers. One 
example of an energy information service 
is wind and PV power generation forecasts, 
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which are typically derived from a multitude of 
different weather data sources. - Energy system integrators:  Energy system integrators are established or new companies which develop ICT-based system 
solutions in all segments of the smart grid 
supply chain for their customers, e. g. solutions 
for advanced distribution system management 
and grid maintenance solutions for DSO, smart 
metering solutions for metering service provid-
ers or virtual power plant management solutions 
for VPP operators. The ICT sector in Europe has 
increasingly been participating in the develop-
ment of smart grids and is involved in approxi-
mately 60 % of all related research projects [48]. 
The ICT-related smart grid concepts developed 
by energy system integrators contribute to the 
general understanding of smart grids among 
established and new market actors, public 
decision-makers, and the general public.
4.4.3 Market design 
and RES integration
General market design German electricity whole-
sale markets bring together roughly 300 power gen-
eration companies, about 50 power trading compa-
nies, and approximately 1,110 power retail companies 
[19]. A high level of liquidity indicates that electric-
ity wholesale markets are functioning well [19]. The 
German wholesale market is currently separated into 
two major energy-only markets (see . Fig. 4.10):- The European Energy Exchange (EEX) with two products: spot (short-term) and future 
(long-term) markets for electricity. In contrast 
to China, there is only one uniform wholesale 
price for electricity in Germany irrespective 
of the power source, production technology, 
or age of the power plant under consideration. 
The market price – for all generators – at any 
given time is determined by the marginal costs 
of the last power plant required to satisfy total 
electricity demand. This nationally integrated 
market leads to a situation in which, at any 
point in time, only those power plants with the 
lowest marginal costs of production are able to 
sell their electricity on the market.- The over-the-counter (OTC) market gives sup-pliers and buyers of electricity the opportunity 
to bilaterally trade electricity and to negotiate 
contracts and prices irrespective of standard-
ized contracts or prices at the power exchange. 
Like the EEX, OTC contracts offer the pos-
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 . Fig. 4.10 Electricity wholesale markets in Germany
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sibility for spot and future trades. Products on 
both markets can be the same, e. g. short-term 
contracts with direct physical fulfillment can 
be either traded via the exchange or negotiated 
directly with another party on the OTC spot 
market.
Most of Germany’s electricity is traded bilaterally 
between generation and retail companies. In 2012 
for example, 7,000 TWh of electricity were traded 
in OTC transactions, whereas only approximately 
1,200 TWh were traded at the EEX [19].6 The attrac-
tiveness of OTC trading results from the fact that 
OTC products can be designed more flexibly ac-
cording to the specific needs of the parties involved. 
Nonetheless, EEX prices are very important because 
they serve as a reference value for OTC trading.
While generation and retail companies use the 
power exchange to trade electricity especially for 
short-term contracts (physical fulfillment), most of 
the trade at the power exchange is focused on the 
exchange of futures. Here electricity traders focus 
on financial exchanges. Traders expect to gain ben-
efits through the arbitrage between different future 
periods. Retail companies have to pay the generators 
for the electricity produced and the grid operator 
for the transport of the electricity. The generation 
company needs to inform TSO in advance about the 
exact electricity volume that its facility will produce 
within a certain period of time and to which cus-
tomer (e. g. power retail companies) the electricity 
needs to be transported.
Promotion and integration of RES To subsidize the 
development of RES, a fixed feed-in tariff which is 
significantly above market prices is paid to RES own-
ers. The EEG, which regulates the promotion of RES, 
was enacted in 2000 on the basis of the former Act on 
the Feed-In of Electricity from RES into the Public Grid, 
itself enacted in December 1990. The EEG regulates 
a feed-in system that comprises four key elements:- Fixed feed-in tariff: for each kWh produced and fed into the grid, a fixed price is paid 
6 Note that the quantity of electricity virtually traded either 
via OTC or EEX is considerably higher than the physical 
quantity of electricity generation and consumption. This is 
due to hedging or arbitrage activities of market participants. 
which is higher than the wholesale market 
price for electricity.- Take-up obligation: grid operators must buy the electricity from RES at all times and pay 
the feed-in tariff independently from current 
market prices.- RES priority: RES has priority over non-RES in case of network congestion.- RES curtailment in last resort: in case of network congestion, conventional power sup-
ply needs to be curtailed as much as possible 
before RES can be curtailed as well.
Feed-in tariffs at a glance The feed-in tariffs are 
usually paid for electricity stemming from hydro 
power, landfill gas, gas from purification plants, 
mine gas, biomass, biogas, geothermal power, on-
shore wind, offshore wind, small-sized rooftop PV 
installations, and large-scale PV parks. With regard 
to the specific design of the feed-in tariffs, three as-
pects must be considered:- First, feed-in tariffs differ depending on the power source under consideration. - Second, feed-in tariffs for installations using the same power source often depend on the 
installed capacity with higher feed-in tariffs 
applying to smaller installations.- Third, feed-in tariffs are paid for a period of 20 years and the feed-in tariff paid for each 
installation at the moment of its commission-
ing is guaranteed over the whole period.7
Feed-in tariffs for new installations have been 
steadily adjusted downwards since the implemen-
tation of the EEG in 2000, reflecting technical prog-
ress and the declining costs of RES. However, feed-in 
tariffs for installations that went into service before 
the adjustments remain at their originally guaran-
teed level. To facilitate planning for RES investors, 
future reductions of the feed-in tariffs are already 
known today and recorded in specific reduction 
schemes that are part of governmental supplements 
7 Wind power represents an exception to this general frame-
work: tariffs for wind farms are not constant over the whole 
period but are slightly elevated during the first years of 
the operation. Also, feed-in tariffs for wind farms do not 
decrease with the size of the wind farm.
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to the EEG. Depending on the capacity and some 
other characteristics of the installations, the follow-
ing ranges of feed-in tariffs for the power sources 
with the highest relevance were paid in 2012 [49]:- Hydro: 0.034 €/kWh–0.127 €/kWh - Onshore wind: 0.0893 €/kWh–0.0991 €/kWh- Offshore wind: 0.15 €/kWh–0.19 €/kWh- Biomass: 0.06 €/kWh–0.143 €/kWh - PV: 0.1794 €/kWh–0.2443 €/kWh
Financial burden caused by feed-in tariffs Elec-
tricity generated by means of RES (RES-E) is traded 
on wholesale markets irrespectively of the feed-in 
tariffs. RES-E enters Germany’s wholesale markets 
in the following way:- Generators of RES-E receive the feed-in tariff from their respective distribution grid opera-
tor, who in turn gets an equivalent compensa-
tion from the transmission grid operator.- The transmission grid operator sells RES-E on a wholesale market, frequently receiving a 
price considerably lower than the governmen-
tally fixed feed-in tariff.- To avoid financial burdens for transmission grid operators as a result of this practice, 
the difference between the fixed feed-in 
tariffs and the market prices for electricity 
is refunded in full to the transmission grid 
operator.- The financial capital for this compensation stems from the electricity consumers, who have 
to pay a surcharge for the promotion of RES on 
their electricity bill (renewable energy sur-
charge). The amount of the surcharge depends 
on the type of consumer (with high discounts 
for industrial consumers) but does not depend 
on the consumer’s geographic location.
The financial burden caused by this compensation 
has increased significantly in the course of the past 
years. In 2000, approximately one billion euros was 
necessary to cover the difference costs of RES feed-
in tariffs.8 This figure increased to approximately 
EUR 16 billion in 2012 and is projected to amount 
8  Difference costs refer to the total amount of feed-in tariffs 
paid to investors minus the revenues from RES-E on whole-
sale markets. 
to roughly EUR 20 billion in 2014 [50]. Owing to 
the increasing share of RES in Germany’s elec-
tricity mix, the renewable energy surcharge rose 
from 0.0008 €/kWh in 2000 to 0.0528 €/kWh in 
2013 [51]. Germany has made the experience that 
setting up a system with feed-in tariffs financed by 
means of a surcharge that does not vary in differ-
ent regions redirects purchasing power from re-
gions with high loads towards regions with high 
RES capacities. Berlin, with its more than 3 mil-
lion inhabitants (roughly 4.1 % of Germany’s total 
population), received only 0.1 % of all RES con-
nected payments, whereas Schleswig-Holstein, a 
federal state in Northern Germany with less than 
3 million inhabitants (about 3.5 % of the popula-
tion), received 7.0 % of all RES connected pay-
ments [51]. However, Berlin’s population did not 
pay less than the population in Schleswig-Holstein 
to finance the RES funds. This means that purchas-
ing power was implicitly redirected from Berlin 
to Schleswig-Holstein owing to the RES financing 
mechanism.
The effects of RES on wholesale electricity 
prices The price on the wholesale electricity mar-
ket is determined by the marginal costs of the last 
power plant required to satisfy total electricity de-
mand setting the price which is applied to all gen-
erators at that point in time. The power plants are 
ranked according to their marginal costs of electric-
ity generation (merit order), with the plants with 











 . Fig. 4.11 Effects of RES supply on the wholesale electricity 
prices
Chapter 4 • Germany’s way from conventional power grids towards smart grids68
dispatched first and the ones with the highest mar-
ginal costs brought online last.
TSO are mandated by law to prioritize the 
feed-in of RES before other conventional genera-
tion technologies. Once installed and connected 
to the grid, wind and PV installations can produce 
electricity with almost zero marginal costs, while 
costs of electricity generation from fossil fuel-fired 
power plants depends on the price of the combus-
tibles used (fuel costs). Thus, electricity generated 
from RES enters the wholesale markets at the be-
ginning of the merit order (at zero marginal costs) 
and is dispatched first. As a consequence, average 
wholesale prices decrease as the generation tech-
nologies with higher marginal costs are displaced 
by an increasing volume of RES-E. Thus, large-scale 
integration of RES-E suppresses wholesale electric-
ity prices. This is known as the so-called merit order 
effect (see . Fig. 4.11). With large amounts of RES-
E traded on the wholesale markets (on windy and 
sunny days), wholesale prices are rather low. When 
high feed-in of RES-E corresponds to low demand 
on the consumption side (typically on Sundays), 
prices for electricity can even reach negative val-
ues. On these days, Germany sometimes exports 
electricity to foreign countries and has to remu-
nerate these countries for absorbing the German 
electricity. There were negative spot market prices 
for almost 80 hours in 2013. Such negative prices 
occurred in ten of twelve months [52]. In conclu-
sion, it can be said that the increasing share of RES 
leads to decreasing but much more volatile prices 
on the wholesale markets.
As wholesale market prices decrease, gas-fired 
power plants, which have high marginal costs, are 
dispatched less and less frequently making an eco-
nomically viable operation difficult and deterring 
investors. However, with their flexibility and fast 
ramp times gas-fired power plants are considered a 
necessary part of a power system with a high share 
of variable RES. Due to these developments, discus-
sions on a revision of the EEG and alternative sup-
port schemes and incentive mechanisms for invest-
ments in conventional power plants are currently 
taking place in Germany.
Electricity retail markets and prices Electricity 
retail markets are based on bilateral standardized 
contracts without any interactions on market-
places. They are less complex than wholesale mar-
kets. In both Germany and China, households and 
industrial consumers pay different retail prices. In 
contrast to China, German households have to 
pay significantly more than industrial consumers. 
In 2012, the price amounted to roughly 0.13 €/
kWh for industrial consumers, whereas the price 
for household consumers amounted to approxi-
mately 0.26 €/kWh [53]. These privileges for in-
dustrial consumers were introduced to increase 
the competitiveness of Germany’s industry on 
world markets. 
The retail price for electricity can be subdivided 
into three main categories: - Taxes (electricity tax and value-added-tax) and fees (mainly concessional duties and the 
renewable energy surcharge) currently make 
up approximately 50 % of the electricity price.- Costs of power generation and retail amount to approximately 30 % of the price. Be-
tween 1998 and 2000, these costs decreased 
from 0.1291 €/kWh to 0.0858 €/kWh as a 
result of the market liberalization of 1998, 
which created more market competition in all 
areas of the power sector supply chain. In the 
following years, the size of this price compo-
nent increased slowly but steadily until 2009 
and has remained rather stable since then 
[53]. - Governmentally regulated network charges compensating grid operators for electric-
ity transmission and distribution. Network 
charges make up roughly 20 % of the retail 
price paid by household consumers [3]
. Figure 4.12 illustrates the development of electric-
ity prices for private households and its composition 
in Germany since 2006. The electricity retail price 
has increased due to rising costs of power genera-
tion and retail as well as rising taxes and surcharges 
(fees), which increased from 0.0714 €/kWh in 2006 
to 0.1163 €/kWh by 2012 [53]. The increase of the 
renewable energy surcharge from 0.008 €/kWh in 
2006 to 0.0528 €/kWh in 2013 contributed to this 
development. In the same timeframe, the network 
charges decreased slightly.
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4.4.4 Development of infrastructure 
and network regulation
Coordination of network expansion In Ger-
many, many different stakeholders are involved in 
grid expansion planning. Even if planning activity 
is mainly in the hands of TSO and BNetzA, other 
established power sector companies, third parties 
and the public can also influence network expan-
sion planning. From a legal point of view, the expan-
sion of the electric power grid is mainly regulated 
by EnWG, by the Energy Network Development Act 
(EnLAG), and by NABEG: - § 12 EnWG states that transmission grid operators are responsible for elaborating and 
issuing a coordinated network expansion plan 
each year. This plan is supposed to describe 
which upgrades of the transmission grids will 
be necessary during the following ten years. 
The process of network expansion planning 
is monitored by BNetzA. It allows for public 
participation and is open to comments from 
various stakeholders.- EnLAG defines specific investment projects in single transmission lines with the intention 
of facilitating the integration of RES, improv-
ing the interconnection with neighboring 
countries, easing the connection of new power 
plants, and reducing network congestions.- NABEG further specifies procedures relat-ing to the network expansion plan. Its main 
motivation is to accelerate the planning and 
approval procedures of network expansion.
Cost pass-through regulation until 2009 The costs 
of investments in the grid infrastructure are shared 
by all electricity consumers via network charges. 
Until 2009, investment into the grid infrastructure 
was regulated using a so-called cost pass-through 
regulation which was also applied in many European 
countries and the United States. Cost pass-through 
regulation adjusts permissible revenues according to 
the grid operator’s accounting and capital costs. The 
primary advantage of this system is that it lowers in-
vestment risks as practically all costs can be passed 
on to the end-user (via network charges), thus en-
couraging investment in the infrastructure. However, 
this regulation does not set incentives for efficient 
grid operation especially important in power systems 
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 . Fig. 4.12 Development of the electricity price for private households in Germany, adapted from [3]
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Incentive-based regulation after 2009 Today, 
network charges in Germany are regulated using 
incentive-based regulation in the form of a so-called 
revenue cap. This solution relates to a model pro-
posed by the former UK Treasury economist Ste-
phen Littlechild in 1983. He criticized the lack of 
efficiency incentives of cost pass-through regulation 
and proposed the price-based regulation, which is 
known as RPI-X [54]. Apart from Germany, similar 
systems exist across Europe (e. g. the UK) and in 
some areas of the United States as well.
For Germany, the details of revenue cap regu-
lation are defined in the Incentive Regulation Or-
dinance (ARegV). With price-based regulation, 
the future revenue cap is defined ex-ante for the 
coming regulation period (five years in Germany). 
Within the regulation period, the formula used to 
calculate the precise level of the revenue cap re-
mains unchanged. Permissible revenues therefore 
follow a predetermined path during the regula-
tion period. The revenue cap is mainly based on 
previous-year revenues minus the so-called RPI-X 
Factor. This factor consists of the retail price index 
(RPI) and an anticipated increase in productiv-
ity (the so-called X-Factor). The X-Factor is an 
important element of incentive-based regulation. 
It is determined individually for each grid opera-
tor. If a grid operator reaches a higher increase in 
productivity than anticipated by the regulator, ad-
ditional cost savings need not be passed through 
to the consumer and thus remain as additional 
profit for the company. This mechanism there-
fore represents an incentive to improve efficiency. 
The disadvantage of incentive-based regulation is 
that cost-saving pressure may be at the expense of 
network investment. In Germany, with its large 
network investment requirements, a reform of the 
regulatory system to facilitate efficient investment 
is therefore currently being discussed.
Regulation of supply security Network regulation 
relates not only to network charges but also to moni-
toring supply security. EnWG contains several para-
graphs on this aspect. § 13 and § 14 EnWG assign 
responsibility for stable grid operation to transmis-
sion grid operators and distribution grid operators 
respectively. In urgent situations with a national rel-
evance (for example situations of network conges-
tions), grid operators must contact BNetzA without 
any delays (§ 13, section 6, EnWG). With regard to 
less urgent and more local situations, grid opera-
tors are obliged to issue a yearly report listing all 
supply interruptions within their respective grid 
area (§ 52 EnWG). This report must be submitted 
to BNetzA every year by the end of April via an 
internet-based process (see [55]). 
The description of each supply interruption 
must include the time, duration, scope, and cause 
of the interruption. Grid operators are also obliged 
to describe the preventive measures taken to avoid 
such interruptions in the future. A document en-
titled Guidelines of BNetzA concerning reporting du-
ties for supply interruptions in electric power grids 
according to § 52 EnWG (see [56]) specifies the in-
formation to be transmitted to the regulator.
4.4.5 Coordination of generation 
and consumption
Long-term coordination vs. short-term balancing 
of generation and consumption Neither elec-
tricity generation nor electricity consumption has 
changed dramatically in Germany during the last 
two decades. Thus, policies focusing on facilitating 
the long-term coordination of electricity generation 
capacities with the development of electricity con-
sumption are not a primary concern in Germany. 
However, due to the increasing intermittency of 
Germany’s electricity generation caused by RES 
integration, policies aiming at balancing electricity 
generation and consumption in the short-term have 
become more and more important.
The role of TSO in balancing generation and con-
sumption in the short-term Before the beginning 
of the unbundling process, decisions such as the dis-
patching of power plants were coordinated within 
the firms themselves. Today, these decisions are 
coordinated in the wholesale and retail markets de-
scribed in ▶ Sect. 4.4.3. In some cases, however, the 
balancing of generation and consumption and re-
spective dispatching of power plants as determined 
by the market cannot be realized due to physical 
restrictions with regard to power grid infrastructure 
capacities. In these cases, the TSO are responsible 
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for balancing generation and consumption in or-
der to secure system stability. Specifically, German 
TSO are allowed to take the following measures and 
make the following adjustments:- So-called balancing markets are independent from EEX and OTC trading and allow genera-
tion and consumption to be adjusted in the very 
short term: according to § 12 EnWG, TSO can 
tender the required balancing power through 
a common internet platform.9 Three different 
reserves are tendered: primary, secondary, and 
tertiary reserve. Primary reserve needs to be 
available within 30 seconds and is tendered on a 
monthly basis. Secondary reserve must be avail-
able within 5 minutes and is also tendered on 
a monthly basis. Tertiary reserve has to replace 
the secondary reserve after 15 minutes. Tertiary 
reserve is tendered on a daily basis.- An Ordinance on Disconnectable Loads (AbLaV) was issued in 2013. It allows TSO to 
tender, on a monthly basis, loads of up to 3 GW 
that can be disconnected within 15 minutes if 
there is an urgent need to adjust consumption 
downwards. Like in the balancing markets, the 
loads are tendered on an internet platform.- If generation and consumption cannot be bal-anced in balancing markets or by disconnecting 
loads according to AbLaV, TSO are entitled to 
overrule market outcomes by forcing power gen-
erators to adjust their generation. In that case, 
the affected generation companies have to be 
compensated for financial losses and BNetzA has 
to be informed immediately on such measures.
The role of electricity tariffs in balancing genera-
tion and consumption in the short term Tradi-
tionally, the main function of electricity prices was 
the coordination of electricity generation and con-
sumption in the long-run by incentivizing invest-
ments in generation capacities, grid capacities, and 
end-use-devices. Currently, there is a trend towards 
tariff structures on retail markets being designed 
to take over the balancing of generation and con-
sumption even in the short term. The widespread 
introduction of such time-of-use pricing critically 
9 Please refer to ▶ http://www.regelleistung.net for more 
information on this internet platform.
depends on a successful rollout of smart meters. 
Currently, only few households in Germany are 
equipped with smart meters. According to a recent 
survey among German energy market experts, the 
widespread rollout of smart meters is not expected 
to be completed before 2029 [57].
As a consequence, the German tariff system cur-
rently has less time-of-use pricing elements than 
the Chinese tariff system. The following elements 
provide examples for time-of-use pricing elements 
included in the German tariff system:- For more than 20 years, electricity prices for industrial consumers have been separated into 
a peak load price and a base load price. This 
offers users an incentive to keep peak demand 
as low as possible. Technically, energy manage-
ment systems within factories supervise and 
control the processes within certain ranges 
to effectively reduce peak demand. In recent 
times, more differentiated time-of-use pricing 
has been introduced to take advantage of the 
flexibility within the industrial production 
process for load shifting.- Since 2011, EnWG has obliged each power retail company to offer at least one electric-
ity tariff for residential consumers with price 
levels differentiating at least between times 
of peak and base load. However, only few 
German households have chosen such a tariff 
because the potential financial savings it offers 
are rather low [58]. 
4.4.6 The role of information 
and communication
The role of government in promoting smart grid-
related ICT In addition to guiding the German 
debate on smart grid developments and including 
third parties in the smart grid development process, 
the German government promotes the development 
of smart grid technologies by means of innovation 
policies. The smart grid innovation policies of the 
German government currently focus on the pro-
motion of R&D and are embedded into the govern-
ment’s broader energy research policy.- The first objective of Germany’s energy re-search policy is to contribute to achieving the 
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targets set by the government in relation to the 
energy sector and climate policy by supporting 
the early-stage development of new technolo-
gies, concepts and business models.- The second target is to enhance the position of German companies in the field of modern 
energy technologies. - The third objective is to secure and enhance technological options. This objective seeks 
to help improve the flexibility of Germany’s 
energy supply and is consequently directly 
related to smart grid technologies.
In general, smart grid research projects are co-
funded by the German government with a govern-
ment grant amounting to 50 % of the total project 
costs being paid to industrial project members. 
Public research institutes and universities often get 
100 % government funding. Mainly large consortia 
of industrial companies (utilities, manufacturers, 
telcos, innovative small and medium-sized enter-
prises, and energy service companies) and R&D 
institutions such as universities or independent in-
stitutes compete among each other for government 
funds. Their research proposals are evaluated by 
independent evaluators or government bodies and 
the best concepts are recommended for funding. 
Some results from early R&D projects Germany’s 
main funding program for smart grid and smart 
market policies so far was the so-called E-Energy 
funding scheme set up by BMWi and supported by 
BMUB. Extended demonstration projects were car-
ried out in six German regions to validate the in-
tegration and balancing of renewables and the in-
clusion of third parties and smart markets such as 
regional energy marketplaces. The development of 
new ICT solutions for smart grids and smart markets 
was an additional key target. The overall volume of 
this program was roughly EUR 140 million [59]. 
The main motivations behind the E-Energy 
funding scheme were- to establish a lead market in developing smart grid technologies,- to integrate smart grid developments into the European context, and- to guarantee the security of supply in the future power system. 
The results of one of the E-Energy projects called E-
DeMa show that in today’s market conditions there 
are not enough incentives for residential consum-
ers to apply DSM or demand response (DR) [60]. 
However, it is expected that the projected expan-
sion of RES generation capacities will increase the 
demand and the corresponding business opportu-
nity for DSM. Therefore, numerous German retail-
ers have projects promoting consumers’ commit-
ment to shift electricity consumption to off-peak 
times and to use electricity more efficiently (e. g. 
by visualizing end users’ electricity consumption). 
One important result in this context is that new 
market concepts are necessary to efficiently explore 
the load shifting potential of customers. An elec-
tronic marketplace developed in the framework 
of the E-Energy projects could, for example, serve 
as a communication and interaction platform for 
residential consumers.
Selected findings and lessons learned 
from E-Energy- Household customers with detailed informa-tion on their load behavior are able to reduce 
electricity consumption by roughly 5 %. - Saving potentials are higher for commercial and industrial enterprises. These consumers 
were able to save up to 20 % with detailed 
information on their electricity consumption. - Electricity consumption needs to be made transparent with feedback instruments indi-
cating current and historical consumption.- An illustration of historical consumption provided with the monthly electricity bill can 
sometimes constitute sufficient feedback 
for household consumers. In general, more 
sophisticated feedback instruments are 
necessary, especially for companies.- Transparent electricity consumption pat-terns are not sufficient to save on electric 
power. Consumers must also be empowered 
to assess the relevant information and de-
cide on possible options. Advisory measures, 
efficiency indicators, and analytic tools are 
necessary in this context. 
Source: B.A.U.M. Consult G.m.b.H. [59]
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In the wake of the E-Energy funding scheme, the 
call for project proposals for the Future Proof Power 
Grids research program took place in early 2013. 
The aim of the program is to improve cooperation 
between industry and academia throughout the 
value chain and facilitate international research co-
operation. Another goal is to improve the environ-
mental, economic, and resource efficiency of elec-
tricity networks as well as the security of electricity 
supply research under this program is supported 
with a total of EUR 150 million provided by three 
different ministries [61]. More than 400 companies 
and 300 academic and research institutions formed 
research consortia and submitted 171 project pro-
posals. The large majority of project proposals deals 
with issues related to distribution grids, with pro-
posed research on transmission grids also attracting 
a significant amount of proposals and wind power 
integration trailing behind [61]. The focus of most 
proposals is on the management of grid operations, 
followed by technical challenges of transmission 
and distribution grids as well as network planning.
The role of the ICT industry in promoting smart 
grids The ICT industry has developed a promi-
nent view on Germany’s smart grid issues. Repre-
sentatives of the ICT industry contributed to the 
creation of the comprehensive German smart grid 
vision elaborated in FEG. Germany’s ICT industry 
is focusing less on basic aspects of communications 
but more on general services to end consumers, 
e. g. value-added services at residential level, apps 
for energy efficiency, and big data aspects relating 
to power grid data exchange, data processing, and 
archiving. While smart grid funding and lobbying 
is strongly influenced by the ICT industry, aspects 
related to distribution grids are still dominated by 
companies from the energy sector. 
The Federation of German Industries (BDI) and 
the Federal Association for Information Technology, 
Telecommunications and New Media (BITKOM), 
which focus on the ICT point of view, can be re-
garded as important players to address the view of 
the ICT industry in the smart grid debate: the for-
mer is a large general industrial association commu-
nicating the interests of German industry to those 
in positions of political responsibility. The latter is a 
large association dedicated to information technol-
ogy, telecommunications, and new media industry. 
In addition to the promotion of the business devel-
opment, these associations focus on the aspect of 
data privacy. Therefore, important legislation and 
regulatory topics covered by both associations are 
smart metering (private consumption data), smart 
home gateways (also private data and service inter-
ruptions), and certain aspects of controllable local 
systems and communication requirements of the 
German Forum Network Technology/Network Op-
eration in the VDE (FNN).
Information security in Germany’s smart 
grid environment
Besides system operation, information security 
in Germany strongly focuses on the aspect of 
user acceptance, e. g. in the domain of smart 
metering. In that context, data privacy is a very 
important issue. The standards discussed in 
the context of information security in Ger-
many include the IEC Technical Committee (TC) 
57 family, ISA 99 and the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection Committee (CIPC). Furthermore, 
studies for the BMWi have been carried out to 
provide an overview of previous attacks in the 
energy domain, existing solutions and security 
standards, and also insights on security metrics 
and patterns [63].
Standardization in the information security sec-
tor seeks to unify the implementation of ICT se-
curity measures. The ultimate aim is to improve 
the common security level in the power system.
An overview of common security standards in 
Germany is given by BITKOM and DIN, although 
it does not cover the energy domain directly 
[64]. An evaluation of security standards and 
guidelines for the energy domain was con-
ducted in the European project European 
Network for the Security of Control and Real 
Time Systems (ESCoRTS). This topic is also ad-
dressed by the Smart Grid Information Security 
(SGIS) working group, which is partly respon-
sible for carrying out the European Mandate 
M/490 as well as the corresponding DKE Group 
STD 1911.11 in Germany (see [65]).
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The requirements stated in the white paper on 
Requirements for Secure Control and Telecommu-
nication Systems [66] by the German Association 
of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW) aim to 
support the acquisition, development, and 
revision of control and telecommunications 
systems in the energy sector to minimize the 
consequences of threats.
Key findings- Germany has a stable and nationwide integrated electric power system. The power sector is in an ad-
vanced state of unbundling, featuring widely used 
markets for power exchange. Retail prices are rather 
high in Germany due to taxes and levies imposed to 
finance the modernization of the power system.- An important goal of the German government is to increase the sustainability of the electric power 
system. RES generation capacities have therefore 
been strongly built up in recent years and are likely 
to further increase in importance during the next 
decades. The increasing feed-in of intermittent RES 
generation puts more and more stress on grid op-
eration in Germany. In this context, Germany has 
gathered significant experience on topics relating 
to grid integration and curtailment of RES.- In Germany, smart grids are seen as a means to enhance the electric power grid so that it can 
cope with the increasing feed-in of RES and to 
avoid investments in the conventional (primary) 
grid infrastructure. New market concepts such as 
regional energy marketplaces, business services, 
and VPP also play an important role in the German 
smart grid concept. They are expected to increase 
business activities, integrate new market actors in 
the power sector, and facilitate the involvement of 
power consumers.- Representatives from the electric power sector, manufacturing sector, ICT sector, and from the sci-
ence and research community recently developed 
a comprehensive smart grid vision for Germany 
that uses a systematic and comprehensive top-
down approach. This approach can serve as a best 
practice example of how to develop and formulate 
a smart grid vision.
- The government plays a strong role in Germany’s energy sector regulation: it published credible 
long-term goals for the development of the power 
sector until 2050. There is also strong coordination 
between the different governmental institutions 
involved in energy policy. Finally, the regulatory 
authority is independent from the government 
and can be seen as a powerful player in Germa-
ny’s power system. The government is very active 
in the smart grid development process as well: 
BNetzA has issued a widely acknowledged govern-
ment position on smart grids and smart markets 
while BMWi aims at including new market actors 
in the smart grid development process. - The unbundling process, the legally enforced trend towards more competition, as well as the 
migration towards smart grids and RES have con-
tributed to the emergence of new market actors 
in Germany. Their growing importance can be 
considered as the most profound change in Ger-
many’s market structure during the last few years: 
new market actors introduced innovative products 
and services and contributed to the moderniza-
tion of Germany’s energy power sector. The ICT 
industry for example, has developed a prominent 
view on Germany’s smart grid topics and places 
a special emphasis on services being provided to 
end consumers.
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5.1 Define a long-term strategy 
for the electricity sector 
and establish an independent 
and powerful regulator
Chinese context - China has formulated explicit targets for the short-term future of its electric power 
system in its 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy 
Development. However, there are no official 
goals for the period after 2015. Also, there 
is as yet no comprehensive vision of China’s 
smart grid, especially with regard to distribu-
tion grids and the period after 2020. - The governance structure of China’s energy system regulation comprises a broad variety 
of ministries and institutions. The multiplicity 
of these stakeholders as well as the frequent 
reorganizations that have been taking 
place lead to difficulties in coordination and 
increased overlap of competences between 
the various government institutions involved 
in the power system regulation.- China’s earlier regulatory authority, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was 
merged with the National Energy Administra-
tion (NEA) in 2013. The National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and NEA are 
currently the responsible regulatory institu-
tions for the electricity sector. Both share 
regulatory responsibilities and are subject to 
political and industrial influence.
5.1.1 Background
Smart grids require strong government leader-
ship Smart grids are not an objective in its own 
right, but a new approach to meet the challenges 
that will arise with future electricity systems, for 
instance with an increasing share of renewable 
energies. Specifically, smart grids aim at achieving 
economic efficiency by combining the strengths of 
conventional grids with the new capabilities of ICT. 
In Germany, ICT requirements in electricity grids 
are driven mainly by intermittent supply from RES. 
Without RES, the conventional grid infrastructure 
would be sufficient to maintain high reliability levels 
in Germany’s electric power system. 
The evolution towards smart grids necessitates 
strong vision and leadership on the part of the 
government, because smart grids are not a market-
driven concept:- A clearly defined long-term strategy for the electric power sector reduces uncertainty for 
smart grid investors and manufacturers. A 
lower level of uncertainty on future develop-
ments reduces the risks with respect to the 
investment’s future cash flows. As such, smart 
grid investors and manufacturers are more 
willing to invest in smart grid technologies. A 
long-term strategy includes government tar-
gets with regard to the development of electric-
ity generation capacities of different technolo-
gies (the so-called generation mix) and targets 
for energy efficiency.- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of government bodies are a fundamental require-
ment for the development of smart grids. 
Especially, a clear delineation between the 
competences of the ministries and the regula-
tor, and possibly other supervisory bodies is 
associated with a high degree of credibility and 
assertiveness of government policy. - An independent and powerful regulator func-tions as a coordinating institution between 
all market participants (incumbents and new 
market entrants). The coordination specifi-
cally focuses on the development of equal 
and non-discriminatory conditions of market 
entry where all market parties are treated 
equally and market power of single market 
actors is limited. The regulator should be 
sufficiently powerful to impose the measures 
necessary to manage the development of the 
electricity sector and the development of 
smart grids.
Characteristics of an independent regulator There 
are two aspects to a regulator’s independence: - independence from the regulated industry and- independence from politics.
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It is important for the regulator to be independent 
from the industry that is being regulated. If inde-
pendence is not guaranteed, the danger of so-called 
regulatory capture (i. e. the regulator rather favors 
commercial and industrial interests instead of pub-
lic interests) is high [1]. On the other hand, a regu-
lator needs to cooperate closely with the industry. 
Therefore, a relation of mutual trust is important. In 
some cases, the regulatory office is actually financed 
by the regulated industry. Note that this is not nec-
essarily a contradiction to the requirement of in-
dependence. Following the rules set by the govern-
ment, the firms are actually obliged to finance the 
work of the regulator on the basis of a pre-defined 
payment plan which is not based on a firm’s satisfac-
tion with the regulator’s work. The risk of regulatory 
capture is therefore small. 
The independence of the regulator from the 
regulated industry can be ensured in several ways:- The processes, decisions, and procedures of the regulator have to be transparent so that they 
can be controlled.- The regulator should make use of public consultations in which not only the regulated 
industry but also other stakeholders or the 
general public can express their views. Again, 
this avoids opaque agreements between the 
regulator and regulated industries.- The regulator should be monitored at regular intervals and should have to justify its work, 
for example, in an annual report.- Personal financial interests between the regulator and the regulated industry must be 
avoided. Two rules are specifically important 
in this context: first, senior regulator manage-
ment should not be allowed to have financial 
stakes in the regulated industry. Second, a 
moratorium period during which senior regu-
lator management cannot accept a job in the 
regulated industry is very useful.
Why the regulator should be independent from 
politics or from the ministry is a less straightfor-
ward question. Ultimately, the regulator is a govern-
ment institution that is governed by the ministry. 
The relevant concern is the precise legal delineation 
of authority: who decides on what? In the follow-
ing, four main arguments for independence of the 
regulator are listed: - Following the classical pattern of the separa-tion of powers, the legislator, the body that 
sets the rules, needs to be separated from the 
regulator, who applies the rules, as a system of 
checks and balances.- The state may be the owner of the regulated industry, which causes an obvious conflict of 
interest.- Ministries are often very close to political decision-makers and base their decisions on 
criteria that are different from those of regula-
tors. Politicians have to mediate and choose 
between various diverging preferences in their 
society. Regulators of a monopoly industry, in 
contrast, try to improve overall efficiency by 
applying legal and economic tools.- Regulation requires a long-term perspective. Grid operators for example, are incentivized to 
continuously invest in the grid infrastructure 
only with a high predictability and stability 
of legal and regulatory decisions. Whereas 
politicians tend to be subject to so-called 
short-termism (i. e. they often ignore long-term 
issues), an independent regulator is less vul-
nerable to short-termism as he is not elected 
by the public.
How can independence of the regulator from poli-
tics be achieved?- In the governance structure, the regulator can be an independent chamber of the ministry 
instead of an integrated department.- The appointment and especially the dismissal of the chief regulator(s) should be a transpar-
ent and well-defined process.- The regulatory office should have a budget that is largely independent from daily government 
business.- The duties and powers of the regulator should be laid down in a law. Specifically, the delinea-
tion of competence between the regulator and 
the ministry should be clearly described. In 
many countries, a general energy law contains 
a description of the duties and powers of the 
regulator. 
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- There should be a system of checks and bal-ances. Specifically, it has to be clear who is 
responsible for regulating and controlling the 
regulator. For example, this may be a judicial 
court system, or another regulatory author-
ity with an equal level of substance (e. g. a 
competition commission). A system of checks 
and balances allows greater regulator indepen-
dence.
It is important to note that the precise details of 
independence from politics or ministries depend 
strongly on the wider political and governmental 
structure in a country. 
Characteristics of a powerful regulator The need 
for a powerful regulator is more obvious: - The competences of the regulator need to be laid down in a law so that decisions can be 
enforced and challenged in court. In Europe, 
it has been extensively debated whether the 
liberalized parts of the energy sector could be 
regulated under a general competition law or 
whether sector-specific legislation is necessary 
to ensure the development of competition. 
The test of practical experience, for example 
in Germany, has shown convincingly that 
sector-specific regulation, executed by a sector-
specific regulator, is necessary (e. g. [2]). - The regulator needs to have an adequate budget. The stakes in industry are so high 
that it always pays off for the industry to hire 
consultants, lawyers, and lobbyists to argue 
their case; the regulator needs to address these 
claims. Moreover, good regulation is difficult 
and requires highly qualified staff; the regula-
tor will have to compete with the industry for 
qualified employees.- Electric power companies and other stake-holders should have the right to appeal the 
regulator’s decisions before a court or other 
tribunals empowered to conduct judicial 
reviews. Such a system of checks and balances 
makes the regulator more powerful because 
knowing that another institution may check 
and correct the regulator allows him to take 
more risk.
5.1.2 International practice
Long-term strategies for the electric power sec-
tor Medium-term to long-term plans with concrete 
goals regarding electricity consumption, energy ef-
ficiency, and/or renewables have been published in 
many industrialized and emerging countries. These 
plans often cover a period of at least 25 years (see 
[3], [4], and [5] for examples from UK, India, and 
Brazil). In its Federal Energy Concept, Germany has 
defined binding political goals for renewables until 
2050. The government has specified the future share 
of RES-E in gross electricity production with four 
goals for different time periods: by 2020 renewables 
are to have a share of at least 35 % in gross electricity 
consumption, a 50 % share by 2030, 65 % by 2040 
and 80 % by 2050 [6]. Similar targets have been de-
fined with respect to gross electricity consumption 
that is planned to decrease by 50 % until 2050.
Different studies commissioned by the German 
government analyze how to achieve the various gov-
ernment targets. At the same time, the scenarios for 
energy and power sector development put forward 
in these studies serve as a foundation for policy for-
mulation and a point of reference for further studies 
on more particular topics such as smart grid devel-
opment. A study entitled Long-term scenarios and 
strategies for the expansion of renewable energies in 
Germany, taking account of developments in Europe 
and across the world investigated potential scenar-
ios with respect to the development of renewable 
energies in Germany [7]. The results of this study 
are used to define strategies for the development 
of smart grids in Germany (e. g. how to finance the 
large investment requirements for smart grids). 
The role of an independent and powerful regula-
tor The OECD points at the importance of a clear 
definition of roles and responsibilities with respect 
to regulation. Within the OECD’s recommendations 
on regulation, the necessity of a common govern-
ment policy defining clear goals for the regulation 
process is specified. According to OECD, strategies 
shall be set for the implementation of these goals to 
give regulation a clearly defined framework [8]. Fur-
thermore, OECD emphasized the importance of an 
independent and powerful regulator for the efficient 
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development of the electricity sector. The govern-
ment has the task to clearly define the duties and the 
power of the regulator [8]. OECD also points out that 
independence of the regulator is essential since its 
decisions can have serious economic effects on the 
regulated parties. This is especially the case for smart 
grids, where the introduction of competition is di-
rectly related to economic effects for the incumbents.
The US American way: FERC
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) is the regulatory authority in the 
United States. It is an independent regulator 
responsible for the regulation of the interstate 
transmission of electricity, natural gas, and 
oil. In addition, FERC reviews proposals to 
build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and 
interstate natural gas pipelines, and it licenses 
hydro power projects. Further responsibilities of 
FERC outlined in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
include, amongst others:- review of mergers and acquisitions as well as corporate transactions by electricity compa-
nies,- approval of siting and abandonment of interstate natural gas pipelines and storage 
facilities,- licensing and inspection of hydro power projects,- protection of the reliability of the high volt-age interstate transmission system through 
mandatory reliability standards,- monitoring and investigation of energy markets, and- administration of accounting and financial reporting regulations and conduction of 
regulated companies [58].
The independence and power of FERC are 
specified in 42 USC section 7172 g – Jurisdiction 
of the Commission [59]:
“The decision of the Commission involving any 
function within its jurisdiction, other than action 
by it on a matter referred to it pursuant to sec-
tion 7174 of this title, shall be final agency action 
within the meaning of section 704 of title 5 and 
shall not be subject to further review by the Secre-
tary or any officer or employee of the Department.”
The European Commission (EC) describes the char-
acteristics of a powerful regulator in articles 37 et 
seq. of Directive 2009/72/EC (see appendix E). It 
states, for instance, that a powerful regulator should 
fulfill the following tasks and requirements:- issue decisions that are binding for electric power companies,- impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties on electric power companies,- ensure high standards of universal and public service,- protect vulnerable customers, - contribute to the effectiveness of consumer protection measures, and- promote effective competition and the proper functioning of the electricity market. 
Germany has established BNetzA, a regulator in-
dependent from the industry and the government. 
The powers and duties of BNetzA are recorded in 
EnWG. Neither the ministry nor the industry can 
overrule the decisions taken by BNetzA. The regu-
lator’s decisions can only be challenged before the 
court. The German regulator makes use of its power 
to supervise the network charges of the grid opera-
tors, to prevent or remove obstacles in access to en-
ergy supply networks for suppliers and consumers, 
to standardize processes for switching the power 
retail company, and to improve the conditions for 
connecting new generators to the grid. Driven by 
the growing share of renewables and the resulting 
need to expand the grid infrastructure in Germany, 
the regulator also has the task of supervising the net-
work expansion process (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.1 for more 
detailed information on the German regulator).
5.1.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China has not yet formulated explicit targets for the 
long-term future of its electric power system. This 
situation risks creating uncertainty among smart 
grid investors and manufacturers which might con-
sequently postpone smart grid investments. Their 
uncertainty could be reduced by means of a clearly 
defined and committed long-term strategy for the 
electric power sector. Such a strategy should include 
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government targets with regard to future generation 
capacities, shares of different generation technologies 
(generation mix), and targets for energy efficiency. 
In Germany, the long-term energy strategy contains 
binding government goals for a period of roughly 
40  years, whereas long-term energy strategies in 
countries with higher economic growth rates and ac-
cordingly more dynamic energy sectors (e. g. India 
and Brazil) cover periods of approximately 25 years. 
The governance structure of China’s energy sys-
tem comprises a broad variety of ministries and in-
stitutions. The multiplicity of these stakeholders as 
well as the frequent reorganizations that have been 
taking place lead to a rather low degree of coordi-
nation and to a rather high degree of overlaps of 
competence between the various government actors 
involved in the power system regulation. Based on 
OECD recommendations and on the German ex-
periences, clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
concerning the regulation of the electricity sector 
and the development of smart grids would acceler-
ate and ease the smart grid development in China. 
The existence of an independent and powerful regu-
lator is by far the most important regulatory issue 
in this context. China’s earlier regulatory authority, 
SERC, was recently merged with NEA. NDRC and 
NEA are currently the most relevant regulatory 
institutions for the electricity sector. As they share 
regulatory competences and are subject to political 
and industrial influence, regulation in China is less 
powerful and independent than in countries such 
as Germany and the United States. Thus, specific 
attention should be paid to the development of an 
independent and powerful regulator in China. 
The recommended approach at a glance- A long-term strategy for the electric power system serves as a basis for more specific 
smart grid development strategies and 
objectives and is important for investors to 
gain investment security.- It is beneficial to centralize responsibilities for the regulation of the electricity sector in the 
hands of a single independent and powerful 
institution (regulator) that supervises the ef-
ficient development of the electric power sys-
tem in general and smart grids in particular.
5.2 Create level playing fields 
for access to power system 
infrastructure and information
Chinese context- Chinese grid operators are still integrated as they own and operate the electric power 
grids, are responsible for power retail, and 
invest in RES generation capacities. Also, 
power system data management (i. e. data 
collection and provision on grid status as 
well as generation and consumption quanti-
ties) is their task. Both major grid operators 
are currently developing systems for data 
management in smart grids. However, these 
systems focus on information collection by 
the grid operator for their own operation 
management, but not on information provi-
sion to other market actors. - New market actors are rarely participating in the development process of smart grids 
in China. Therefore, the innovation potential 
which could come from these new stake-
holders, for instance from the ICT sector, 
currently remains untapped.- The Chinese government plans to establish a modern energy market system to increase 
competition and affordability. In particular, 
the reform of state-owned enterprises and 
the introduction of more market-related ele-
ments are envisaged. 
5.2.1 Background
Benefits of integrating new market actors Smart 
grids are a relatively new concept aiming at mak-
ing grid operation more reliable and efficient and 
accelerating the emergence of new energy-related 
products and services. Due to the novelty of the 
smart grid approach, many technological advances 
and ideas are necessary for smart grids to be devel-
oped in an effective and efficient way. Experiences 
from other sectors and countries suggest that new 
market actors, i. e. new competitors in the electric 
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power sector or companies from other sectors such 
as the ICT industry, are key drivers of innovations: 
on the one hand, they offer innovative products 
and services that were not supplied by established 
market actors before. In a smart grid context, non-
incumbents create new business models and offer 
new products and services by making use of avail-
able power system information and infrastructure in 
an innovative way (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.2 for examples of 
new market actors in the German electricity sector). 
On the other hand, new market actors contribute to 
an increased level of competition which is usually 
considered to drive innovation, enable greater cost 
efficiency in production, lower retail price levels, 
and provide a higher variety of products and ser-
vices (see ▶ Sect. 2.3).
A fair access to essential facilities is a prerequisite 
for new market actor integration New market ac-
tors can only enter the markets if equal and non-
discriminatory access to essential facilities (i. e. a 
level playing field) is guaranteed [9] [10]. In smart 
grids, level playing fields should be secured in two 
respects:- First, equal access to the physical grid infra-structure is important. Since connecting new 
power generation and consumption units to 
the power grid is laborious and often associ-
ated with high costs, grid operators might have 
a tendency to discriminate in favor of affiliated 
companies or against generators and consum-
ers in remote regions. Regulation must prevent 
such a discriminatory behavior.- Second, access to power system information and data is required. Power system informa-
tion and data are getting increasingly impor-
tant and are a prerequisite for new market 
actors to offer new and innovative products 
and services [11]. This does not mean that 
each established or new market actor has ac-
cess to all power system information, or that 
information is even open to the public; instead 
it means that each eligible market actor has 
equal and fair access to the information rel-
evant for his business model. This is the task of 
power system data management, which should 
be organized in a way that both established 
and new market actors can participate in the 
rule-making process and can trust on non-
discriminatory access. 
Concepts for a non-discriminatory access to 
power system information Two concepts should 
ensure a non-discriminatory access to power system 
information and data in smart grids: - Technology neutrality is a regulatory concept for the telecommunications sector that was in-
troduced by the European Commission in Di-
rective 2002/21/EG. In this context, technology 
neutrality means that the regulator does not 
impose or discriminate in favor of a particular 
type of technology. This concept has been ap-
plied to several technological issues in Europe, 
for example with respect to the development 
of broadband internet, where the regulator left 
it open to the market to decide between the 
deployment of different technologies such as 
digital subscriber line (DSL), power-line com-
munications (PLC), cable modem, or satellite. 
Technology neutrality is also important for 
smart grids, e. g. with respect to the question 
regarding which infrastructure should be used 
for the power system information exchange. 
This issue is currently being discussed under 
the headline of advanced metering infrastruc-
ture (AMI).1 The development of AMI is in its 
early introduction phase. Therefore, what spe-
cific technology should be used for building up 
the necessary infrastructure has not yet been 
settled. Different technologies could be ap-
plied, e. g. PLC, wireless, or fiber technologies. 
In this context, regulation needs to ensure that 
the most efficient technology will be applied, 
independently of which company supplies the 
technology. - Provider neutrality is another general regula-tory concept that is also currently applied in 
the telecommunications sector in Europe. 
It basically states that the regulator should 
ensure that regulation does not discriminate 
1 AMI is defined as “systems [that] are comprised of state-of-
the-art electronic/digital hardware and software, which com-
bine interval data measurement with continuously available 
remote communications. These systems enable measurement 
of detailed, time-based information and frequent collection 
and transmittal of such information to various parties.” [60].
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against particular service providers. Applied 
to smart grids, this means that the regulator 
should ensure that established and new market 
actors are treated equally and allowed to offer 
services on an equal footing in smart grids. On 
the one hand, services could be provided by es-
tablished players (e. g. DSO), on the other hand 
new market actors could provide complemen-
tary services or even substitute services of 
established players for the costumer. Provider 
neutrality should consequently ensure that 
competitive advantages (e. g. best technolo-
gies or low costs/prices) and not the provider’s 
market power affects consumer’s choice. 
Defining roles and responsibilities of all market 
actors eases new market actor integration Lib-
eralized energy markets for energy resources, elec-
tricity, capacity, or ancillary services necessitate 
the exchange of large amounts of information and 
data between different market actors. A mounting 
number of market actors leads to a more inten-
sive inter-company exchange of operational and 
business-related information and data. Against 
this background, it is of critical importance that all 
market actors get assigned their respective roles and 
responsibilities [12]: on the one hand, they have to 
know the stakes and information requirements of 
their business partners and other actors in the elec-
tric power sector to better understand their business 
opportunities and their own contribution towards 
smart grid development. On the other hand, spe-
cific rules and data standards for inter-company 
exchange of business-related information help to re-
duce the transaction costs among all market actors.
5.2.2 International practice
Ensuring technology neutrality For the develop-
ment of smart grids, the concept of technology neu-
trality is particularly important with respect to the 
development of the ICT infrastructure. In principle, 
different communication technologies could be 
applied (PLC, 3G, etc.) and different data storages 
types could be used. Eurelectric, the association of 
the electricity industry in Europe, has defined basic 
requirements for the ICT infrastructures in smart 
grids. The German regulator has addressed this issue 
as well and specified that, currently, a medium-scale 
broadband connection should fulfill the necessary 
requirements to build up the AMI for smart grids. 
However, the German regulator stresses that with the 
use of real-time data the quality requirements con-
cerning availability and latency cannot be fulfilled by 
all existing ICT solutions on the market [13].
Basic requirements for ICT infrastructures 
in smart grids
According to Eurelectric, the most important 
requirements for ICT in the context of smart 
grids are to:- “Ensure that telecoms infrastructure and links are absolutely reliable, robust, meet opera-
tional requirements in terms of speed, capacity 
and latency and will be available at all times, 
particularly at times of critical incidents (e. g. 
be resilient to power outages for several hours 
because they are needed to rebuild the grid. - Provide well manageable and robust access control and user privileges mechanisms to the 
smart grid components and systems. - Guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of all smart grid-related com-
munication events. - Guarantee a robust physical protection for the smart grid components as well as for the whole 
communication network. - Ensure that mission-critical telecommunica-tions services are still alive during and up to the 
end of a wide area 72 hours blackout. - Implement strong monitoring systems to keep track of all the smart grid activity, implementing 
Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) systems for security related incidents 
analysis and maintain well trained security 
response teams to have a strong and quick 
response in the case of any security violation. - Warrant a true real time transfer of informa-tion: for a part the smart grid can be seen as an 
extension of the current SCADA systems; fully 
available at any time and the guaranteeing the 
perfect transfer of commands and feedback 
confirmation of the system operations. 
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- Have an end-to-end security approach to guar-antee a transversal security layer on the smart 
grid.”
Source: Wording from Eurelectric [61]
Ensuring provider neutrality Provider neutral-
ity is a key requirement for third-party access in 
general and is currently being discussed within 
the evaluation of different governance models for 
power system information management in smart 
grids. In this context, the European Commission 
(EC) has been trying to define which actor should 
be responsible for the data handling in smart grids. 
The models under discussion are based on unbun-
dled companies or new market actors. The discus-
sion on the different governance models is ongoing 
and no decision has been taken yet. Three potential 
models are currently being discussed (for more de-
tails see [11]):- DSO as market facilitator: This model al-locates responsibility for power system data 
management, including collection of data and 
construction of the necessary information in-
frastructure to the DSO. The concentration of 
responsibilities within one institution has the 
advantage of centralized internal coordination 
and management of the ICT infrastructure. 
The main disadvantage of a DSO-centered 
solution addresses discrimination concerns. In 
principle, unbundling prescriptions require the 
neutrality of DSO in Europe. Yet, it is doubt-
ful whether full neutrality can be guaranteed 
because of asymmetric information to the 
disadvantage of the regulator. This concept 
requires significant regulatory oversight. How-
ever, it is not new to the regulator, as the DSO 
are already regulated.- Independent central data hub (CDH): The CDH would be responsible for power sys-
tem data management in smart grids and for 
central data storage under the supervision of 
the regulator. A key advantage of this approach 
is the neutrality of the market facilitator and 
the non-discriminatory access to information 
for third parties. The key challenge for this 
concept is the need to establish coordination 
mechanisms between the parties involved, e. g. 
the network owners/system operators and the 
CDH. It should be noted that the regulator 
needs to ensure that the provider of the CDH 
does not discriminate against other parties or 
abuse its market power.- Data access point manager (DAM): The DAM concept focuses on a competitive market 
for power system information management 
and proposes to establish independent and 
unregulated service providers that consumers 
can choose from. Each DAM offers to build up 
the necessary information infrastructure for 
the consumer. Importantly, the DAM does not 
store the data centrally. Storage remains decen-
tralized with the users, giving consumers full 
control of their own data. The DAM only acts 
as an interface which allows each consumer to 
decide which commercial party gets access to 
its main data. Such a decentralized approach 
requires a high degree of standardization to 
ensure flawless system integration. The DSO 
would have to control the quality of services 
provided by the DAM and each regulator 
would need to define the basic principles of 
the DAM to integrate them into the national 
electricity system.
Defining roles and responsibilities of all market 
actors At the European level, the Smart Grids Task 
Force (SGTF) of the European Commission broadly 
defined roles and responsibilities of various market 
actors in smart grids [12]: in a first step, all relevant 
smart grid actors (including companies from all 
supply chain stages of the electric power sector, end-
users as well as influencing actors such as regulators, 
legislation authorities and standardization bodies) 
have been defined (see appendix E for an overview 
of all smart grid actors defined). In a second step, 
current as well as future responsibilities related to 
the smart grid development have been described 
for all actors. The work of SGTF should be under-
stood as a practical toolset and guideline for further 
developments and business models for use by grid 
operators and grid users [12]. 
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Future responsibilities of grid operators 
in smart grids
“[…] it appears that it is the DSOs who will have 
to face the biggest challenges so that Smart Grids 
will become a reality. The reasons include;- Growing distributed generation, active man-agement of demand, local storage and electric 
vehicles (EV) will impact the DSO infrastruc-
ture. Thus the DSO will have to be an active 
participant in all such projects along with the 
actors implementing these projects as these 
projects will fundamentally change today’s 
relatively static distribution system to a much 
more dynamic distribution system.- As more fluctuating distributed generation will feed into the distribution system, gathering 
and handling the data about the state of the 
distribution system will be one key issue for the 
DSO.- Attention will need to be paid to ensure that all privacy and system security recommendations 
(in line with the provisions defined by EG2) will 
be adhered to. Ownership of the data, length 
of time data is stored etc. will all need to be 
addressed in an appropriate way.- The data collected will enable the DSOs to fulfil their duty in relation to the overall grid stability 
and operational security, given that more and 
more distributed generation will be connected 
to the distribution grid.
In order to resolve the above challenges, the 
DSOs will have to continue upgrading their grid 
infrastructure, control centres and educating their 
employees accordingly.
The TSOs will have to provide more support & 
communication of data to the DSOs, but will also 
require more specific information from the DSOs, 
especially with more distributed generation com-
ing from the distribution grids. In order to achieve 
this, both TSOs and DSOs need to ensure that the 
standards they implement for communication 
and data exchange are compatible. It also follows 
that the TSOs will have to gradually redesign 
power system control as well as market informa-
tion management relating to forecasting the 
overall system load in conjunction with the DSOs. 
At the same time, the DSOs will have to strengthen 
their role in providing the required data relating 
to the distributed generation, local storage and 
electric vehicles within the distribution grid.
Both TSO and DSO should be able to execute their 
active role in Smart Grid management by ensuring 
more sophisticated legal provisions for system 
security management under increased uncer-
tainty. Following the analysis about funding […], 
these mechanisms should include the ability to 
interfere with the planned market activities in case 
of disturbed or emergency operational conditions, 
without “automatic” socialization of the related 
costs to other grid users.
Finally, the role of grid communications will sig-
nificantly increase as much more data will have to 
be gathered and exchanged frequently, which will 
be in turn used for different purposes by the grid 
operators and other service providers. As stated 
above, the standardization of communication 
protocols as well as clear rules for the handling 
and the security of this data will have to be devel-
oped and enforced. The security of the grid and 
supply systems as well as the privacy of customer 
data must remain the top priority.”
Source: Wording from Smart Grids Task Force [11]
At the German level, roles and responsibilities of 
companies in the electric power sector are further 
specified in EnWG, with an emphasis on specific 
conditions in Germany. This definition of roles and 
responsibilities in Germany’s most prominent en-
ergy law contributed to a high understanding on 
business opportunities and legal obligations among 
affected companies in Germany. 
With respect to the inter-company exchange of 
business-related information, BNetzA issued the 
so-called Business Processes for Delivery of Electric-
ity to Customers (GPKE) based on the United Na-
tions Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, 
Commerce and Transport (UN/EDIFACT) in 2006 
(see [14] for more information). GPKE standardize 
inter-company communication and data exchange 
in the case of typical business processes such as bill-
ing of customers or customers changing their power 
retail company. In reducing transaction costs of typ-
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ical business processes, GPKE ease the emergence 
of new market actors.
5.2.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The main electricity sector reform of 2002 mandated 
the separation (or unbundling) of the state-owned 
vertically integrated utility responsible for all supply 
chain stages across China into five big power genera-
tion companies, two major grid operators handling 
transmission, distribution and retail as well as four 
power service corporations. China’s power genera-
tion sector can be described as liberalized, as it po-
tentially allows competition between the major five 
generation companies and the thousands of smaller 
local and regional generation companies. Chinese 
grid operators are not completely unbundled as they 
own and operate the electric power grids, are respon-
sible for retail, and also invest into RES generation 
capacities. Recently a potential separation of grid 
operators into transmission and distribution com-
panies or into smaller, regional businesses has been 
subject of debate [15]. With respect to smart grid 
developments, non-incumbents (e. g. from the ICT 
sector) are not yet actively participating in the devel-
opment process. Therefore, the innovation potential 
which could come from these new stakeholders, for 
instance the ICT sector, currently remains untapped.
Experiences from Europe show that defining 
roles and responsibilities of established and new 
market actors (including specific rules and data 
standards for inter-company exchange of business-
related information) leads to a better understanding 
of business opportunities and helps to reduce the 
transaction costs among all market actors. As such, 
the definition of roles and responsibilities contrib-
uted to the emergence of new market actors in the 
European electricity sector.
Currently, the management of power system 
data (e. g. grid status information or metering data 
on electricity generation and consumption) is in the 
hands of China’s grid operators. The concepts of tech-
nology and provider neutrality are not applied. As 
soon as new market actors are to be integrated in the 
electric power system, power system data manage-
ment will become more relevant on a broader scale. 
The regulator should develop a governance system 
that will ensure provider and technology neutrality 
and a level playing field for all stakeholders. Non-
discriminatory access to information in smart grids 
is of particular importance for third parties to be able 
to develop their business plans. Neutral informa-
tion management is therefore a key issue. There are 
various models currently being discussed in Europe. 
However, there is not yet one preferred solution fit-
ting all possible contexts. Therefore, recommending a 
best practice approach to China in this context is not 
yet advisable. A better approach would be to evaluate 
what governance model best suits China to ensure 
non-discriminatory access to information for third 
parties in the near future.
The recommended approach at a glance- Defining roles and responsibilities of estab-lished and non-established market actors in 
the smart grid development facilitates the 
emergence of new market actors and helps 
to make the exchange of business-related 
information and data more efficient. - It should be evaluated which framework for smart grid data management is able to 
ensure provider and technology neutrality 
in China. On this basis, a suitable framework 
needs to be established.
5.3 Introduce network regulation 
for efficient investment 
incentives for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Chinese context- China’s main challenge in the electricity sec-tor is how to handle the massive electricity 
grid expansion necessary to facilitate the 
country’s rapid economic growth and to 
integrate the increasing number of RES. A 
network regulation system that focuses on 
facilitating investments is lacking.
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- At present, there is no explicit price for power transmission and distribution (net-
work charge) based on actual costs. The 
source of grid operators’ income is the dif-
ference between the on-grid and the retail 
price for electricity, which are both fixed by 
the government. 
5.3.1 Background
Network regulation for smart grids Smart grids 
require substantial investment and innovation, es-
pecially from the grid operators. In setting network 
charges (i. e. prices for power transmission and dis-
tribution), regulating institutions have an important 
influence on the investment behavior of grid opera-
tors. Which regulatory scheme (i. e. which specific 
method used for calculating network charges) is 
best suited to set incentives for efficient investment 
is far from settled: in general, regulation should fa-
cilitate necessary investment and avoid unnecessary 
investment at the same time. 
In a smart grid context, incentivizing efficient 
investment into the infrastructure is becoming even 
more important because benefits of innovation and 
investment in smart grid technologies may not al-
ways accrue to the investor (more information on 
this issue is presented below). In these cases, addi-
tional incentive schemes are required to encourage 
grid operators to invest specifically in smart grid 
technologies.
The benefits of regulating only the monopolistic 
bottlenecks Even if it is far from settled which reg-
ulatory scheme is best suited to set incentives for 
efficient investment, it is generally accepted that net-
work regulation should focus on the monopolistic 
bottlenecks (transmission and distribution grids), 
leaving the commercial businesses (generation, 
trade and retail) to competitive forces and moni-
toring by competition law [16], [17]. This approach 
is referred to as disaggregated regulation. Also with 
respect to the smart grid development, it has been 
emphasized that regulation should only focus on 
network charges and network planning while all 
other aspects should be subject to the market and 
competition law [13].
Disaggregated regulation has the following ad-
vantages:- Regulation inevitably provides misdirected in-centives: only competitive markets are able to 
provide incentives to hold prices down to mar-
ginal costs and to minimize long-run costs. 
Regulated markets can only do one or the 
other but not both [18]. In this light, a regula-
tory focus on the natural monopoly part of the 
supply chain avoids misdirected incentives at 
the competitive parts of the supply chain.- Leaving a stage of the supply chain unregu-lated eases the market entry of new market 
actors [19] because requirements for licenses, 
permits and monitoring obligations in regu-
lated markets raise the investment needed to 
enter a market. - A focus on regulation of the natural monopoly may improve the quality of regulation because 
the regulator’s most skilled employees can 
more easily focus their efforts on the natural 
monopoly part of the supply chain. It will then 
be easier for them to get a grip on the regu-
lated firms’ cost-developments and investment 
requirements. - Different stages of the electric power system may require different types of regulation. In 
case the regulator decides to regulate the retail 
stage of the electricity value chain, it is im-
portant to set incentives for quality of service 
and cost efficiency of power retail companies 
and to allow differentiated tariffs for different 
consumer groups. Regulation for networks, in 
turn, needs to set incentives for efficient invest-
ment, as network expansion has become so 
urgent.
Network regulation and investment incen-
tives Disaggregated regulation entails the necessity 
to apply a specific network regulation scheme. The 
challenge of network regulation is setting efficient 
investment incentives (i. e. allowing necessary in-
vestment while avoiding unnecessary investment) 
because the regulator is confronted with the follow-
ing dilemma: the regulated companies know their 
own cost structures and market opportunities bet-
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ter than the regulator. As a consequence, regulation 
cannot provide full-powered incentives to incentiv-
ize necessary investment and to avoid unnecessary 
investment at the same time [18]. Regulators must 
always accept a trade-off between both goals.2 The 
regulator’s challenge is to achieve acceptable levels 
of both goals at the same time. In accordance with 
the trade-off described above, two polar cases are 
commonly distinguished in regulation theory:- Rate-of-return (also known as cost-pass-through) regulation fixes the rate of return 
and requires revenues to adjust according to 
underlying costs. If costs go down, revenues 
should go down and if costs go up, revenues 
may go up as well. Therefore, the incentives to 
reduce costs are low. In fact, firms make profits 
by inflating the capital base as this is the basis 
for the rate of return. With cost-pass-through 
regulation, firms may actually have strong 
incentives to overinvest (i. e. they do not avoid 
unnecessary investment).- Price-cap regulation, also called revenue-cap regulation or RPI-X regulation, tries to avoid 
these very incentives [20]. Price-cap regulation 
fixes the price or revenue path ex-ante for the 
next regulatory period, irrespective of the actual 
cost development during the regulatory period. 
If the firm succeeds in reducing its costs more 
than anticipated by the regulator, the firm can 
keep the additional profits; this is an incen-
tive to minimize costs. Therefore, this type of 
regulation is often called incentive regulation.3 
A counterargument for price-cap regulation is 
a situation in which costs do not go down, but 
tend upwards. This typically happens if net-
works need to be expanded. Under the typical 
RPI-X regulation, firms then have an incentive 
to avoid necessary investments [21].
2 Note that the inevitability of this trade-off has been es-
tablished repeatedly and with great rigor [18]. However, 
the extent of the regulator’s dilemma can be reduced if 
the regulator has a fair amount of information on the cost 
structures and market opportunities of the regulated com-
panies.
3 The term incentive regulation is unfortunately somewhat 
misleading. Regulation always sets incentives: the ques-
tion is merely what incentives and whether they are good 
or bad.
The necessity of additional incentive schemes in 
a smart grid context An additional challenge is 
starting to emerge given the decentralization of de-
cisions in the smart grid value chain. This challenge 
can be illustrated through the following example: 
suppose a new market actor, e. g. the operator of 
a wind farm, wants to invest in storage capacities 
close to a wind farm as the facility can store elec-
tricity from the wind farm at times of congestion 
in the grid. Imagine that this investment would be 
economically more efficient than expanding the 
distribution grid. From the perspective of the grid 
operator, only the costs associated with the invest-
ment in the grid infrastructure are usually taken 
into account for calculating the network charges. 
Thus, the grid operator has no incentive to support 
the investment in the economically more efficient 
storage facility. The regulatory framework needs to 
take account of the spill-over effects and allow cost- 
and revenue-sharing models to incentivize invest-
ment in smart grid solutions, like the storage facility 
in the example above. 
5.3.2 International practice
Regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks and net-
work regulation schemes In Europe and many 
other countries with liberalized electricity markets, 
regulation focuses on the natural monopoly part of 
the supply chain, i. e. power transmission and dis-
tribution grids. The other elements of the supply 
chain, i. e. generation and retail, are liberalized and 
governed by general competition law only. As such, 
European power sector regulators focus primarily 
on the regulation of network charges for transmis-
sion and distribution grids. In fact, most of them are 
not even authorized to intervene in the competitive 
parts of the electricity sector. 
With respect to specific network regulation 
schemes, the cost-pass-through regulation was tra-
ditionally applied in many European countries and 
the United States. Since this regulation scheme does 
not set incentives for an efficient grid operation, 
which is especially important in power systems with 
a limited need for grid expansion and upgrade, most 
European countries and some parts of the United 
States abandoned cost-pass-through regulation in 
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favor of different variants of price cap regulation.4 
Germany for example, applies an RPI-X regulation 
scheme since 2009 (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.4 for more de-
tails). Currently, only Belgium and most parts of the 
United States [22], [23] still apply cost-pass-through 
regulation. Owing to the large network investment 
requirements associated with the transition towards 
more RES and smart grids, a reform of the RPI-X 
system to facilitate efficient investment is currently 
being discussed in Germany and other parts of Eu-
rope. In the light of these developments, it can be 
seen that no single regulatory scheme is preferable 
in every situation. In the end, regulatory schemes 
have to take into account the current needs of each 
country under consideration.
Regulatory approaches setting incentives for ef-
ficient investments Network regulation should 
set incentives for network operators to develop a 
secure and stable network at the lowest cost. Also, 
network regulation should set incentives to invest 
in smart grid solutions, especially in solutions that 
defer costly investments in grid expansion. Three 
possible incentive instruments have been applied 
in countries such as Italy, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. These instruments are described 
below. However, note that this list is not compre-
hensive:- Explicit investment incentives could be ap-plied. Such incentives could be so-called rate-
of-return adders. The idea behind rate-of-re-
turn adders is that network operators can earn 
additional return on equity (ROE) for specific 
projects selected by the regulator. The rate-of-
return adder (usually between 2 % and 3 %) 
increases the incentive for the network opera-
tor to build this specific line or to invest in the 
respective project. This concept has proven to 
be successful in Italy. Here, roughly 71 % of all 
investments made by the Italian TSO Terna 
in 2009 were priority projects with a rate-of-
return adder. In Italy, this adder is provided for 
4 Even if the general idea behind the price cap regulation 
scheme is identical in the different countries, specific for-
mula and parameters (e. g. the length of the regulation 
period or the allowed return of grid operators) differ from 
country to country. A more specific and detailed overview 
of network regulation in Europe can be found in [22]. 
twelve years after the investment [24]. In Italy’s 
case, it can be observed that overall invest-
ments, not only those with the rate-of-return 
adder, increased since the introduction of the 
adder. Similar effects were observed in the 
United States [24]. - Explicit profit-sharing mechanisms, or sliding scales, are currently applied in the UK [25]. 
They can contribute to strengthening the 
incentives for investment in smart grid tech-
nologies. The idea behind the profit-sharing 
mechanism is that the grid operator is allowed 
to keep a share of a cost reduction achieved 
through the application of a smart application 
(e. g. a storage facility) as a substitute for grid 
investments. If the costs for the smart applica-
tion are lower than the investment in the grid 
infrastructure, but both measures result in a 
more stable grid, then the grid operator has 
an incentive to invest in the smart application. 
Note that the sliding scales have to be granted 
by the regulator and that calculating their size 
is a complex task.- The innovation bonus is an additional instru-ment motivating the grid operator to invest in 
smart grid technologies. The innovation bonus 
is determined by the regulator and grants 
funds for R&D activities of the grid opera-
tors. The additional costs for the R&D activity 
are thereby at least partially refunded to the 
operator and do not reduce the operator’s 
revenues. The innovation bonus is currently 
applied in the UK as well and has proved to 
be an efficient instrument [25]. Similar to 
rate-of-return adders, innovation bonuses can 
be designed and granted rather easily by the 
regulator.
5.3.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China does currently not apply disaggregated regu-
lation, but electricity wholesale and retail prices are 
subject to regulation. A basic step in the regulatory 
environment would be to focus on the monopolistic 
networks alone. This would avoid misdirected in-
centives at the generation and retail sectors, ease the 
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emergence of new market actors, and improve the 
quality of regulation. In applying a specific regula-
tion scheme, the regulator should focus on setting 
efficient investment incentives. As there is no regu-
lation scheme suitable to all countries in all contexts, 
the specific design of a regulation scheme for China 
has to be elaborated with great rigor. The consider-
able investment needs in China’s electric power grid 
and the recent experiences with RPI-X regulation in 
Germany should be taken into account. 
China faces the primary challenge of having to 
increase security of supply. In addition, the potential 
that comes with smart grids can only be realized 
if there is an incentive for grid operators to invest 
into smart solutions (e. g. storage facilities or DSM). 
Thus, network regulation in China should specifi-
cally focus on incentives for security of supply and 
smart solutions. The application of rate-of-return 
adders for high priority projects for security of sup-
ply and for investment in smart solutions should be 
evaluated. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Regulating only the natural monopoly part of the electric power sector (transmission 
and distribution grids) improves the op-
portunities for market entry of new market 
actors, reduces misdirected incentives, and 
may increase quality of regulation. - Network regulation should focus on setting efficient investment incentives balancing 
between network expansion and smart 
grid applications in an economically ef-
ficient way. Specifically, the application of 
rate-of-return adders for projects with a 
high priority for security of supply might be 
interesting for China. Furthermore, profit-
sharing mechanisms or innovation bonuses 
could be applied to increase the diffusion of 
innovative technologies in China’s electricity 
sector.
5.4 Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Chinese context- From 2010 to 2015, generation and grid ca-pacities are planned to increase by roughly 
50 % in order to cope with the steadily grow-
ing demand. Their further expansion beyond 
that point in time is inevitable. - RES generation capacities are expected to increase out of proportion – their share in 
the electricity mix will increase significantly. - Electricity grid expansion planning is cur-rently organized in a top-down process with 
low transparency and little involvement of 
actors other than government authorities 
and grid operators.
5.4.1 Background
Towards a more decentralized system So far, elec-
tric power grids have been designed to transport the 
electricity generated in central power stations (e. g. 
coal-fired power plants) to industrial or residential 
load centers. The subordinated distribution grids 
have only been used to redistribute the electricity 
towards end-consumers. Single distribution grids 
have been operated quite independently from those 
in other areas. In this setting, a coordination of the 
necessary grid expansion measures has been impor-
tant mainly at the level of transmission grids. 
The current developments towards more inter-
mittent RES and actively involved end-consumers 
result in a more decentralized system with bidirec-
tional flows of electricity and information. Massive 
investments in the power grid infrastructure have 
to be undertaken to cope with these developments, 
especially at the distribution grid level: in Germany 
for example, the investment needs in the distribu-
tion grid infrastructure are considerably higher 
than in the transmission grid infrastructure [21], 
[26] because roughly 97 % of RES in Germany are 
connected to the distribution grids [27]. A coordi-
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nation of the necessary grid expansion measures 
is especially important at the level of distribution 
grids to facilitate an efficient allocation of invest-
ments and reduce economic inefficiencies as much 
as possible.
Fragmentation of interests Up to now, invest-
ments in generation capacities were made mainly 
by operators of large-scale centralized power plants, 
a situation that allows grid operators to collect in-
formation on where and when a new power plant 
is planned for construction rather easily. Network 
expansion planning was a task with a moderate 
complexity organized by grid operators, operators 
of large-scale centralized power plants, and coordi-
nating government institutions. 
Currently, the number and the heterogeneity of 
stakeholders with interests in network expansion 
planning increases: - Investments into distributed RES are made by a larger number of more heterogeneous com-
panies or even by private investors in many 
countries [28]. Therefore, advanced planning 
on how much new grid capacity need to be 
built in what area becomes more difficult for 
the network operators. - The trend towards smart grids is associated with an increasing amount of new market 
actors with diverse interests. As the business 
models of new market actors often depend 
on available grid capacities, their interests are 
also relevant for long-term electricity network 
planning alongside the stakes of established 
market actors making the process of stake-
holder consultation more complex. If the 
interests of stakeholders such as grid operators 
on different voltage levels, power plant opera-
tors, industrial consumers, representatives of 
small end-users, environmental groups, local 
governments and central government minis-
tries are not coordinated effectively, network 
expansion risks being economically inefficient 
[29]. 
Against this background, it becomes of vital impor-
tance to develop a long-term centrally coordinated 
NDP that includes plans and interests of all relevant 
market actors and network users at an early stage.
5.4.2 International practice
Network expansion planning in Europe The EU 
requires each member state to develop a 10-year 
NDP currently focusing on transmission grid ex-
pansion but not distribution grid expansion [30]. 
Given the high investment and coordination needs 
on the distribution grid level, the non-coordination 
of distribution grid expansion unnecessarily inflates 
costs of network expansion. In Germany, a group of 
geographically adjacent DSO consequently started 
initiatives to coordinate distribution grid expansion 
planning [31].
The network development plans are based on 
several scenarios (three scenarios in the case of Ger-
many) concerning the future development of RES 
and the corresponding electricity system in each 
member state. The national planning processes 
are accompanied by 10-year network development 
plans of the ENTSO-E. Starting in 2010, these plans 
are to be issued every two years. The main results of 
the version published in 2012 are:- One third of investments planned in the first network development plan of 2010 are expe-
riencing implementation delays owing to long 
approval processes.- 52,300 km of extra high voltage transmis-sion lines clustered in 100 projects have to be 
modernized or constructed, mainly due to 
bottlenecks related to RES integration. - 20 megatons CO2 can be saved in the period up to 2022 due to further market integration in 
Europe. - Extending the grid by about 1.3 % enables the addition of 3 % more generation capacities 
[32]. 
Network expansion planning in Germany In Ger-
many, the rules for developing the national NDP are 
defined in § 12 EnWG and the NABEG. . Figure 5.1 
illustrates the different steps towards the network 
development plan in Germany. These are [33]: - The starting point in the network development process is the scenario framework. It is drafted 
by the four German TSO and includes fore-
casts relating to the development of electricity 
generation, the shares of different generation 
technologies, and power consumption for the 
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next ten years. To achieve a realistic forecast, 
three different scenarios based on different as-
sumptions regarding the increase in generation 
capacities, RES expansion, and CO2 abatement 
are considered. The scenarios are submitted to 
BNetzA, which approves them after a public 
consultation process. During this process, dis-
tribution grid operators and other interested 
parties have the opportunity to comment on 
the different scenarios.- The four TSO subsequently employ the ap-proved scenarios for calculating network 
expansion requirements. Selecting the neces-
sary expansion measures and assigning a 
timeframe (two to ten years depending on 
the respective project) for their realization 
leads to a first draft of the respective network 
development plan. BNetzA again assesses this 
first draft within a public consultation process. 
During this process, the drafted network 
development plan is published on a public 
website and can be commented from various 
stakeholders and citizens. The network devel-
opment plan is then revised by the TSO and 
once again assessed by BNetzA. Furthermore, 
BNetzA conducts the environmental impact 
assessment.- Based on the final version of the network de-velopment plan and the environmental impact 
report published at the same time, BNetzA has 
the responsibility to draft the so-called Federal 
Requirements Plan, which is finally brought in 
the parliamentary legislative procedure. 
While this process currently focuses on transmis-
sion grids only, it might serve as a best-practice ex-
ample of how to organize the grid expansion plan-
ning on the distribution grid level as well.
The role of stakeholder platforms One of the main 
goals of BMWi with respect to grid development is 
to involve new market actors in the strategic smart 
grid planning process. One prominent example of 
the ministry’s activities is the Future-oriented En-
ergy Grids Platform, which was founded in 2010. In 
February 2011, the platform was transformed into 
a permanent dialogue forum [35]. The platform in-
volves all relevant parties of the electricity sector: 
Federal Requirements Plan
reflects the need to develop the 
network in a concrete way
Scenario Framework reflects  
the development of the energy 
policy framework (e.g. production 
capacities, consumption, etc.). It 
is the starting point to define the 
need for network development.
Federal Requirements Plan (Bundesbedarfsplan)
Consultation of German Network 
Development Plan and of the 
Environment Report by BNetzA
Draft Federal Requirements Plan    
by BNetzA
Draft Scenario Framework by TSO
Consultation
Approval of the TSO “Scenario  
Framework” by BNetzA
Approved “Scenario Framework”
Establishment of the Draft German 
Network Development Plan 
involving all TSO by June 3, 2012
 . Fig. 5.1 Process for the network development plan in Germany, adapted from [34]
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grid operators, ICT-companies, environmental and 
consumer associations, research institutions, and 
representatives of several ministries and govern-
mental institutions. One of the platform’s main tasks 
is to discuss the draft documents of the network de-
velopment plan. The platform is therefore an impor-
tant instrument for the regulator to get feedback on 
NDP. Besides this task, the grid platform serves as a 
discussion platform for planning and approval pro-
cedures, the regulatory framework for investments 
into networks, grid connection of offshore wind 
farms, funding and testing of new technologies, 
development of smart meters, system stability, and 
applications of storage systems for network stability.
. Figure 5.2 shows the organizational structure of 
the platform. The plenary which adopts recommen-
dations on actions is hosted by BMWi. The platform 
is subdivided in four different working groups, one 
of them directly responsible for smart grid issues. 
The different working groups provide consulting 
services for BMWi or other government institutions, 
make publicly available the results of their meetings, 
draft documents and recommendations, and support 
other publicly funded initiatives for smart grid devel-
opment. The working group responsible for network 
development planning for example, proposed a joint 
grid connection process for offshore wind farms as 
well as an offshore master plan. In the meantime, both 
propositions have been included in NABEG [36].
5.4.3 Recommended approach 
for China
China faces a high need to expand the existing elec-
tricity network within the next few years. On both 
levels of the grid, transmission and distribution, 
this need is driven by growing consumer demand 
for electricity and the integration of RES. Support-
ing and guiding the formulation of a consistent 
and comprehensive concept regarding the set-up 
of China’s future electric power grid is a key task 
for Chinese energy sector regulation. Government 
guidance is particularly important in the context of 
the build-up of RES generation capacities and smart 
grids both resulting in an increasing number of 
stakeholders involved in the electric power system. 
Today, there are no formalized institutions that 
acknowledge stakeholder interests in grid expansion 
planning in China. Therefore, stakeholder involve-
ment currently focuses mainly on the grid opera-
tors, the government, and the China Electric Power 
Planning Institute. Other stakeholders are not inte-
grated into the process in a formal way. 
Plenary
Chair: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy
adopts recommendations on action regarding questions of 
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 . Fig. 5.2 Structure of the Future Oriented Energy Grids Platform, adapted from [35]
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Three aspects are especially important with re-
spect to the coordination of network expansion in 
China: - First, the institution that has the responsibil-ity to supervise the network planning process 
should be specified. Experience in Germany 
illustrates that a government institution such 
as the regulator should take this responsibil-
ity. This has the primary advantage that results 
from the planning process can be transferred 
directly into the government policy-making 
process. - Second, an evaluation should be made of which stakeholders are relevant for network 
expansion planning. Specifically, formal co-
ordination between grid operators and power 
generation companies seems to be of great 
importance to align grid and generation capac-
ity expansion processes. A platform such as 
the Future Oriented Energy Grids Platform in 
Germany has been proven effective in integrat-
ing new stakeholders in the strategic network 
development process. The evaluation of which 
stakeholders are relevant for network expan-
sion planning could also happen within such a 
stakeholder platform. - Third, it is beneficial to specify procedures for the development of network plans. In this 
context, China could take advantage of Ger-
man experience with the network development 
planning process. Making mandatory a NDP 
for both transmission and distribution grids, 
including smart grids, helps to make net-
work expansion as efficient as possible. Clear 
scenarios about the development of RES, the 
general electricity mix, and electricity demand 
in China are needed as a basis for the defini-
tion of a network development plan in China. 
Such scenarios could then serve as a common 
basis for the network development process 
in China. Stakeholder involvement should be 
a key element of this procedure because the 
number of stakeholders is likely to increase 
in the near future due to the importance of 
non-incumbent market actors for smart grids. 
These new stakeholders should be integrated 
into the strategic network development process 
in a formal way. 
The recommended approach at a glance- A stakeholder platform on the topic of the future electricity network involving all rel-
evant market actors of the electricity sector 
(e. g. similar to the Future Oriented Energy 
Grids Platform in Germany) could help to 
evaluate which stakeholders are relevant for 
network expansion planning, support the 
network planning process, enhance mutual 
understanding among different stakehold-
ers and provide recommendations to the 
government. - Make mandatory a network development plan (NDP) for transmission and distribution 
grids, including a procedure for consulting 
the NDP with third parties and the public. 
The NDP should reflect fundamental govern-
ment policy, future energy policy goals, 
smart grid goals as well as reliability and 
security issues. The regulator should super-
vise and confirm the final NDP, which is then 
signed into law by the legislature.
5.5 Improve grid integration of RES
Chinese context- Despite the fact that China has aggressively expanded solar and wind generation capaci-
ties since 2006, their shares in the electric-
ity generation mix remain small. However, 
shares of both generation sources are 
planned to increase significantly according 
to government plans. Today, new market ac-
tors are only partly involved in the build-up 
of RES generation capacities.- Within the existing regulatory framework a lack of sufficient incentives for grid integra-
tion of RES persists even though significant 
improvements have been made in recent 
years. A considerable number of wind farms 
is only connected to the electric power grid 
with delay.
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- Often, wind farms can also not be con-nected due to the lack of a Low Voltage Ride 
Through Function. At the same time substan-
tial quantities of wind power still have to be 
curtailed in order to increase grid stability.
5.5.1 Background
New market actors require a physical connection 
to the power grid In many countries, non-incum-
bent stakeholders have been investing in RES gen-
eration capacities and contributing to the increase 
of RES in the electricity mix: project developers, 
industrial and commercial companies, prosumers, 
and even venture capital and private equity com-
panies [28]. These non-incumbent stakeholders 
need clearly defined conditions for the physical 
connection of RES installations to the power grid. 
Their RES plants need to be technically connected 
to the grid in such a manner that electricity gener-
ated from RES can be fed in. Without an equal and 
fair access, they abstain from investing in RES. As a 
result, a huge potential of capital resources for RES 
investment remains untapped.
The three elements of physical grid integration of 
RES Grid integration of RES, i. e. the issue of how 
effective, rapid, and fair the access of RES generation 
capacities to the electric power grid is organized, 
consists of three different aspects:- Grid expansion, necessary due to the connec-tion of RES, is a prerequisite for the large-scale 
integration of RES (compare ▶ Sects. 5.3 
and 5.4).- Grid connection of RES means technically interconnecting RES to the grid in such a man-
ner that electricity generated from RES can be 
fed in.- Specific grid operation issues with large amounts of RES implies assuring that the gen-
erated electricity has access to the grid so that 
it can be transported to end consumers [37].
Grid connection Important issues in many coun-
tries are so-called long lead times (e. g. delays). 
This subject groups all aspects associated with the 
time the investor of a renewable energy generation 
unit has to wait before connecting to the grid and 
feeding of electricity in the grid is allowed. Long 
lead times increase the financial risk for investors, 
creating less favorable credit conditions for them, 
and thus reducing the incentives for investments 
in RES. 
The effectiveness of grid connection is also af-
fected by how grid connection costs are distributed 
among the parties involved in the process. In this 
context, shallow or deep cost approaches can be ap-
plied:- In a deep cost approach, the RES investors requesting connection not only cover the 
costs of grid connection but also further costs 
related to grid reinforcement and extension 
beyond the connection point (i. e. deeper into 
the network). - In a shallow cost approach, the RES inves-tor only pays for grid connection costs to the 
connection point, but not for reinforcement 
and extension costs. Generally, the deep cost 
approach creates higher costs and risks for the 
RES investor. It is therefore more often viewed 
as an obstacle to RES deployment [37].
Grid operation In countries with a low share of 
intermittent RES-E in the energy mix, grid op-
eration is usually not adversely affected by RES 
installations. However, European countries like 
Germany or Denmark have made the experience 
that, with a share of approximately 10 % to 20 % of 
intermittent RES-E, grid operation becomes more 
and more difficult because regional feed-in often 
exceeds regional loads and the grids do not have 
sufficient capacities to absorb and transport the 
complete surplus of RES-E. One straight-forward 
remedy for these situations is to expand grid capaci-
ties. However, curtailing specific RES generators in 
times of peak production might be economically 
more interesting: a study suggests that curtailing 
only 2 % of the annual electricity production from 
RES (in times of peak production) could reduce 
infrastructure investments by 10 % between now 
and 2030 [26].
Grid curtailment is currently a critical issue in a 
number of European countries, especially due to the 
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lack of specific curtailment rules and compensation 
issues [37]. Clear and well-defined grid codes for the 
interconnection of RES on all grid and voltage levels 
are a decisive factor to ease grid operation with RES 
[38]. These rules define the interaction of RES and 
the electric power grid in terms of grid operation. 
This also includes the handling of congestions and 
disturbances.
The ICT-integration of RES RES integration issues 
go beyond the physical connection of RES to the 
power grid. The basic idea of smart grids is to make 
all generators and consumers of electricity monitor-
able and in part remotely controllable by means of 
ICT. Only if RES plants are remotely controllable, 
RES generation can be coordinated with grid capac-
ities at any time. In this light, the equipment of RES 
with communication interfaces is an essential part 
of smart grids. Also with respect to an economically 
efficient grid curtailment of RES, the capability of 
grid operators to monitor and control installations 
remotely is necessary.
Especially distributed RES (e. g. small rooftop 
PV installations or single wind turbines) are cur-
rently only rarely equipped with technology al-
lowing the grid operator to remotely monitor or 
control the installations. Given that owners of RES, 
especially those of small-scale RES, have usually few 
incentives in investing in communication interfaces, 
the widespread deployment and usage of such inter-
faces depends on appropriate regulatory guidance.
5.5.2 International practice
The European perspective In its Directive 2001/77/
EC2 [39], the EU laid down a common regulatory 
basis for the promotion of electricity generated from 
RES and a framework for the integration of RES into 
the grid [40]. Paragraphs 1–3 of article 7 contain 
general references to grid connection and operation 
issues demanding that EU member states
» take the necessary measures to ensure that 
transmission system operators and DSOs in their 
territory guarantee the transmission and distribu-
tion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources.
Also, the directive proposes priority access to the 
grid for electricity from RES and favors a cost-
sharing of grid expansion measures between grid 
operators and RES operators to pure deep cost and 
pure shallow costs approaches [39]. 
Published eight years later, Directive 2009/28/
EC3 further regulates grid connection and opera-
tion issues. In paragraphs 2–4 of article 16, the EU 
makes a clear case for priority access for electric-
ity from RES. The Directive recommends that such 
electricity be fed in with priority, that grid curtail-
ment measures for RES be minimized and justified 
by the regulator, and that grid expansion costs re-
lated to renewable energies be transparent and born 
in full or in part by the grid operators. 
Since 2009, ENTSO-E has been working on a 
network code for grid connection requirements 
which aims at
» setting out clear and objective requirements for 
generators for grid connection in order to contrib-
ute to non-discrimination, effective competition 
and the efficient functioning of the internal elec-
tricity market and to ensure system security [41]. 
The network code 
» defines a common set of requirements for power 
generation facilities, including synchronous gener-
ation units, power park modules and offshore gen-
eration facilities, to be connected to the network 
and sets up a common framework for grid connec-
tion agreements between grid operators and the 
power generation facility operators [41]. 
In defining these requirements, the network code 
clearly reduces conflicts between RES investors and 
grid operators and contributes to a better commu-
nication between them and to shorter lead times in 
RES connection as a result of more standardized 
procedures.
Grid connection of RES in Germany Part 2, chap-
ters 1–3 of the EEG contain regulations that are of 
critical importance with respect to the effectiveness 
of grid connection in Germany: - Chapter 1 section 5 emphasizes that grid operators must immediately and as a priority 
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connect all RES to the grid even if this con-
nection necessitates optimizing, boosting, or 
expanding the grid. - Paragraph 1 contains a definition of the so-called grid connection point. It is the point 
in the electricity grid which is at the nearest 
linear distance from the location of the RES 
installation. The generation capacity of the RES 
unit to be connected determines the voltage 
level of the nearest grid connection point. - The responsibility of building a connection between the RES installation and the grid con-
nection point is assigned to the grid operator. 
However, the costs for building this direct 
connection are passed on to the RES investor 
as specified in chapter 3, section 13, and para-
graph 1 of the EEG. Note that due to the rather 
close meshed electricity grids in Germany, the 
distances between the installations and the 
grid connection points are often rather short. 
Thus, connection costs to be paid by the RES 
investors are rather low in Germany.- As specified in chapter 3, section 14, however, the share of the costs within the entire electric 
power grid that is related to optimizing, boost-
ing, and expanding the grid system is allocated 
to the grid operator (shallow cost approach). 
This cost-sharing mechanism prevents the 
investors in RES projects from installing 
capacities at great distances from the existing 
power grid, as they are the ones who have to 
cover the costs for the direct line to the nearest 
connection point. - Chapter 2, section 9 specifies further that the grid operator can only be forced to optimize 
or expand the electricity grid if this is not 
economically unreasonable. 
EEG – Paragraphs 1–4 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 5- Grid system operators shall immediately and as a priority connect installations generat-
ing electricity from renewable energy sources 
and from mine gas to that point in their grid 
system (grid connection point) which is suit-
able in terms of the voltage and which is at the 
shortest linear distance from the location of 
the installation if no other grid system has a 
technically and economically more favorable 
grid connection point. […] - Installation operators shall be entitled to choose another grid connection point in this 
grid system or in another grid system which is 
suitable with regard to the voltage.- In derogation of subsections (1) and (2) above, the grid system operator shall be entitled to as-
sign the installation a different grid connection 
point. This shall not apply where the purchase 
of electricity from the installation concerned 
would not be guaranteed in accordance with 
section 8(1).- The obligation to connect the installation to the grid system shall also apply where the pur-
chase of the electricity is only made possible 
by optimizing, boosting or expanding the grid 
system in accordance with section 9.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
The combination of a shallow cost approach and 
an obligation to connect RES with priority is one 
important factor with regard to grid connection in 
Germany. Another important element of the EEG 
(with regard to grid connection) is the definition of 
what happens if the grid operator fails to connect 
RES. Part 2, chapter 1, section 10 of the EEG is based 
on the notion that grid connection rules can be ef-
fective only if non-compliance of the grid operator 
leads to financial losses.
EEG – Paragraphs 1–2 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 10 - In the event that the grid system operator vio-lates his obligations under section 9(1), those 
interested in feeding in electricity may demand 
compensation for the damage incurred. The 
liability to pay compensation shall not apply if 
the grid system operator was not responsible 
for the violation of the obligation.- Where there are facts to substantiate the assumption that the grid system operator did 
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not fulfill his obligation under section 9(1), 
installation operators may require the grid 
system operator to submit information con-
cerning whether and to what extent the grid 
system operator did not meet his obligation to 
optimize, boost and expand his grid system. 
This information may be withheld if it is not 
necessary in order to establish whether the 
entitlement in accordance with subsection (1) 
above exists.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
Grid operation in the presence of RES at the Ger-
man level In spite of the increasing share of elec-
tricity from wind and PV power, Germany’s electric 
power grids are still among the most secure and 
reliable grids worldwide. Germany has made the 
experience that effective grid curtailment rules are 
necessary to sustain reliability and security of sup-
ply in times of rising feed-in from RES. To allow for 
an effective grid operation in spite of the presence 
of RES, the EEG distinguishes between normal and 
critical grid conditions:5- In normal grid conditions, electricity produced in RES installations has to be fed in at any 
time – irrespective of electricity consumption. 
This is regulated in part 2, chapter 1, section 8 
of the EEG, which states that “[transmission] 
grid system operators shall immediately and 
as a priority purchase, transmit and distribute 
the entire available quantity of electricity from 
renewable energy sources”.- During critical grid conditions, however, grid operators are allowed to curtail electricity 
from RES by taking technical control over 
installations connected to their grid system. 
Part 2, chapter 2, section 6 of the EEG specifies 
that all RES plants have to be equipped with 
a communication interface allowing the grid 
operator to take over technical control over 
installations or to limit their effective capacity 
to 70 % of the installed capacity instead. Those 
RES with a capacity exceeding 100 kW have to 
5 Critical conditions occur when operational limits, accord-
ing to common technical guidelines, are violated. 
be unconditionally enhanced with a commu-
nication interface allowing the grid operator to 
remotely monitor the electricity feed-in in real 
time and to remotely control installations. To 
prevent a misuse of grid curtailment, grid op-
erators are obliged to immediately report such 
measures to the BNetzA. This grid curtailment 
of RES is not to the detriment of RES investors 
because they receive equivalent compensations 
to the extent that they incur no financial losses 
as a result of the grid curtailment (see appen-
dix E for extracts from EEG, chapter 2, part 2, 
sections 11 and 12.).
EEG – Paragraphs 1–2 of Part 2, Chapter 1, 
Section 6 - Installation operators and operators of CHP installations shall provide installations with an 
installed capacity exceeding100 kilowatts with 
technical facilities with which the grid system 
operator can, at any time:
1. reduce output by remote means in the event 
of grid overload; and
2. call up the current electricity feed-in at any 
given point in time.- Operators of installations generating electricity from solar radiation:
1. with an installed capacity between 30 kilo-
watts and 100 kilowatts shall fulfil the 
obligation pursuant to subsection (1) no. 1 
above;
2. with a maximum installed capacity of 
30 kilowatts shall:
a) fulfil the obligation pursuant to subsec-
tion (1) no. 1 above; or
b) limit the maximum effective capacity fed 
in at the grid connection point with the 
grid system to 70 percent of the installed 
capacity.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [62]
Ensuring compliance with the EEG regula-
tion Well specified laws alone might not be suffi-
cient to ensure an effective grid integration of RES 
if there is no institution with a distinct judiciary 
function to monitor compliance with the rules 
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and settle any dispute between grid operators and 
power plant owners. In this light, BMUB commis-
sioned and funded the so-called Clearingstelle EEG 
in 2007. Since then the Clearingstelle EEG serves as 
a neutral and independent institution with the in-
tention to settle any dispute between grid operators 
and power plant owners with regard to topics sur-
rounding EEG. The staff of the Clearingstelle EEG 
consists of an interdisciplinary team of lawyers and 
engineers with expertise in the field of renewable 
energies [42]. 
The general idea is that ordinary courts settle 
potential disputes rather through costly and time 
consuming litigation while the Clearingstelle EEG 
can offer alternative dispute resolution options 
such as- mediation, - joint dispute resolution, and- arbitration [42]. 
In addition, the Clearingstelle EEG reports the re-
sults of past legal disputes such that a high transpar-
ency on the jurisdiction exists among grid operators 
and plant owners. In sum, the Clearingstelle EEG 
clearly contributes to a high compliance with the 
EEG regulation in Germany.6
5.5.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The physical grid integration of RES in China cur-
rently lacks efficiency. This refers to both grid con-
nection and grid operation. Specifically, a consider-
able part of wind power is currently being curtailed. 
There is also evidence that only a very small part 
of investments are being made by non-incumbent 
players in China: investments from venture capital 
and private equity companies for example, are quite 
low compared to many other countries [28]. For the 
government’s ambitious RES expansion targets to 
be achieved and in order to incentivize new market 
actors to invest in RES, the physical grid integration 
of RES has to become more effective.
6 Further information on the work of the Clearingstelle EEG 
can be found at ▶ https://www.clearingstelle-eeg.de/
english. 
Transparency and a clear division of responsi-
bilities between grid operators and RES investors 
would encourage the deployment of RES and in-
centivize new market actors to invest in RES. The 
following recommendations are made based on best 
practices from Europe and especially Germany:- The grid operator is a monopolistic company with special responsibility. He has to define 
clear, transparent, and technically sound grid 
codes for the integration of generation units 
at all voltage levels. These codes have to be 
defined properly and made binding.- For an efficient and fast connection, grid con-nection points have to be defined properly 
for all kinds of RES on all voltage levels of the 
grid. RES need to be assigned a grid connec-
tion point on request, so that the interconnec-
tion point can be installed without delay and 
according to well-defined technical standards.- Grid operators have to bear liability for the grid connection of RES. This is very impor-
tant, because liability puts a high priority on 
the establishment of the grid connection and 
avoids delays on the grid operator’s side. In this 
context, definition of financial incentives (e. g. 
in form of penalties) is an effective measure 
to quicken the grid connection process and to 
reduce the risk for RES investors.
The same arguments which hold for the grid con-
nection are equally valid for grid operation issues. 
To ensure grid stability, it is necessary to curtail 
RES in times of critical grid conditions. To provide 
transparent procedures to the RES operators, de-
tailed processes for curtailment of RES (including 
documentation, transparency rules, timeframes, 
involved parties, etc.) have to be defined and the 
requirements for information exchange within 
these measures have to be specified. To ensure an 
economically efficient grid curtailment, the instal-
lation of communication interfaces at RES instal-
lations should be promoted by appropriate regula-
tion (such as part 2, chapter 1, section 6 of EEG 
in Germany). Moreover, it is important that grid 
curtailment of RES only takes place if this is ur-
gently needed to stabilize grid operation and that 
the compensation to the RES investor is calculated 
transparently.
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The experiences from Germany further show 
that the establishment of an independent institution 
offering mediation, joint dispute resolution, and ar-
bitration services contributes to a high compliance 
with the regulation. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Grid connection points and binding grid codes specifying respective responsibilities 
of grid operators and power generators have 
to be defined. - Grid operators have to bear liability regard-ing the grid connection of RES.- Binding procedures for curtailment of RES have to be defined. To ensure an economi-
cally efficient grid curtailment, the instal-
lation of communication interfaces at RES 
installations should be promoted by appro-
priate regulation. - An institution offering mediation, joint dis-pute resolution, and arbitration services in 
the context of grid connection issues should 
be assigned. 
5.6 Optimize the balancing 
of electricity generation 
and consumption
Chinese context- Due to the high share of industrial load, Chi-na’s overall electricity load curve is currently 
rather flat. In the future, China’s electricity 
generation might become considerably 
more fluctuating owing to the further build-
up of RES generation capacities planned by 
the government. In addition, shares of more 
intermittent residential and commercial 
electricity consumption are expected to 
increase. Both factors will lead to regionally 
higher load variability in China. - Higher load variability necessitates a more effective coordination of electricity 
generation and consumption. Specifically, 
with growing shares of intermittent RES it 
will become indispensable that electricity 
consumption will be, at least partly, able to 
follow electricity generation. This necessi-
tates the use of economic incentives as well 
as sophisticated technologies facilitating the 
coordination of electricity generation and 
consumption. All types of consumers, i. e. 
industrial, commercial, and residential, have 
to be involved in these activities.- Time-of-use pricing (i. e. electricity prices depending on the time when electricity 
is provided) aims at incentivizing electric-
ity consumers to shift their consumption 
according to generation and grid capacities. 
It has gradually been introduced in China 
to all categories of users except residential 
consumers and irrigational users. The Chi-
nese government recently announced that 
it would introduce time-of-use pricing also 
for residential consumers by the end of 2015. 
While this is certainly a step in the right 
direction, it is still questionable whether the 
present tariff system offers sufficient price 
incentives for a pronounced intraday shifting 
of power demand. 
5.6.1 Background
Peak shaving and residual peak load shaving The 
balancing of generation and consumption of elec-
tricity is of crucial importance for the stable opera-
tion of electric power systems. In a power system 
with 100 % generation from large central (bulk) 
power plants, electricity generation follows the load. 
Sometimes, peak loads may cause shortages on the 
generation side. Peak shaving, i. e. reducing the elec-
trical power consumption during periods of maxi-
mum electricity demand, is then an important fac-
tor to stabilize system operation. In power systems 
with a high share of RES, however, the motivation 
for peak shaving changes somewhat: in such power 
systems, the residual load, i. e. the difference between 
load and renewable generation, is highly volatile due 
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to the intermittent nature of renewable generation. 
In these cases, large central power plants, usually 
conventional fossil fuel-driven power plants, have 
to cover the residual load – also known as residual 
peak load shaving (or residual load balancing).
Balancing mechanisms and technologies like de-
mand side management (DSM), supply side manage-
ment (SSM), microgrids, virtual power plants (VPP), 
and energy storage can be employed to facilitate the 
coordination of electricity generation and consump-
tion. All these mechanisms and technologies require 
an ICT infrastructure for measurement, control, and 
billing of various loads and/or generation units at 
local, regional, or distributed sites.
Demand side management DSM is an important 
mechanism for peak shaving and residual peak 
shaving for different types of loads. DSM means in-
centivizing electricity consumers to adapt their con-
sumption to the availability of electricity generation. 
Principally, the loads can be influenced by means 
of two different mechanisms: on the one hand, end 
customers can react manually to suitable incen-
tives such as price signals. On the other hand, auto-
mated load control is conceivable for devices where 
deferred use and a modulated operation mode en-
tail no loss of comfort, economic consequences, or 
other restrictions in everyday household/business 
life (dispensable loads). With respect to the poten-
tial of DSM on low voltage level, the necessary IT 
infrastructure and the relation between DSM and 
AMI have been discussed widely [43].
Supply side management Supply side management 
(SSM) works similarly to DSM but refers to local 
or distributed generation facilities. SSM means in-
centivizing electricity producers to adapt their gen-
eration to the demand of electricity. The generation 
units are typically small-scale residential units like 
CHP plants or larger CHP units located at industrial 
facilities.
Virtual power plants Virtual power plants (VPP) 
aggregate power generation, storage, or consump-
tion units into one balancing unit by means of ICT 
metering and control technologies. These units may 
be spread out over the grid and belong to separate 
owners. VPP are especially useful in the context of 
electricity markets: the VPP operator controls or 
manages the operation of the generation units to 
follow a joint schedule or to offer balancing power 
to the system operators. 
Microgrids Microgrids are a specific solution to 
manage the intermittent character of RES on a re-
gional level. They are grid areas in which generation 
from local RES or other distributed generation and 
consumption is balanced by local control mecha-
nisms by means of information exchange between 
the devices through local ICT. As such, the higher-
level distribution grid to which the microgrid is 
connected is not necessarily and immediately ex-
posed to the intermittence of RES connected to the 
microgrid. Island grids without any connections to 
distribution grids are an extreme form of this ap-
proach. Note that microgrids are geographically 
connected grid regions, while VPP are virtually 
aggregated units which are distributed throughout 
larger grid areas.
Energy storage Requirements for power storage 
differ according to field of application. Some storage 
technologies are used to balance fluctuations within 
a very short timeframe (e. g. some milliseconds) and 
others are used for longer timeframes (e. g. days or 
weeks):- Hydrogen generated by means of electrolysis can be used to store electric power for time-
frames lasting up to several months.- Pumped-storage and compressed air energy storage power stations are suitable for an in-
traday balancing of generation and consump-
tion. On a global level, pumped-storage power 
plants are the most important technology to 
store electric power. - Electrochemical storage mediums like batteries are employed to store electricity for time-
frames ranging from one hour to several days. - Centrifugal mass storage, super caps, and superconductive inductors can be charged 
and unloaded within an extremely short 
timeframe. They are used for grid stabilization 
services and voltage maintenance [44].
Barriers to the development of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies There are many different 
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barriers to the development of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies as described above. The 
elimination of such barriers calls for suitable regu-
latory measures. In principal, these barriers can be 
classified into three different categories [45]: - Technological barriers refer to the fact that the maturity of some technologies that might be 
important for the balancing of generation and 
consumption is still rather low [46]. Electro-
chemical storage mediums such as batteries, 
for example, are in many cases still too expen-
sive to be used in a widespread manner [44].- Economic barriers exist, because for many stakeholders in the electricity sector the costs 
of investing in balancing mechanisms and 
technologies are still higher than the benefits. 
For potential investors, especially for small-
sized third parties, the administrative overhead 
and the necessary investments in ICT for 
controlling, balancing, and billing are relatively 
high. Many of them consequently refrain from 
investing in balancing technologies. Specifi-
cally, there are many open questions related to 
billing, balancing, and accounting, in the case 
that several market actors coordinate power 
generation and load for different business 
purposes.- Institutional barriers may arise if new tech-nologies have to adapt to practices and codes 
developed in a context in which these new 
technologies were not yet known. For example, 
microgrids require specific connection codes 
that are different from small conventional 
distribution grids. The costs of deploying such 
balancing mechanisms and technologies criti-
cally depend on connection codes, legal re-
porting obligations, and application processes 
[45].
5.6.2 International practice
Reducing technological barriers In order to pro-
mote the development of technologies and business 
models to balance electricity generation and con-
sumption, government-supported R&D programs 
are of fundamental importance (Germany’s R&D 
program E-Energy is presented in ▶ Sect. 4.4.6). 
Many countries have established funding schemes 
to reduce existing technological barriers:- The United States for example, claim to invest at least $3 billion into smart grid projects [47]. 
Specifically, they have funded two important 
R&D programs for microgrid and DSM dem-
onstration projects run by the United States 
Department of Defense (USDOD) and the 
United States Department of Energy (USDOE). 
The USDOD provided $38.5 million for three 
different military base microgrid demonstra-
tions, with a focus on reliability and energy 
security [45]. The USDOE spent over $50 mil-
lion for nine projects having the concrete goal 
of achieving a 15 % peak load reduction in the 
local distribution feeder [45]. - In recent years, the EU has also invested significant amounts in smart grid-related R&D 
and devoted several major research efforts ex-
clusively to DSM, SSM, VPP, microgrids, and 
energy storage. One promising example is the 
Future Internet for Smart Energy (FINSENY) 
project which was conducted as part of the 
private public partnership Future Internet from 
2010 to 2013.7 
In the United States and in Europe, the experience 
was made that two factors are especially important 
with respect to the success of R&D funding (cf. e. g. 
[45]):- Clear targets on what should be achieved by means of the research program have to be de-
fined in advance by the funding organization. 
Only if such targets exist can the success of the 
research project be measured and controlled 
during and after the project.- The recipient of R&D subsidies often has to co-finance the research program with its own 
capital. Financial participation is an impor-
tant additional incentive to ensure that the 
recipient of the subsidies will efficiently and 
effectively carry out the research project.
Reducing economic barriers All regulatory ap-
proaches aiming at decreasing investment costs in 
7 See ▶ http://www.fi-ppp-finseny.eu for more information 
on this project.
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balancing mechanisms or technologies or increasing 
profits related to their usage can be seen as an effec-
tive measure to promote their development:- A possible solution aiming at reducing invest-ment costs is to directly subsidize the usage 
of balancing mechanisms or technologies. To 
promote electricity storage, for example, the 
German government recently established a 
co-funding scheme for electric battery storages 
newly installed in private houses in combina-
tion with PV. The purpose of this measure is 
to promote local consumption of electricity 
generated by PV, thereby limiting the PV feed-
in to the distribution grid. - Time-of-use pricing is an important option to increase profits related to the usage of DSM, 
SSM, and energy storage. The higher the price 
differences between peak and base load prices, 
the higher the rate of return of DSM, SSM, and 
energy storage. - The attractiveness of microgrids critically depends on the difference of electricity genera-
tion costs within the microgrid and general 
retail prices for electricity. If a microgrid is 
able to produce its own electricity, consumers 
within the microgrid are independent from 
general electricity retail prices. However, it is 
only if general retail prices for electricity are 
higher than electricity generation costs within 
the microgrid that investments in these tech-
nologies might be potentially amortized after 
some years. In this light, increasing electricity 
retail tariffs can be seen as an important driver 
for investments in microgrids. Depending on 
the regulatory environment, microgrid opera-
tors might also be able to export the electric-
ity to the distribution grid. In this case, the 
question to be asked is whether the operators 
receive payments for the electricity they export 
and what rate these payments depend on: 
wholesale, retail, or potentially a feed-in tariff. 
Feed-in tariffs that are higher than the general 
retail price for electricity and higher than elec-
tricity generation costs inside the microgrid 
can be seen as an effective measure to promote 
the development of microgrids [48].
Reducing institutional barriers Standards for 
regulating the general grid connection of RES are 
common in most countries. Like Europe, the United 
States, for example, have a standard for grid con-
nection: IEEE 1547 was established in 2003. These 
standards often do not contain specific rules for 
VPP or microgrids. However, some countries have 
started to issue special regulation for VPP and/or 
microgrids:- To ease the grid connection of microgrids, the United States issued IEEE 1547.4: Guide 
for Design, Operation, and Integration of 
Distributed Resource Island Systems with 
Electric Power Systems. This standard presents 
alternative approaches and good practices for 
the design and operation of microgrids and 
their integration with distribution grids. For 
instance, this includes the ability to separate 
from and reconnect to the distribution grid 
while providing power to the islanded mi-
crogrid. The IEEE 1547.4 standard is currently 
gaining approval on the international level.- Another example of institutional barriers for microgrids being reduced is Germany, where 
microgrid operators have been relieved of 
several legal requirements that have applied to 
distribution grid operators in Germany since 
2005. Special rules applying to so-called site 
networks have been introduced by EnWG for 
grids covering campuses and enterprises. Such 
site networks can be designed as microgrids. 
For example, operators of site networks are not 
subject to the general connection obligation 
(§ 18 EnWG): they are permitted to publish 
less reports on grid conditions (§ 14b EnWG), 
have less monitoring obligations (§ 35 EnWG), 
and less obligations to report service disrup-
tions (§ 52 EnWG).
5.6.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The key driver for the usage of balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies in China is peak shaving 
due to the high growth rate of power consumption. 
The balancing mechanisms and technologies de-
scribed above, especially DSM and energy storage, 
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will contribute to a more effective peak shaving and 
to an improved utilization rate of the grid infra-
structure. In the long term, residual peak shaving 
– necessary due to the increasing expansion of RES 
generation capacities – will be an additional aspect 
in China. Balancing mechanisms and technologies 
like SSM, VPP, and microgrids will become more 
important in this context.
In 2011, more than 70 % of China’s electricity was 
consumed by the industrial sector [49]. In general, 
the technical potential for peak shaving in this sec-
tor is comparatively high and can be realized with 
dedicated ICT solutions. Usually, the potential for 
peak shaving is smaller and more distributed in the 
commercial sector and especially in the residential 
sector. ICT requirements and costs of implementing 
balancing mechanisms and technologies in these sec-
tors are therefore comparatively higher. In this light, 
balancing between generation and consumption in 
China should be optimized with a focus on industrial 
and commercial consumers in the short- to medium-
term and on residential consumers in the long term.
With this general background in mind, several 
specific policies may foster the development and 
usage of specific balancing mechanisms and tech-
nologies: - Time-of-use pricing to incentivize the usage of DSM and energy storage: Time-of-use pricing 
has gradually been introduced to all catego-
ries of users except residential consumers and 
irrigational users. With regard to commercial 
and industrial consumers, China already has 
a very high time-of-use adoption rate, with 
roughly two thirds of large-scale customers 
using time-based electricity tariffs [50]. Even 
if the difference between peak and off-peak 
prices has increased in recent times, it is still 
questionable whether the current tariff system 
offers sufficient incentives for a pronounced 
intraday shifting of power demand [51]. The 
Chinese government recently announced that 
it would also introduce time-of-use pricing for 
residential consumers by the end of 2015 [50]. 
In designing this new tariff system, sufficient 
differences between peak and off-peak prices 
have to be considered as a key success factor. 
The same key success factor applies to time-of-
use pricing in non-residential sectors. 
- Additional R&D funds for SSM, VPP, microgrid, and energy storage demonstration projects: 
To help abolish technological barriers, the 
Chinese government has decided to promote 
the development of different balancing mecha-
nisms and technologies and it has already 
started to foster R&D in these areas. From an 
institutional point of view, the NEA has played 
the most active role in promoting balancing 
mechanisms [45]. Other institutions that are 
interested in the promotion of such technolo-
gies are the NDRC, the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Rural Development, and the MOF 
[45]. However, the pertinent research has just 
started in China and consequently needs to 
be intensified in the future to catch up with 
international best practice technologies. Thus, 
additional R&D funds should be set up for 
SSM, VPP, microgrid, or energy storage dem-
onstration projects. In this context, it is specifi-
cally important to set up concrete performance 
targets for funded demonstration projects and 
require a co-financing of the subsidies’ recipi-
ents.- Feed-in tariffs and interconnection standards for microgrids: compared to European coun-
tries and many other countries, retail prices for 
electricity are very low in China. As a conse-
quence, prices for locally generated electricity 
(e. g. in microgrids) are often significantly 
higher than local retail prices for electricity. 
This has already led individual investors to 
abandon microgrids demonstration projects 
[46]. However, increasing electricity retail 
prices to promote the development of mi-
crogrids would directly contrast one of China’s 
primary energy policy goals: affordable retail 
prices. Therefore, feed-in tariffs for local RES 
or microgrids could be an option to incentiv-
ize investments in microgrids. Also, intercon-
nection standards for microgrids (such as 
IEEE 1547.4), currently not existing in China, 
should be issued and made legally binding.
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The recommended approach at a glance- Coordination between generation and con-sumption should be optimized with a focus 
on industrial and commercial consumers in 
the short- to medium-term and on residen-
tial consumers in the long term. - Peak shaving is of crucial importance in the short to medium term. To promote peak 
shaving, it is specifically recommended to 
refine time-of-use pricing in China in order 
to set sufficient incentives (by means of 
high differences between peak and off-peak 
prices) for investments in DSM and energy 
storage for all categories of consumers.- Residual peak shaving is relevant in the long term. Additional R&D funds for SSM, VPP, 
and microgrids as well as interconnection 
standards and feed-in tariffs specifically 
for microgrids can be employed to reduce 
technological, economic, and institutional 
barriers to the development of SSM, VPP, and 
microgrids. 
5.7 Facilitate the development 
of a unified view of smart grids
Chinese context- Due to the different strategies of China’s grid operators with regard to smart grid develop-
ment and the fact that the Chinese govern-
ment has not yet publicly defined its view 
on smart grids, there is still no unanimously 
accepted vision on the technological and or-
ganizational design of smart grids in China. 
As a result, there is much uncertainty among 
potential smart grid investors regarding the 
future development. - The diversity of stakeholders interested in standardization in China has increased 
in recent years: in addition to the central 
government, research institutes, universi-
ties, civilian and defense industries, and 
regional governments, all have their own 
interests with regard to standardization and 
are increasingly willing to contribute to the 
standardization process [63].
5.7.1 Background
Smart grids require a common understanding 
of all stakeholders Smart grids represent a con-
cept aiming at the integration of information and 
communication among market actors from various 
sectors as well as a multitude of power system com-
ponents. In a smart grid, data on the grid status is 
exchanged as well as data related to services, prod-
ucts, and reporting obligations. A key challenge of 
smart grids is to integrate its different components 
and ensure that they can communicate with the help 
of ICT. The definition of common standards for in-
terfaces and communication protocols is therefore 
of utmost importance in order to ensure interoper-
ability and a smooth exchange of information be-
tween the different elements of a smart grid. The 
costs of connecting smart grid technologies through 
ICT (integration costs) significantly affect the over-
all costs of deploying smart grid technologies and 
are thus one key success factor for smart grids. A 
prerequisite for reducing integration costs is a uni-
fied view on smart grid technologies, business pro-
cesses, and procedures. Furthermore, smart grid-
related technologies, products, and services can only 
be developed by the variety of stakeholders in a cost-
efficient manner if requirements for smart grid solu-
tions are accepted by all smart grid stakeholders.
Standardization as a means to create a common 
understanding Standardization can serve to cre-
ate a common understanding between participating 
stakeholders, thus increasing interoperability, and 
reducing smart grid integration costs. According 
to the German Institute for Standardization (DIN), 
standardization usually has at least five major goals:- securing the competiveness of domestic industries in the international context of a 
broad ensemble of diverging technologies and 
procedures,
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- providing a strategic instrument to foster eco-nomic and social success,- supporting and relieving government regula-tion,- fostering technological convergence, and- creating efficient processes and instruments [52].
These goals illustrate that the current scope of stan-
dardization goes well beyond the integration of two 
or more individual systems. The following aspects 
should be focused on in the context of smart grid-
related standardization issues:- How can the development of standards sup-port the common understanding of future 
smart grids?- How can the process of national and interna-tional standardization be optimized for faster 
time to markets of necessary standards?- How can the heterogeneous requirements and viewpoints of different stakeholders with 
regard to smart grid architecture be expressed?
The government’s role in promoting standardiza-
tion In some cases, governments are quite actively 
involved in standardization processes. By issuing 
laws and regulations providing minimum standards 
for certain goods, services, or technologies, govern-
ments are even able to legally enforce standards. In 
many cases, however, standardization is mainly 
pushed forward by the private industry in coopera-
tion with accredited standards developing organiza-
tions (SDO).8 Note that, due to the involvement of 
many different stakeholders in SDO, a high level of 
coordination between the various stakeholders is 
necessary.
Even if standardization is left to the private sec-
tor, many governments acknowledge its importance 
in today’s quickly developing technological envi-
ronment. In 2009, for instance, the German govern-
ment issued a Standardization Policy Concept of the 
Federal Government [53]. This policy paper presents 
the goals and expectations of the government with 
regard to standardization as well as specific measures 
8 Especially in those areas where potential harm to citizens 
resulting from non-compliance with the standard is low, 
standardization is mainly left to private industry [64].
of different ministries. In general, governments have 
many options to influence standardization, and con-
sequently they play an important role in this context. 
To give just a few examples, possible governmental 
measures to promote standardization are:- hosting conferences and symposia on stan-dardization issues,- strengthening the role and (financial) power of SDO,- actively participating in the work of SDO, and- considering standardization issues in the edu-cational system [53].
5.7.2 International practice
European Mandate M/490 The EU specifically 
acknowledges the importance of standardization 
in smart grids: the European Commission issued 
the European Mandate M/490 with the intention 
to promote the development of a unified and com-
monly accepted view on smart grids to increase in-
teroperability and reduce integration costs. To ex-
ecute Mandate M/490, the Smart Grid Coordination 
Group (SG-CG) was founded by the major European 
standardization organizations European Committee 
for Standardization (CEN), European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Organization (CENELEC), and 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). All of them are mirror-organizations of the 
main international standardization organizations In-
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
Scope and objective of Mandate M/490
“The challenge of Smart Grids deployment will 
require changes to existing standards, industry 
rules and processes.
This mandate is to address such a challenge in the 
field of standardization. The expected long term 
duration of Smart Grid deployment suggests the 
need for a framework that is:- Comprehensive and integrated enough to embrace the whole variety of Smart Grid actors 
and ensure communications between them
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- In-depth enough to guarantee interoper-ability of Smart Grids from basic connectivity 
to complex distributed business applications, 
including a unified set of definitions so that all 
Members States have a common understand-
ing of the various components of the Smart 
Grid.- Flexible and fast enough to take advantage of the existing telecommunications infrastructure 
and services as well as the emergence of new 
technologies while enhancing competitiveness 
of the markets.- Flexible enough to accommodate some differ-ences between EU Member States approaches 
to Smart Grids deployment […].
The expected framework will consist of the follow-
ing deliverables:- A technical reference architecture, which will represent the functional information data 
flows between the main domains and inte-
grate many systems and subsystems architec-
tures.- A set of consistent standards, which will support the information exchange (commu-
nication protocols and data models) and the 
integration of all users into the electric system 
operation.
- Sustainable standardization processes and collaborative tools to enable stakeholder 
interactions, to improve the two above and 
adapt them to new requirements based on gap 
analysis, while ensuring the fit to high level 
system constraints such as interoperability, 
security, and privacy, etc.”
Source: Wording from the European Commis-
sion [65]
Organizational aspects of Mandate M/490 The 
SG-CG consists of four working groups that are 
synchronized with those of mandates M/441 (smart 
metering) and M/468 (electric mobility). The fol-
lowing four working groups are organized under a 
joint steering committee (see . Fig. 5.3):- First Set of Standards (WG FSS): Responsible for compiling a consistent set of smart grid 
standards based on existing standards by ap-
plying the concepts and processes from the 
other working groups.- Reference Architecture (WG RA): Responsible for the design of a technical reference archi-
tecture to be used in the other groups in order 
to consistently and comprehensively describe 
smart grids. The technical reference architec-
ture can be thought of as a map showing the 
 . Fig. 5.3 Organizational structure of M/490 SG-CG, taken from [55]
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boundaries as well as different areas of smart 
grids. It can be used to increase the under-
standing of who does what with whom in 
which manner in smart grids.- Sustainable Processes (WG SP): Responsible for the design of processes for the identifica-
tion and application of smart grid use cases. 
In the smart grid context, use cases describe 
specific smart grid applications and define 
the important actors, systems and technolo-
gies and their requirements and functions 
contributing to the development of a common 
understanding of smart grids [54]. Use cases 
are neutral with regard to specific projects, 
products, and vendors and can also be applied 
within a gap analysis revealing the need for 
future smart grid standardization. 
- Smart Grid Information Security (WG SGIS): Responsible for identifying the guidelines to 
achieve information security and privacy in 
the context of the application of current smart 
grid standards.
Main results of European Mandate M/490 As it 
provides the structure referenced in the results of 
the other SG-CG working groups, the so-called 
Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM), a techni-
cal reference architecture developed within WG 
RA, can be described as the first deliverable of the 
Mandate M/490. SGAM (see . Fig. 5.4) is a three-
dimensional model of the European smart grid 
environment. It distinguishes between physical do-
mains (generation, transmission, distribution, dis-
tributed energy resources, and customer premises), 
 . Fig. 5.4 SGAM – The Smart Grid Architecture Model, taken from [56]  
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management zones (process, field, station, opera-
tion, enterprise, and market) and interoperability 
dimensions (component, communication, informa-
tion, function, business).
The different interoperability dimensions are 
based on the GridWise Architecture Council’s (GWAC) 
Inter-operability Context-Setting Framework [57]: the 
component layer represents the physical/technical 
aspect of the system and is therefore used to model 
physical equipment and infrastructure. The commu-
nication layer further specifies protocols and proce-
dures of data exchanges between the components, 
while the information layer outlines the information 
models used in the context of the components and 
information exchange. Above these solution-oriented 
dimensions, the function layer specifies the logical 
and thus technology-independent viewpoint in terms 
of the functions and services realized by the imple-
mentation, while the business layer finally represents 
the objectives as well as regulatory and legal require-
ments connected to these functions.
WG SP applied the SGAM to identify smart 
grid use cases. The use case methodology is widely 
based on the Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 
IEC 62559 and includes a template for the unified 
description of use cases as well as a process to iden-
tify and manage use cases (subject to standardiza-
tion as IEC 62559). WG FSS compiled a smart grid 
standards list based on SGAM and the smart grid 
use cases. The list structures the multitude of stan-
dards within a common framework reducing the 
complexity of the standardization landscape. Us-
ers of the list may search for appropriate smart grid 
standards based on their classification by domains, 
zones and layers (see appendix F for further infor-
mation on the work of WG SP and WG SGIS as well 
as the next steps of Mandate M/490). 
5.7.3 Recommended approach 
for China
The diversity of stakeholders interested in standard-
ization issues in China has generally increased in re-
cent years. The trend towards RES and more actively 
involved end consumers of electric power addition-
ally tends to increase the number of stakeholders 
engaged in smart grid standardization. In particular, 
new market actors such as the ICT industry are ex-
pected to participate actively in order to unfold their 
innovative potential.
Examples for current standardization 
activities in China and possible 
connections to the European Mandate 
M/490
The SGCC Framework and Roadmap for Strong & 
Smart Grid Standards [66] stresses the impor-
tance of standardization for the smart grid 
development. Analyzing this document reveals 
the intention to identify gaps and thereby sup-
port the planning and implementation process. 
The mechanisms and concepts proposed in the 
context of the Mandate M/490 are appropriate 
to be taken into consideration for the stan-
dardization in China and the coordination and 
harmonization of activities on the international 
level.
The issues and aims discussed in the context 
of the standardization process in China may 
benefit from coordination with similar activities 
in the international context. Within the organi-
zational structure of the M/490 SG-CG, possible 
liaisons with standardization activities in other 
countries including China are mentioned as fu-
ture tasks within the scope of Mandate M/490. 
Therefore a joint discussion on the issues of 
smart grid standardization may support the 
design of the smart grid architecture based on a 
unified planning process and a set of consistent 
standards.
As the goal of a consistent standardization 
framework is expressed in context of the SGCC 
Framework and Roadmap for Strong & Smart 
Grid Standards, its structure regarding the 
standardization system in China may represent 
a suitable starting point to integrate the Euro-
pean and Chinese viewpoints in context of a 
common framework. Furthermore, the national 
smart grid standardization task force estab-
lished by the Standardization Administration 
of China (SAC) and NEA about two years ago 
may also be considered as an organizational 
platform to address these issues. 
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The further promotion of smart grid standardiza-
tion activities would accelerate the development 
of an unanimously accepted vision on the techno-
logical and organizational design of smart grids in 
China. Specifically, the integration of new market 
actors in the standardization process would in-
crease the innovation potential in the smart grid 
development. Based on the activities of the Euro-
pean Commission, the following policies are worth 
considering:- The establishment of an organizational ar-rangement for smart grid standardization: the 
Chinese government, for example via MOST, 
could promote the foundation of an organiza-
tional arrangement such as SG-CG to coordi-
nate standardization issues and integrate new 
market actors in the standardization process. 
Within this organizational arrangement, clear 
structures and processes to foster the under-
standing of the smart grid concept and to 
provide the means to model and implement 
smart grid solutions should be defined and 
implemented. The requirements of smart grids 
should be analyzed and current and future 
stakeholders identified. - The commissioning of a reference architecture framework: the government could engage this 
organizational arrangement to develop archi-
tectural concepts such as a technical reference 
architecture (i. e. a Chinese Smart Grid Ar-
chitecture Model). The models applied in this 
context should be able to describe interoper-
ability aspects of the systems, ranging from 
business objectives to technical connectivity of 
the components involved in a solution.- The commissioning of smart grid use cases and standards: use case descriptions and a 
thorough process to address governance and 
quality aspects are beneficial to develop a set 
of consistent and complimentary smart grid 
standards. The work of the SG-CG may be 
regarded as a reference in this area. Moreover, 
adapting the results of SG-CG to the Chinese 
context or creating a compatible (mirror-like) 
approach could serve as the basis to initiate 
a joint discussion on the issues of smart grid 
standardization. 
Following these recommendations, the key quality 
requirements of interoperability, data management, 
and cyber security can then be thoroughly analyzed 
and managed to create appropriate architecture 
models and identify supporting smart grid stan-
dards. This way, Chinese standardization processes 
could be synchronized more with international 
standardization. For example, Chinese standards 
could be promoted to the international level. Cur-
rently, the joint work in standardizing information 
exchange for demand response and in connecting 
demand side equipment and/or systems into the 
smart grid (in IEC PC 118) is a good example for 
the benefits of such cooperation. 
The recommended approach at a glance- Promote the establishment of an organiza-tional arrangement (e. g. similar to SG-CG) to 
coordinate smart grid standardization. - Initiate the development of a reference architecture framework taking into account 
technical and organizational aspects which 
are unique to China (i. e. a Chinese Smart 
Grid Architecture Model). - Ensure that effective and efficient standard-ization processes exist and promote the 
development of smart grid use cases and 
standards. 
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Chapter at a glance
– There are inherent conflicts between the funda-
mental energy policy goals of reliability, afford-
ability, and sustainability. Government priorities 
on the energy policy goals are often reflected in 
energy sector regulation.
– Seven recommendations have been presented in 
support of smart grid development in China. In 
principle, each recommendation is intended as 
support for the fundamental energy policy goals. 
Nevertheless, the implementation sequence of the 
recommendations is not arbitrary with respect to 
the energy policy goals.
– In order to give policy makers an impression 
of how policy goal prioritization influences the 
timeline in which the recommendations should 
be implemented, the present chapter will outline 
three possible regulatory pathways. Each of these 
pathways prioritizes one specific goal of the en-
ergy policy triangle and develops a suitable imple-
mentation roadmap. These roadmaps are intended 
to serve as blueprints for policy makers, who have 
to decide about proper regulation based on the 
individual Chinese prioritization of energy policy 
goals.
6.1 Government targets for China’s 
future electric power system
The following chapter will present the main targets 
of China’s government for each stage of the electric 
power system. These targets are the basis for a com-
prehensive description of the scenarios underlying 
the regulatory pathways. The targets are based on 
the following documents:- 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development, issued by China’s State Council in 2013 [1],- Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Environmental Industry, issued by China’s State 
Council in 2013 [2],- Key Information at a glance – China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development, 
issued by NEA in 2012 [3],- China’s 2012 Energy Policy, issued by the Infor-mation Office of the State Council in 2012 [4].- Understanding China’s 12th Five-Year Energy Plan, issued by IEA in 2013 [5]. 
Targets for the power generation sector In order 
to cope with rapidly increasing power consumption 
and to ensure power system reliability, China’s gov-
ernment plans to increase total electricity genera-
tion capacities during the next years from 970 GW 
in 2010 to 1490 GW in 2015. It is projected that gen-
eration capacities will increase further to 1935 GW 
in 2020 [6]. 
More specifically, China’s government aims at 
vigorously developing distributed and renewable 
energy sources. From 880 TWh in 2011, electricity 
generated solely from renewable sources is projected 
to increase to more than 1,200 TWh in 2015. The 
projected increases in generation capacities for solar 
power, wind power, and biomass power are impres-
sive. If these expansion targets are to be achieved, 
RES must be integrated in the grid more effectively 
than today. The Chinese government additionally 
aims at stopping the deterioration of air quality as 
well as the increase of CO2 emissions. The target is 
therefore for the total amount of discharge of SO2 
and NOx to remain constant between 2015 and 
2020. Also, the increase in CO2 emissions will be 
slowed in spite of the planned coal power genera-
tion growth.
Government targets for the power 
generation sector at a glance- Roughly double generation capacities from 2010 to 2020 - Vigorously develop RES- Stop the deterioration of air quality. - Reduce the growth of CO2 emissions
Targets for the power logistics sector China’s 
government plans to significantly expand transmis-
sion and distribution grids. The capacity of China’s 
transmission grids is planned to double by 2020 
(compared to 2010), creating a national backbone 
grid, interconnecting different Chinese regions and 
improving electricity transmission from the energy 
bases to the load centers. The plan also include 
upgrading urban and rural distribution grids, pro-
moting distribution intelligence, and improving the 
capacity and reliability of the overall power supply. 
This enhancement of distribution grids primarily 
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aims at reducing blackout times by roughly 40 % 
from 2012 to 2020. The government also aims at 
improving asset utilization of the grid infrastructure 
by peak shaving and by reducing the line loss rate 
from 6.5 % in 2010 to 6.3 % in 2015. 
With the goal of facilitating the integration of 
large-scale and intermittent RES, the Chinese gov-
ernment aims at promoting energy storage technol-
ogies by funding R&D on energy storage, energy 
conversion and related key technologies.
Government targets for the power logistics 
sector at a glance- Build up a backbone network and roughly double grid capacities from 2010 to 2020- Upgrade distribution grids and reduce black-out times significantly- Improve asset utilization of grid infrastruc-ture- Promote energy storage
Targets for the power trade and retail sector The 
Chinese government plans to establish a more mar-
ket-oriented energy system to increase competition 
and affordability. Administrative reforms of SOE are 
planned to take place: transmission and distribution 
will be separated in a number of pilot projects and 
independent power trading institutions will be es-
tablished. Electricity markets and price-based coor-
dination mechanisms are planned to be introduced: 
the government strives to form a pricing mecha-
nism where markets set on-grid and off-grid prices 
and the government only sets the price for electric-
ity transmission and distribution (network charge), 
the economic dispatch for power generation will be 
increased, and time-of-use prices, seasonal tariffs 
and interruptible load electricity tariffs are planned 
for more widespread introduction.
Government targets for the power trade 
and retail sector at a glance- Establish a modern energy market system- Promote reforms in key energy sectors- Improve energy pricing mechanisms
Targets for the power consumption sector One 
of the government’s major targets is to increase the 
efficiency of power use in order to reduce growth 
in total electricity consumption. Specifically, the 
government intends to reduce energy consumption 
per unit of GDP by roughly 16 % from 2010 to 2015. 
Given that some of China’s most remote regions are 
still not connected to the electric power grid, China’s 
government also wants to provide universal access 
to electric power even in most remote regions of 
China by 2015.
Government targets for the power 
consumption sector at a glance- Increase efficiency of power use- Provide universal access to electric power even in most remote regions of China by 
2015
Cross-sector targets With regard to power system 
governance, the government aims at improving 
the planning and implementation of power sector 
development: targets and responsibilities of differ-
ent governmental institutions will be clarified and 
coordinated; local governments and the pertinent 
departments of the State Council will be made re-
sponsible for binding indicators such as the share 
of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption or the 
intensity of energy consumption. 
Simultaneously the government is moving for-
ward to strengthen energy industry management by 
accelerating the introduction of an Energy Law and 
by enacting amendments to the Coal Law and the 
Electric Power Law. Also, technology and equipment 
in the energy sector will be further standardized and 
capacities of statistics, monitoring, prediction, and 
warning will be built up.
The Chinese government envisages rationalizing 
energy investment and the management system of 
SOE. The government wants to explicitly adhere to 
the dominance of its state-owned economy in key 
energy sectors related to national security and econ-
omy but, at the same time, it wants to improve the 
management and assessment mechanisms of SOE.
Regardless of the adherence to the dominant 
position of SOE in China’s power system, the gov-
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ernment also has the objective of diversifying in-
vestments in the energy sector. Approval for energy 
infrastructure investments is intended to become 
less restrictive so that the participation of private 
and foreign capital is encouraged. Single energy 
markets, like the oil market, will be opened up to 
competition. The government wants to strengthen 
the innovation potential of China’s environmental 
industry in order to enable the industry to increase 
the supply of green products, expand market de-
mand, and enhance export prospects.
Another goal is to accelerate the development of 
the environmental industry in order to promote the 
development of technologies and equipment that 
save energy, protect the environment, and encour-
age reuse of resources. 
Governmental cross-sector targets 
at a glance- Improve planning and implementation- Strengthen the management of the energy industry- Rationalize energy investment and the man-agement system of SOE - Diversify energy investment- Accelerate the development of the environ-mental industry 
6.2 Underlying scenarios
In the following chapter, three smart grid develop-
ment scenarios will be presented, based on different 
energy policy goals. For each scenario, the recom-
mendations made in ▶ Chap. 5 will be prioritized 
and their interdependencies analyzed. The results of 
this analysis are scenario-based propositions for the 
implementation sequences of the recommendations. 
They will be presented in the form of a roadmap. Each 
roadmap is intended to support China’s smart grid 
development with a focus on one particular scenario. 
The smart grid scenarios presented in the chapter are:- Reliability/Security of Supply: In this scenario, the goal is to maximize electricity availability 
and to minimize outages and disruptions of 
the electricity supply.
- Ecological Sustainability: The second scenario focuses on improving air quality as well as 
on decreasing and potentially stopping the 
growth of CO2 emissions in order to contribute 
to climate protection. Amongst others, this is 
achieved by an accelerated installation of RES 
capacities.- Affordability/Competition: Competition is a key factor for innovation and affordability. 
This scenario will consequently focus on the 
creation of level playing fields and of incentives 
for market participation of new market actors 
through appropriate market design.
The government targets presented in ▶ Sect. 6.1 are 
associated to the three scenarios (see . Fig. 6.1). In 
some cases, a specific target contributes to more 
than one energy policy goal. Yet, in these cases, in 
an effort to increase clarity, only the most obvious 
association to one specific policy goal will be pre-
sented. Two targets are general smart grid develop-
ment targets as recorded in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
for Energy Development. They are placed in the cen-
ter of the triangle, as smart grids are seen as a means 
to contribute to all energy policy goals. 
6.3 Drawing the roadmaps
For migrating from today’s electric power system 
towards smart grids based on one of the given 
scenarios, it is favorable to implement the recom-
mendations in a specific timeline. For deriving the 
implementation sequences, the recommendations 
were sorted by priority in a first step. In a second 
step, main aspects of the recommendations in 
each scenario were collected and allocated to the 
timeframes short term (2015–2016), medium term 
(2017–2020) and long term (2021–2030). Interde-
pendencies between main aspects were explored ad-
ditionally. Afterwards the recommendations were 
arranged chronologically. 
The following three sections show recom-
mended priorities, their main aspects, interdepen-
dencies, and the sequences worked out for the im-
plementation for each scenario. Recommendations 
and dependencies are highlighted within the order 
of their respective importance for the scenario. In 
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addition, a visualization pertaining to the scenario 
and summarizing the timeframes of the respec-
tive measures of each recommendation is also pre-
sented. Furthermore, a possible sequence of starting 
points for work on the recommendations has been 
worked out. The justifications for the prioritization 
of the recommendations are discussed together with 
each chart. Moreover, the specific measures to be 
executed for each recommendation, their respec-
tive interdependencies, and their timeframes are 
explained.
6.3.1 Reliability/Security of Supply 
scenario
Looking at the overall prioritization with respect 
to the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario, it can 
be seen that the recommendations to Define a long-
term strategy for the electricity sector and establish 
an independent and powerful regulator, Coordinate 
network expansion planning for electricity grid expan-
sion and upgrade, and to Improve grid integration of 
RES have a high priority (. Fig. 6.2). Remember that 
these priorities do not necessarily correspond to the 
proposed implementation sequence, because inter-
dependencies within the given scenario have to be 
analyzed before recommendations are implemented.
Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sec-
tor and establish an independent and powerful 
regulator Effective government work is a precon-
dition for the efficient development of smart grids. 
Therefore, roles and responsibilities for government 
administration and regulation have to be set from 
the start. As a consequence, it is important to imple-
ment in the short term all the measures proposed in 
the recommendation to Define a long-term strategy 
for the electricity sector and establish an independent 
and powerful regulator:
Affordability/Compeon Ecological Sustainability
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 . Fig. 6.1 Scenarios and their associations with energy policy goals
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- A clearly defined long-term strategy for elec-tricity system development has to be speci-
fied by the government. The strategy should 
include long-term government targets with re-
gard to the development of generation capaci-
ties of different generation technologies, and 
targets for energy efficiency. Such a strategy 
is a prerequisite for coordinated expansion of 
the electric power system as well as smart grid 
development. It might also serve as a point of 
reference for related government policies. - The centralization of all regulatory aspects in one independent and powerful regula-
tory institution is of critical importance to 
increase the effectiveness of regulation. The 
main tasks of the regulator are coordination 
of network expansion planning and network 
regulation. In the Reliability/Security of Sup-
ply scenario, the regulator should specifically 
monitor power disruptions and outage times 
on national and local levels to provide an 
overview of the quality of electricity supply. 
Much like in Germany, grid operators should 
be obliged to regularly report data on power 
disruptions and outage times to the regulator 
(see ▶ Sect. 4.4.4 for related regulation in Ger-
many). Pertinent laws (for example, a general 
energy law) should empower the Chinese 
regulator to effectively monitor power disrup-
tions and outage times.
Coordinate network expansion planning for 
electricity grid expansion and upgrade Net-
work expansion planning has a high priority in 
this scenario because the electric power grid is the 
backbone of the power system. Coordinated and 
efficient network expansion is the basis of a power 
infrastructure that can be adapted to consumer 
needs in a timely manner. This maximizes energy 
availability as the reliability of the future energy sys-
tem essentially depends on the grid and generation 
capacities being matched to the consumption side.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade 
are:




Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator
Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade 
Improve grid integraon of RES
Opmize the balancing of electricity generaon and consumpon
Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids
Introduce network regulaon for efficient investment incenves for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Create level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and informaonNot important in the given scenario
 . Fig. 6.2 Priority of recommendations in the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario
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- In the short term, the main task to be ac-complished for successful network expansion 
planning is to improve coordination between 
power system stakeholders and to define 
a common procedure for network expan-
sion planning. Specifically, it is beneficial to 
coordinate network expansion planning and 
the construction of new generation capacities. 
The Future-oriented Energy Grids Platform can 
serve as a role model to encourage the estab-
lishment of a similar grid platform in China.- In the medium term, stakeholders involved in the grid planning process have to elaborate a 
network development plan that will be manda-
tory for TSO and DSO under supervision of 
the regulator.
The measures to be implemented within the rec-
ommendation to Define a long-term strategy for the 
electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator should precede the measures 
within the recommendation to Coordinate network 
expansion planning for electricity grid expansion 
and upgrade: a government strategy for the electric 
power system including long-term targets for gen-
eration capacities is a prerequisite for the network 
development process. An independent and power-
ful regulatory institution is supposed to supervise 
the network development process.
Improve grid integration of RES Increasing RES 
capacities contribute to supply the quickly increas-
ing demand for electric power. Therefore, they sup-
port reliability and security of supply if the technical 
integration of RES is clearly defined. However, RES 
that have not been properly integrated may even 
endanger security of supply and stability. 
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Improve grid integration of RES 
are:- In the short term, grid connection points must be defined for all kinds of RES at all grid levels.- Defining a binding network code for grid con-nection that specifies responsibilities of grid 
operators as well as power generators is also a 
task in short term.- RES generation capacities are needed in order to maximize available electricity and thereby 
reduce load curtailments. However, for grid 
stability and security of supply to be ensured, 
RES generation has to be curtailed under 
specific conditions. Therefore, procedures and 
documentation for curtailment of RES and the 
requirements in terms of IT support must be 
specified in the medium term.
Even if the recommendation to Improve grid inte-
gration of RES has high priority, measures to be im-
plemented within several other recommendations 
serve as an input and should be implemented early: 
along with the need for an independent and power-
ful regulator to supervise curtailment procedures 
and define network codes, the clear specification of 
targeted RES generation capacities and well-defined 
network development procedures for network en-
hancement are preconditions for more effective RES 
integration. Also, a unified view of smart grids and 
technical standards contribute to a more effective 
integration of RES [7].
Optimize the balancing of electricity generation 
and consumption When electricity consumption 
increases so quickly that the growth of generation 
capacities can hardly follow, balancing and espe-
cially peak shaving are measures that support se-
curity of supply. Grid operation with higher safety 
margins eases grid control. Therefore, reduced peak 
loads resulting from peak shaving help to avoid sys-
tem instabilities. Coordination of electricity genera-
tion and consumption is therefore of considerable 
priority in the scenario of reliability and security of 
supply. This includes load management, time-of-use 
pricing, and smart meter rollout.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Optimize the balancing of elec-
tricity generation and consumption are:- In the short term, the main aspect is the fur-ther refinement of peak shaving mechanisms 
and technologies for system stabilization with 
focus on industrial and commercial consum-
ers. One interesting option in this context is to 
tender the disconnectable loads on an internet 
platform (see ▶ Sect. 4.4.5 for related regula-
tion in Germany).- As already planned by the Chinese govern-ment, the time-of-use pricing system has to be 
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refined (sufficient price differences between 
peak and off- peak prices for all categories of 
consumers) in the short term as well. A more 
sophisticated time-of-use pricing would incen-
tivize investments in balancing mechanisms 
and technologies – for instance DSM, SSM, 
and energy storage.
An additional interesting measure originally not 
included in the recommendation to Optimize the 
balancing of electricity generation and consumption 
is locational pricing that can be used to signal net-
work congestion. Locational pricing refers to power 
prices which are calculated for a number of locations 
– called nodes – on the transmission grid. Each node 
represents a physical location where power is injected 
by generators or withdrawn by loads [8]. Locational 
pricing reduces network congestion and may also 
set incentives for network expansion in regions with 
many network congestions [9]. It is an option for 
the long term and might become necessary in future 
in order to efficiently integrate the projected RES 
generation capacities. The regulator is supposed to 
supervise such locational pricing by regulating net-
work charges with a clear scheme for the interaction 
between network operators and market players. 
The discussion reveals that measures imple-
mented within the recommendations to Define a 
long-term strategy for the electricity sector and estab-
lish an independent and powerful regulator and to 
Improve grid integration of RES serve as an input for 
the recommendation to Optimize the balancing of 
electricity generation and consumption.
Facilitate the development of a unified view of 
smart grids A technical reference architecture 
helps better understand smart grids and allows ho-
listic analyses of security aspects relating to their 
implementation. Interoperability minimizes indi-
vidual integration efforts and reduces the probabil-
ity of interface failures. Such a reference architec-
ture will therefore increase reliability and security 
of supply. 
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Facilitate the development of a 
unified view of smart grids are:- In the short term, the main aspect is the creation and adoption of an organizational 
arrangement to model smart grid reference 
architectures and to coordinate smart grid 
standardization. - Defining effective and efficient standardization processes (e. g. based on smart grid use cases) 
as well as coordinating the work of SDO to 
establish effective and efficient standardization 
processes are two further important aspects 
that should take place in the same time frame.- In the medium term, a set of consistent smart grid standards should be created using the 
technical reference architecture.
Introduce network regulation for efficient invest-
ment incentives for electricity grid expansion and 
upgrade In the scenario focusing on reliability and 
security of supply, network regulation is somewhat 
less important but not irrelevant. It contributes indi-
rectly to this scenario, as it sets economic incentives 
for the build-up and maintenance of the grid in-
frastructure. Incentives for efficient network invest-
ments and investments in R&D and innovation are 
important in the context of the measures within this 
recommendation. These incentives, by contributing 
to the introduction of smart grid technologies, will 
directly ensure security of supply and reduce costs.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Introduce network regulation 
for efficient investment incentives for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade are:- In the short term, the use of incentive instru-ments like rate-of-return adder or innovation 
bonus should be assessed for application in 
China.- A decision about the use of disaggregated regulation (i. e. regulating only the monopo-
listic bottlenecks) should be made in the short 
to medium term. If applicable, disaggregated 
regulation should be implemented in the me-
dium term.- Also in the medium term, incentives should be defined for investment in innovation and smart 
applications. In this context, the network devel-
opment plan should be aligned and critical net-
work connections for system stability which ne-
cessitate stronger investment incentives should 
be identified. At this point in time, a rate-of-
return adder can be especially beneficial.
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As an independent and powerful regulator is a pre-
requisite for network regulation, the recommenda-
tion to Define a long-term strategy for the electricity 
sector and establish an independent and powerful 
regulator should be realized before network regula-
tion is focused upon.
Create level playing fields for access to power sys-
tem infrastructure and information As new mar-
ket actors are necessary more for innovation than for 
stability of the energy supply, the measures proposed 
in the recommendation to Create level playing fields 
for access to power system infrastructure and informa-
tion are not considered as important in this scenario 
with a focus on reliability and security of supply.
Sequence of implementation In the light of the 
interdependencies described above, the following 
implementation sequence is proposed in the sce-
nario focusing on reliability/security of supply:- Define a long-term strategy for the electric-ity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator.- Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade.- Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids.- Improve grid integration of RES.- Optimize coordination of electricity genera-tion and consumption.- Introduce network regulation for efficient investment incentives for electricity grid ex-
pansion and upgrade.
. Figure 6.3 depicts the points in time for under-
taking the main activities and shows dependencies 






5. Grid Integration 
of RES
6. Balancing of 
Generation and 
Consumption









Define a long-term strategy for the electric power system, introduce independent and powerful 
regulator, and empower the regulator to monitor power disruptions and outage times
Define incentives for investment 






between power system 
stakeholders
Define binding network 
code and grid 
connection points






Concentrate on peak shaving in industry and 
commerce and refine time-of-use pricing system
Create an organizational arrangement to model technical reference architectures and to coordinate 
smart grid standardization and promote the creation of a set of consistent smart grid standards
Assess the 
potential of rate of 
return adders or 
innovation 
bonuses
Decide on the introduction of 
disaggregated regulation and, if possible, 
apply disaggregated regulation
 . Fig. 6.3 Starting points, timeslots of main activities, and dependencies between main aspects of recommendations in the 
scenario focusing on reliability and security of supply
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between the key aspects of recommendations for 
the scenario focusing on reliability and security of 
supply. Each recommendation is represented by a 
bar partitioned into timeframes from left to right. 
The starting point of each bar depicts the proposed 
beginning of work on each recommendation. Rec-
ommendations that are unimportant to the scenario 
are shown in gray. Proposed time points for the 
main measures are represented by the opaque blue 
regions on each bar. At the end of each bar, color 
gradients have been used to show that work on the 
recommendations continues even after the main as-
pects have been taken care of. The main measures 
are shown as boxes. The proposed starting time 
of each measure is shown by a diagonal line con-
necting the box to the bar. Dependencies between 
measures are shown by arrows while preconditions 
are marked with a white line crossing a bar at the 
beginning of the arrow. The end of the arrow points 
to the dependent measure.
6.3.2 Ecological Sustainability 
scenario
An introductory overview of the overall prioriti-
zation with respect to this scenario is presented in 
. Fig. 6.4. It can be seen that the recommendations 
Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector 
and establish an independent and powerful regula-
tor, Improve grid integration of RES, and Create level 
playing fields for access to power system infrastructure 
and information have a high priority in the Ecologi-
cal Sustainability scenario. Again, remember that 
these priorities do not necessarily correspond to 
the proposed implementation sequence because the 
interdependencies within the given scenario have to 
be analyzed before. 
Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sec-
tor and establish an independent and powerful 
regulator As in the previous scenario, the com-
mitment to a long-term strategy and the creation 
of an independent and powerful regulator has the 





Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator
Improve grid integraon of RES
Create level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and informaon
Opmize the balancing of electricity generaon and consumpon
Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade
Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids
Introduce network regulaon for efficient investment incenves for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Not important in the given 
scenario
 . Fig. 6.4 Priority of recommendations in the Ecological Sustainability scenario
Chapter 6 • Regulatory pathways for smart grid development in China128
tainability because a government-defined long-term 
strategy for the future electricity sector including 
specific RES expansion targets is a prerequisite for 
effective and efficient expansion of RES generation 
capacities.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Define a long-term strategy for 
the electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator are:- Effective regulation is required to ensure RES integration. Thus, the centralization of regula-
tory aspects in one independent and powerful 
regulatory institution should be addressed in 
the short term. Responsibilities for grid inte-
gration of RES and for power system informa-
tion management should be assigned in this 
context. - Official government targets for RES expansion are currently defined only until 2015. Within 
the forthcoming Five-Year Plan, the planning 
period will be extended to 2020. Defining a 
long-term government strategy concerning 
energy mix (including RES share), and energy 
efficiency indicators beyond 2020 is conse-
quently a task for the medium term.
Improve grid integration of RES Timely connec-
tion and low curtailment of RES will speed up the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as well as 
emissions of local and regional air pollutants. RES 
therefore need to be integrated into the grid with a 
very high priority and all of the following tasks need 
to be implemented in the short term:- Proper definitions of grid connection points are necessary for all kinds of RES on all grid 
levels. - A binding network code specifying respon-sibilities of both grid operators and power 
generators needs to be defined, as investors 
in RES need clear time limits for grid con-
nection of RES in order to deliver generated 
electricity to the market at the right time. Grid 
operators should have to bear liability for grid 
connection of RES – resulting in a shallow cost 
approach for interconnection, whereby grid 
operators have both the responsibility and the 
opportunity for efficient overall grid develop-
ment.
- Detailed procedures and documentation for curtailment of RES must be specified, and the 
requirements for IT support of these proce-
dures must be clear. The implementation of 
this measure can be seen as a technical and 
economic framework to encourage invest-
ments into RES.
Measures related to the recommendation to Define a 
long-term strategy for the electricity sector and estab-
lish an independent and powerful regulator positively 
impact the effectiveness of the recommendation to 
Improve grid integration of RES: credible long-term 
government targets for RES generation capacities 
reduce risks related to investments in RES units. 
Another prerequisite is a powerful and independent 
regulator to supervise curtailment procedures and 
to define network codes.
Create level playing fields for access to power sys-
tem infrastructure and information In principle, 
new market actors in China can already invest in 
RES. However, they need to be integrated into elec-
tricity sector governance more effectively in order to 
ensure efficient integration of RES. Non-incumbent 
market actors will invest in RES generation capaci-
ties only if the necessary information for competition 
and market access is available to them. Methods for 
the integration of the innovation potential of third 
parties have to be institutionalized and non-discrim-
inatory information sharing has to be guaranteed.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Create level playing fields for ac-
cess to power system infrastructure and information 
are:- In the short term, the main measure of this recommendation is the definition of minimum 
necessary requirements for power system 
information management. Note that this task 
is related to the recommendation to Define a 
long-term strategy for the electricity sector and 
establish an independent and powerful regula-
tor in . Fig. 6.5 due to the pivotal role of the 
government in this context.- In the medium term, the role of new market actors in smart grids should be defined and 
how these actors can be integrated should be 
clarified.
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- An institution for power system information management should be specified, and this 
institution should set up a platform. It should 
then organize access to and exchange of infor-
mation between all eligible parties.
Before the role of new market actors in smart grids 
can be defined, a long-term strategy for the electric 
power sector should be developed. Therefore, the 
recommendation to Define a long-term strategy for 
the electricity sector and establish an independent 
and powerful regulator should precede the recom-
mendation to Create level playing fields for access 
to power system infrastructure and information. An 
architecture and standardization framework en-
courages the development of a unified smart grid 
model containing an overview of relevant use cases 
and business processes. Such a model, representing 
a form of Chinese SGAM, significantly eases the 
organization of power system information manage-
ment. The platform for information management 
should therefore be implemented after the mea-
sures relating to the recommendation to Facilitate 
the development of a unified view of smart grids have 
been applied.
Optimize the balancing of electricity generation 
and consumption When consumption is not coor-
dinated with generation, significant curtailments of 
RES generation are necessary to ensure grid stabil-
ity. This reduces the attractiveness of investments 
in RES generation capacities. The usage of VPP, 
microgrids, or energy storage units facilitates the 
integration of distributed RES. 
Within the scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Optimize the balancing of elec-
tricity generation and consumption are:- The first task in coordinating electricity gen-eration and consumption is to promote VPP, 
microgrids, and energy storage technology for 
local integration in the short term by increas-
ing R&D funding in this area. - The time-of-use pricing system, which de-pends on a successful smart meter rollout, also 
has to be refined (sufficient price differences 
between peak and off peak prices for all cat-
egories of consumers) in the short term. This 
measure is already planned by the Chinese 
government. The first focus should be set on 
industrial and commercial consumers and 
then on residential consumers.- Another interesting measure, originally not included in the recommendation to Optimize 
the balancing of electricity generation and 
consumption, is locational pricing. It might be 
interesting in the long term and contribute to 
RES integration (see ▶ Sect. 6.3.1 for a brief 
description of locational pricing). 
Coordinate network expansion planning for elec-
tricity grid expansion and upgrade Network de-
velopment is necessary to connect new consumers 
and generators to the network, including genera-
tion units belonging to third parties. The network 
development plan allows planning of RES instal-
lation and thereby increases investments in RES. 
As a consequence, network expansion planning is 
relevant in this scenario. The main measures of the 
recommendation to Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade 
should be taken in the short term:- Increased coordination between established stakeholders and new market actors should be 
promoted by the government.- A coordinated and mandatory network de-velopment plan including the aspect of RES 
integration should be established. 
Based on experiences in Germany, an independent 
and powerful regulator is the best-suited organiza-
tion for organizing and implementing these mea-
sures. Therefore, the recommendation to Define a 
long-term strategy for the electricity sector and estab-
lish an independent and powerful regulator should be 
implemented before the recommendation to Coor-
dinate network expansion planning for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade.
Facilitate the development of a unified view of 
smart grids As mentioned above, distributed en-
ergy resources are important and in this scenario 
their number is expected to rise. This implies an 
increase in system scale and complexity and calls 
for a smart grid architecture and standardization 
framework (i. e. an organizational arrangement to 
coordinate and promote smart grid standardization 
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and the development of a reference architecture). 
A unified view of smart grids should exist to elicit 
the resulting requirements and to compare different 
architectural solutions. The smart grid architecture 
and standardization framework should focus on in-
teroperability between actors and systems, which is 
a key aspect in the context of decentralized system 
architectures. The high number of interfaces be-
tween systems implies the need for security analy-
ses, which in turn requires solid models of systems 
architectures [7]. Clear structures and processes 
should be defined in order to coordinate the work 
of SDO. 
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Facilitate the development of a 
unified view of smart grids are:- In the short term, an organizational arrange-ment to coordinate and promote smart grid 
standardization should be created and the de-
velopment of a technical reference architecture 
framework should be assigned. - In the medium term, effective and efficient standardization processes (e. g. based on a 
collection of smart grid use cases) should be 
established.
Introduce network regulation for efficient invest-
ment incentives for electricity grid expansion and 
upgrade For ecological sustainability, an electric 
power grid does not necessarily have to be devel-
oped at lowest costs. As network regulation focuses 
on efficient network investments, it is not an impor-
tant regulation measure for this scenario.
Sequence of implementation . Figure 6.5 shows 




5. Grid Integration 
of RES
6. Balancing of 
Generation and 
Consumption









Introduce independent and powerful 
regulator, and assign responsibilities for RES 
integration and information management
Define the role of new market actors and the responsibilities for information management
Introduce platform for information management









Define network codes, 
connection points, and 
curtailment procedures
Refine time-of-use pricing system and promote VPP, 




Define long-term strategy for 
the electric power system
short term mid term long term
1. Long-term 
strategy / Regulator
 . Fig. 6.5 Starting points, timeslots of main activities, and dependencies between main aspects of recommendations in the 
scenario focusing on ecological sustainability
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pendencies involved in this scenario. For a detailed 
description of the layout of the visualization, please 
check back to the previous section. In the light of 
interdependencies described above, the following 
implementation sequence is proposed in the sce-
nario focusing on ecological sustainability:- Define a long-term strategy for the electric-ity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator.- Improve grid integration of RES. - Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade.- Create level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and information.- Optimize the balancing of electricity genera-tion and consumption.- Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids.
6.3.3 Affordability/Competition 
scenario
An introductory overview of the overall prioriti-
zation with respect to this scenario is presented in 
. Fig. 6.6. It can be seen that the recommendations 
Create level playing fields for access to power system 
infrastructure and information, Coordinate network 
expansion planning, and Define a long-term strategy 
for the electricity sector and establish an independent 
and powerful regulator have a high priority in the 
Affordability/Competition scenario.
Create level playing fields for access to power system in-
frastructure and information In the scenario focusing 
on competition and innovation, two very important 
aspects are power system information management 
and the inclusion of new market actors. As non-in-
cumbent market actors are main drivers for compe-
tition and innovation, non-discriminatory access to 
relevant information is crucial for them to encour-
age investments in the electric power system. China’s 





Create level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and informaon
Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade
Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator
Introduce network regulaon for efficient investment incenves for electricity grid 
expansion and upgrade
Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids
Improve grid integraon of RES
Opmize the balancing of electricity generaon and consumpon
 . Fig. 6.6 Priority of recommendations in the Affordability/Competition scenario
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CSG, whereas the ICT industry hardly participates in 
strategic smart grid developments. It would be highly 
beneficial to change this situation with regard to the 
non-involvement of the ICT sector and to create 
business opportunities for new market actors. 
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Create level playing fields for ac-
cess to power system infrastructure and information 
are:- In the short term, the definition of the role of new market actors in smart grids and how 
these actors can be integrated is one of the 
main aspects.- Defining minimum requirements for a data platform to organize access to and exchange of 
power system information between all eligible 
parties has to be accomplished in the short 
term. - Also, the establishment of such a data platform is another task to be accomplished in this 
timeframe. 
A common understanding of the structural aspects 
of smart grids would encourage the identification 
and description of the roles of new market actors 
as well as their need for information and interfaces 
both on the business and technical level. An institu-
tionalized smart grid architecture and standardiza-
tion framework might therefore serve as an inter-
company interaction mechanism to strengthen the 
role of third parties even beyond standardization. 
Coordinate network expansion planning for 
electricity grid expansion and upgrade The rec-
ommendation to Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade 
proposes that a stakeholder platform for network 
development should be established. This platform 
would mean more involvement of all market actors. 
All measures associated to this recommendation 
should be implemented in the short term:- Coordination between established power system stakeholders and new market actors 
has to be strengthened. For this purpose, a 
stakeholder platform similar to the Future-ori-
ented Energy Grids Platform in Germany could 
be established and managed by a government 
institution. 
- Common procedures for network expan-sion planning should be defined. A network 
development plan should be elaborated within 
a coordinated process and shared responsibili-
ties and made mandatory afterwards. - Responsibilities for network planning should be identified, thereby clarifying which new 
market actors should participate in this pro-
cess. This task shall be accomplished by a gov-
ernment organization, but it can be supported 
by grid operators. 
Before the start of network expansion planning in-
cluding new market actors, the role of new market 
actors in China’s electric power system must be de-
fined. Therefore, the recommendation to Create level 
playing fields for access to power system infrastructure 
and information should precede the recommenda-
tion to Coordinate network expansion planning for 
electricity grid expansion and upgrade. 
Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sec-
tor and establish an independent and powerful 
regulator As government agencies have to super-
vise and guide grid operation, an effective defini-
tion of the government’s roles and responsibilities is 
important. This ensures favorable conditions for the 
development and rollout of innovations. 
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Define a long-term strategy for 
the electricity sector and establish an independent and 
powerful regulator are:- If the responsibilities for network planning have not already been defined within the pre-
vious recommendation, the government has to 
define these responsibilities in the short term.- An independent and powerful regulator should be established in the medium term.- A long-term strategy for the future electric power sector beyond 2020 must be defined in 
the same time frame.
Introduce network regulation for efficient invest-
ment incentives for electricity grid expansion and 
upgrade In the scenario focusing on affordability 
and competition, disaggregated regulation should 
ensure that only monopolistic bottlenecks (trans-
mission and distribution grids) are regulated. Con-
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sequently, competition can evolve in all other stages 
of the supply chain and incentives are created for a 
cost-efficient build-up of the grid and for technical 
innovations.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the 
recommendation to Introduce network regulation for 
efficient investment incentives for electricity grid ex-
pansion and upgrade within this scenario are:- Network charges offering efficient investment incentives in smart grids have to be introduced 
in the medium term.- After network charges have been fixed, disaggre-gated regulation can be introduced. Due to the 
high impact of disaggregated regulation on com-
petition in the retail sector, this measure should 
also be implemented in the medium term. 
Before network regulation can be established, the 
responsibility for network regulation has to be de-
fined and an independent and powerful regulator 
is necessary.
Facilitate the development of a unified view of 
smart grids As mentioned above, a smart grid ar-
chitecture and standardization framework (i. e. an 
organizational arrangement to coordinate smart 
grid standardization and the development of a refer-
ence architecture) can be institutionalized as an in-
ter-company interaction mechanism to strengthen 
the role of new market actors. In addition, it ensures 
interoperability between solutions coming from dif-
ferent vendors, prevents vendor lock-in and makes 
Chinese smart grid technologies applicable in in-
ternational markets as well as vice versa [10], [11]. 
Furthermore, the framework supports the standard-
ization and engineering process and thereby the dif-
fusion of knowledge. 
Within this scenario the main measures of the 
recommendation to Facilitate the development of a 
unified view of smart grids are:- In the short term, the smart grid architecture and standardization framework has to be cre-
ated or adopted to enable modeling of smart 
grid solution architectures. - Coordinating the work of organizations in-volved in the development of standards needs 
clear structures and incentives for new market 
actors to participate in the process. The defini-
tion of these structures and incentives is also a 
short-term task. - In addition, standardization processes need to be coordinated with international standardiza-
tion in the short term in order to establish ef-
fective and efficient standardization processes 
(e. g. based on a collection of smart grid use 
cases) in the medium term.
Improve grid integration of RES Grid integration 
of RES is important in this scenario. The stricter the 
conditions for grid connection of RES are formu-
lated, the less smaller power generation companies 
are dependent on the grid operators. Rules favorable 
for the integration of RES attract new investors, i. e. 
third parties that need both stable investment and 
technical conditions. The following measures should 
therefore be implemented in the short term in order 
to allow competition in the field of RES generation:- Grid connection points need proper definition for all kinds of RES on all grid levels.- A binding network code for grid connection specifying the respective responsibilities of grid 
operators and power generators needs to be 
specified. In this context, grid operators should 
bear liability for grid connection of RES.- A detailed procedure and documentation for curtailment of RES including, for example, 
document exchange and transparency rules 
must be defined. Additionally, the require-
ments for IT support for these procedures 
need to be specified.
Well-defined network development procedures for 
network enhancement involving RES will positively 
impact the effectiveness of these measures. The rec-
ommendation to Coordinate network expansion 
planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade 
should therefore start before the recommendation 
to Improve grid integration of RES.
Optimize the balancing of electricity generation 
and consumption The recommendation with the 
lowest priority in this scenario is the balancing of 
electricity generation and consumption, which is 
relevant for integrating prosumers in the electric 
power system. Balancing of electricity generation 
and consumption includes load management, time-
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of-use pricing, smart meter rollout, and the promo-
tion of VPP, microgrids, and energy storage by re-
ducing barriers to their implementation.
Within this scenario, the main measures of the rec-
ommendation to Optimize the balancing of electric-
ity generation and consumption are:- In the medium term, coordination between electricity generation and consumption can 
be optimized by peak shaving and a further 
refinement of time-of-use pricing. Such a 
time-of-use based framework for pricing with 
sufficient price differences will incentivize the 
usage of balancing mechanisms and technolo-
gies such as DSM, SSM, and energy storage.
Balancing of electricity generation and consump-
tion potentially depends on the grid integration of 
RES. However, power system information manage-
ment with smart meter infrastructure and informa-
tion interchange between all parties as well as an 
independent and powerful regulator for regulation 
of network charges are also necessary. 
Sequence of Implementation . Figure 6.7 shows 
the timeframes of main activities and interde-
pendencies. In the light of the interdependencies 
described above, the following implementation 
sequence is proposed in the scenario focusing on 





5. Grid Integration 
of RES
6. Balancing of 
Generation and 
Consumption









Introduce independent and  
powerful regulator and define a long-term 





role of new 
market actors
Specify responsible institution and 
introduce platform for information 




Define network codes, 
connection points, 
curtailment rules for RES
Adopt SGAM for China, introduce efficient standardization 
processes, and coordinate with international standardization
Further incentivize peak shaving in industry 
and commerce with time-of-use-pricing
Keep synchronized




short term mid term long term
 . Fig. 6.7 Starting points, timeslots of main activities, and dependencies between main aspects of recommendations in the 
scenario focusing on competition and innovation
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- Introduce network regulation for efficient investment incentives for electricity grid ex-
pansion and upgrade.- Facilitate the development of a unified view of smart grids.- Improve grid integration of RES.- Optimize coordination of electricity genera-tion and consumption.
6.4 Discussion of the three 
roadmaps
In addition to the specific timeline of each scenario, 
the three different roadmaps presented above give 
policy makers the following general hints:- The priority and relevance of each recom-mendation can be assessed on the basis of the 
underlying scenario. For example, it can be 
seen that the measures of the recommendation 
to Create level playing fields for access to power 
system infrastructure and information have the 
highest priority if the government focuses on 
fostering competition and innovation but are 
virtually irrelevant if the government focuses 
only on reliability issues.- Comparing the proposed implementation sequences in all three scenarios shows which 
recommendations have high priorities in all 
three scenarios. Such recommendations can 
be considered as political imperatives and 
should be implemented irrespective of the un-
derlying policy goals of the Chinese govern-
ment.
. Figure 6.8 summarizes the proposed implemen-
tation sequences for all three scenarios. Those rec-
ommendations to be implemented in the beginning 
are presented in the left. For example, the Ecological 
Sustainability scenario starts with Define a long-term 
strategy for the electricity sector and establish an inde-
pendent and powerful regulator, followed by Improve 
grid integration of RES and then by the remaining 
recommendations.
Comparing the implementation sequences in 
all three scenarios reveals that there are two recom-
mended approaches with the highest overall prior-
ity. The measures subsumed within these recom-
mendations shall be implemented independently 
of the underlying scenario:- Define a long-term strategy for the electricity sector and establish an independent and power-
ful regulator, and - Coordinate network expansion planning for electricity grid expansion and upgrade.
Three of the remaining five recommendations are 
relevant in each scenario, though with a lower pri-
ority: - The Improvement of the grid integration of RES has a very high priority under the Ecological 
Sustainability scenario and is also important 
for the Reliability/Security of Supply scenario. 
It is somewhat less important in the Affordabil-
ity/Competition scenario. - The Facilitation of the development of a unified view of smart grids is especially important with 
respect to the Reliability/Security of Supply 
scenario. It is somewhat less important with 
regard to the Affordability/Competition and 
Ecological Sustainability scenarios.- The Optimization of the balancing of electric-ity generation and consumption is particularly 
relevant for the Reliability/Security of Supply 
scenario. The recommendation has a lower rel-
evance in the Ecological Sustainability scenario 
and is ranked last in the Affordability/Competi-
tion scenario.
The two remaining recommendations are not rel-
evant in every scenario. Rather, they contribute to 
single energy policy goals. In particular, both of 
these recommendations are essential for migrating 
towards smart grids focusing on affordability and 
competition: - The Creation of level playing fields for access to power system infrastructure and informa-
tion is the first recommendation that should 
be implemented if the government strives to 
develop smart grids focusing on affordability 
and competition. It is also important if the 
government chooses to focus on ecological 
sustainability.- The Introduction of network regulation for electricity grid expansion and upgrade is at 
position four in the implementation sequence 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 . Fig. 6.8 Overview of proposed implementation sequences for all three scenarios
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of the Affordability/Competition scenario. It 
is also relevant, though at a later stage, in the 
Reliability/Security of Supply scenario.
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Appendix A – Tables and Figures
 . Table A.1 Electricity consumption in China in 2011, data from [1]
Consumer Electricity Consumption 
in TWh in 2011
in % of Total
Industry 3,469 73.8
Residential Sector 562 12.0
Wholesale, Retail, Trade, and Hotels/Restaurants 150  3.1
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery, 
and Water Conservancy
101  2.2
Transport, Storage, and Postal Service  85  1.8
Construction  57  1.2
Others 275  5.9
 . Table A.2 Circuit length of transmission lines with 35-kV and above and installed capacity of transformers by the end 
of 2010
Voltage level Circuit length of transmission line/km Capacity of transformers/ 10,000-kVA
Total 35-kV and above 1,336,772 361,742
1000-kV AC 1,006 600
+/− 800-kV DC 3,334 593
750-kV AC 6,685 3,870
+/− 660-kV DC 1,095
500-kV AC 135,180 69,843






 . Table A.3 Reliability rate of power supply for users in cities at the level of 1000-KV during the 11th Five-Year Plan 
(2006–2010)
Year Reliability ratio of power supply/% Average blackout time/hours/household
2010 99.923  6.722




 . Table A.4 Administrative regime of the power sector in China
Organization Description
Power sector regime reform working 
group
– Theoretically enjoying top decision-making rights regarding the power 
regime reform
National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)
– Responsible for long-term planning and for the issuance of energy-
related Five-Year Plans
– Approving important investment projects
– Regulating energy and electricity prices
– Proposing energy conservation and new energy development policies
National Energy Administration 
(NEA)
– Proposing the energy development strategy
– Drafting energy development plans and industrial policies and organizing 
their implementation 
– Drafting all energy-related provision and rules
– Advancing energy regime reforms
– Coordinating key issues emerging in the process of energy development 
and reforms 
– Exercising regulations on power system construction, power safety, 
power supply and service, as well tariff and information disclosure
Ministry of Finance (MOF) – Responsible for final decisions on some matters concerning the financial 
code and financial costs standards
Provincial Economic and Trade 
Commission (PETC)
– Acting as the regulator at local level and serving as coordinators; in 
practice, they also perform the functions of local regulation institutions
State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASAC)
– Supervising the performance of SOE
– Appointing and dismissing SOE executives
– Formulating auditing requests and approving key decisions
Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP)
– Responsible for tasks related to overall environmental protection
– Cooperating with NEA in the performance of its duties
State Administration of Work Safety 
(SAWS)
– Giving guidance to safety inspection and being responsible for industrial 
safety regulation
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 . Table A.5 Regional and provincial grid operators in China
SGCC
Regional subsidiaries Provincial subsidiaries Province
North China Grid Ltd. Beijing Electric Power Corporation Beijing
Tianjin Electric Power Corporation Tianjin
Hebei Electric Power Corporation Hebei
Shanxi Electric Power Corporation Shanxi
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Electric Power 
(Group) Co. Ltd.
Inner Mongolia
Shangdong Electric Power Corporation Shangdong
Northeast China Grid Company Ltd. Liaoning Electric Power Corporation Liaoning
Jilin Electric Power Corporation Jilin
Heilongjiang Electric Power Corporation Heilongjiang
East China Grid Company Ltd. Shanghai Electric Power Corporation Shanghai
Jiangsu Electric Power Corporation Jiangsu
Zhejiang Electric Power Corporation Zhejiang
Anhui Electric Power Corporation Anhui
Fujian Electric Power Corporation Fujian
Central China Grid Company Ltd. Henan Electric Power Corporation Henan
Hubei Electric Power Corporation Hubei
Hunan Electric Power Corporation Hunan
Jiangxi Electric Power Corporation Jiangxi
Sichuan Electric Power Corporation Sichuan
Chongqing Electric Power Corporation Chongqing
Northwest China Grid Company Ltd. Shaanxi Electric Power Corporation Shaanxi
Gansu Electric Power Corporation Gansu
Qinghai Electric Power Corporation Qinghai
Ningxia Electric Power Corporation Ningxia
Xinjiang Electric Power Corporation Xinjiang
CSG
Provincial subsidiaries Province
– Guangdong Power Grid Corporation Guangdong
Guangxi Power Grid Corporation Guangxi
Yunnan Power Grid Corporation Yunnan
Guizhou Power Grid Corporation Guizhou
Hainan Power Grid Corporation Hainan
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Grid operators non-affiliated to SGCC or CSG
– East Inner Mongolia Electric Power Company Ltd. Inner Mongolia
Tibet Electric Power Company Ltd. Tibet
CLP Holdings Ltd. Hongkong
 . Table A.5 (continued) Regional and provincial grid operators in China
 . Table A.6 Share of current application of ICT and challenges structured by voltage levels, adapted from [2]
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 . Fig. A.1 Germany’s power grids in 2012 (© VDE e. V. [3])
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Appendix B – Bottom-up view on China’s technological 
smart grid vision
The following descriptions and lists present a full 
picture of the modern grid technologies that are be-
ing deployed and tested in demonstration projects, 
individual cities, or individual provinces. These de-
scriptions and lists have been provided by the Chi-
nese expert team, and they represent the state-of-
the-art of China’s smart grid technologies.
Transmission grids- Control systems: SGCC has successfully devel-oped a smart grid dispatching support system. 
In order to improve safe and stable operation, 
CSG carried out a series of advanced projects 
to improve the dispatching automation. An 
automatic dispatching system covering all 
dispatching areas has recently been com-
pleted; it is still based on a manual dispatcher 
but supplemented by automatic decisions. 
An integrated dispatching system is under 
construction; it will include strong simulation 
capability, off-line analysis, and decision-
making capacity. Furthermore, research and 
pre-testing of intelligent system integration is 
in process.- Power lines: Several UHV transmission lines constructed by SGCC and CSG have gone into 
normal operation in recent years. This technol-
ogy is perceived as an important component of 
the Chinese smart grid vision.- Transformers: At the end of December 2008, the 1,000-kV transformers manufactured by 
Baoding Tianwei Baobian Electrical Co., Ltd 
and TBEA Shenyang Transformer Co., Ltd 
all passed the pre-delivery test and on-site 
delivery test. On January 6th 2009, they passed 
the 168-h assessment. The UHV transformer 
with single-unit capacity of 1,000 MVA and 
single-column capacity of 334 MVA is the larg-
est in the world. Moreover, three of the largest 
transformer manufacturers in China have 
enjoyed enormous development in ± 500-kV 
converter transformer by absorbing foreign 
technologies. Xian XD Transformer Co., Ltd 
has mastered the core technology for manu-
facturing ± 500-kV DC power transmission 
devices with the capabilities of independent 
design and manufacturing. Now it has set up 
annual production of 18–50 ± 500-kV con-
verter transformers and smoothing reactors. 
Shenyang Transformer and Baobian Trans-
former have all introduced Siemens technolo-
gies. They have developed ± 500-kV converter 
transformers jointly with Siemens and mas-
tered the basic technology for designing and 
manufacturing converter transformers.- Fixed series compensation: This technology is seen as one of the most important technolo-
gies for improving transmission and distribu-
tion grid capacities. Since 2000, China has 
witnessed rapid development and satisfactory 
results in the 500-kV fixed serial compensation 
technology. One of the important techni-
cal issues in the promotion of fixed series 
compensation technology is the stability of 
sub-synchronous resonance induced by the 
interaction between fixed series compensation 
and large-scale turbo-generators. Recently, 
domestic companies have achieved technical 
breakthroughs in this area. For example, Inner 
Mongolia Shangdu Power Plant has success-
fully resolved the problem of sub-synchronous 
resonance by using supplementary excita-
tion damping control and shaft torsion. Their 
achievements have created a basis for further 
promotion of the technical application of fixed 
series compensation.- Wires: CSG launched a pilot application of high-strength heat-resistant wires, carbon fiber 
wires, compact lines, and a helicopter patrol-
ling line.- Substations: SGCC has developed intelligent components of high-voltage (HV) switchgears, 
intelligent transformer components, modular 
intelligent HV vacuum circuit breakers with 
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phase selection function, integrated monitor-
ing systems based on a unified information 
platform, a time synchronization system, grid 
security and grid status monitoring equip-
ment, data and event logging equipment, 
polymorphic remote viewing inspection and 
firefighting system, secondary equipment for 
online automatic calibration and early warning 
systems as well as other critical equipment and 
systems. Turning to CSG, they launched the 
promotion and application of digital substa-
tions. One 220-kV and seven 110-kV digital 
substations have been built. Furthermore, 
online equipment monitoring technology has 
been applied. Equipment condition monitor-
ing centers and technical supervision centers 
are under construction. These centers will 
provide monitoring and early warning capa-
bility, fault diagnosis, status evaluation, risk 
assessment, maintenance strategies as well as 
asset management and maintenance decision 
support. In 2009, the company completed the 
formulation of the relevant technical specifica-
tions and acceptance codes, and in 2010 it built 
the provincial host station system.- Gas insulated substations: Gas insulated substations have entered the application stage. 
Online ice monitoring and lightning detection 
monitoring tools have been gradually applied.
Distribution grids- Distribution grids with ring structures: SGCC has developed an intelligent environmentally 
friendly ring main unit, and an automatic 
distribution system. CSG has continued to 
expand the distribution grid structure of urban 
and rural distribution grids. The current distri-
bution grid is still weak and most of the loads 
have single-supply access with T connections 
without ring structures.- Troubleshooting and diagnosis: Currently, the troubleshooting and diagnostic work needs 
to be done manually. Distribution automa-
tion pilot installations exist only in large and 
medium-sized cities and mainly cover the te-
lemetry data acquisition and monitoring, fault 
signal sending, problem solving and alarm, 
fault location and troubleshooting functions. 
The systems have information distribution and 
partition management functions via an inte-
grated bus, in accordance with IEC61970 and 
IEC61968 public information model standards 
and distribution grid management system 
interface standard. They provide real-time 
information exchange and synchronization of 
data and models among distribution automa-
tion system and related automation systems.
Power consumption- Smart home and consumption systems: SGCC exploits smart technologies such as a chip 
dedicated to information collection, smart 
meters, smart appliances, smart sockets, smart 
interactive terminals, smart energy storage 
systems, power grid management terminals 
and systems, smart energy-using service 
systems, electric vehicle charging equipment, 
self-service electricity service terminals, infor-
mation collection systems, and smart interac-
tive terminal detection devices. CSG has built 
a market automation system, standardized 
market businesses, carried out research on the 
power supply customer service standardiza-
tion system, and strengthened demand side 
management activities of large consumers.- Market management systems: Through the construction of market and management 
systems in accordance with uniform technical 
specifications, Yunnan Power Grid Company 
and Hainan Power Grid Corporation have 
realized centralized provincial deployment 
systems, while other branch and subsidiary 
companies have deployed such systems at city 
level. In an effort to meet the actual needs of 
the power market, measurement automation 
systems have mainly encouraged off-peak 
power consumption and introduced electricity 
metering and monitoring, remote meter read-
ing, and other functions.- Electric vehicle charging: Various Chinese companies have started research on the key 
technology for electric vehicle charging. Elec-
tricity charging stations and poles for electric 
vehicles have been constructed as trial points 
in Shenzhen, and exchange electricity Experi-
ence Centers in Guangzhou.
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Information and communication technology (ICT)- ICT systems: SGCC has developed an optical phase conductor and the pertinent supporting 
equipment, information security technology 
inspection tools, and analysis platforms. It 
has also developed smart grid key equipment 
including intelligent switch combinations 
and electrical and optical fiber composite 
low-voltage cables, which have successfully 
been put into operation. Smart grid dispatch-
ing technology support systems, intelligent 
primary equipment and facilities for electric 
vehicle charging have achieved a major tech-
nological breakthrough. CSG has developed a 
common information model, enterprise data 
resource planning, SOA technical specifica-
tions as well as a series of technical standards. 
It has also undertaken the construction of a 
unified data center, an integrated distribution 
system, an enterprise cockpit, and a massive 
real-time data platform. In 2006–2010, the 
company launched the “CSG 123 Plan”, which 
promotes unified business standards for the 
entire grid and unified information standards 
by building an integration system that includes 
IT infrastructure, technology architecture, and 
IT services to realize digitized grid support, 
informational business management as well 
as intelligent analysis and decision. As a result 
of this plan, the company has made remark-
able achievements in terms of information 
technology, and information levels have been 
improved significantly: optical fiber com-
munications now basically cover substations 
and generation stations for 110-kV and above. 
Emergency communication grids have been 
built. Distribution grid communication gives 
priority to optical fiber communication, public 
grid wireless communication, and medium 
voltage power line carrier communication. 
From an information security aspect, a series 
of technical standards and specifications in-
volving information security protection tech-
nology have been worked out. System-level 
protection measures are being implemented 
in order to achieve information resource 
partition and hierarchical security protection. 
Information security technology and manage-
ment systems have been developed, combin-
ing a variety of technical means including 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, anti-
virus systems, public key infrastructure, risk 
assessment, and other features.
Energy storage- Pumped-storage power: Energy storage is of great significance for the development of 
smart grids. It can be applied in the case of 
peak shaving in electrical systems to solve the 
power utilization problem or to improve power 
supply quality and grid reliability. Meanwhile, 
it can also be used to control the fluctuation 
of the electricity system in order to enhance 
the safety of the grid and to foster optimal 
utilization of renewable energy and promote 
further developments in this area. By 2011, 
11 pumped storage power stations had already 
been constructed with total installed capac-
ity accounting for 1.8 % of overall installed 
power. With the construction of pumped stor-
age power stations during the 11th Five-Year 
Period, the dispatchable hydro power includ-
ing that of pumped storage power stations in 
the whole country except for Hubei and Lasha 
will be 3–7 % of China’s total installed capacity 
once they have been put into normal opera-
tion.- New energy storage technologies: Significant progress has been made in research into new 
types of energy storage. In the past decades, 
organizations such as the Electrical Engi-
neering Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, the Beijing Feilun Energy Storage 
Flexible Research as well as some academic 
institutions have all been engaged in studying 
fly wheel energy storage. At present, important 
breakthroughs have been obtained in key tech-
nical fields such as superconductive magnetic 
levitation, high-speed motors, and power 
conversion. A research group at the Advanced 
Material Lab and Macromolecular Science 
Department of Fudan University has success-
fully developed a new kind of type of energy 
element-oriented carbon nano fiber. Based on 
this technology, a new type of solar fiber bat-
tery with a diameter of only 60–100 microm-
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eters can be manufactured, allowing PV con-
version and energy storage in the same piece 
of fiber. In addition, China has also achieved 
lasting breakthroughs in research into energy 
storage using storage batteries. Since the 
research into battery supported energy storage 
with vanadium redox flow in 1995, China has 
developed a 10-kW-battery energy storage 
system and established battery energy storage 
lab modules. In 2008, China Electric Power 
Research Institute developed a 100-kW bat-
tery energy storage system applicable to wind 
power plants. In January 2011, China achieved 
an important breakthrough in the construc-
tion of large-capacity battery energy storage 
technology through the synchronization of 
a megawatt battery energy storage station of 
Southern Grid, a development representing 
material progress in the integrated application 
technology of Chinese large-capacity battery 
energy storage. The final construction scale of 
Southern Grid’s 10-MW battery energy storage 
station is 10 MW for four hours with initial 
project construction of 5 MW for four hours. 
Currently, a 1-MW four-hour battery energy 
storage system has been successfully synchro-
nized and put into normal operation.
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Appendix C – Integration levels of China’s power 
system components in 2012 and 2020
The system integration of China’s power system 
components in 2012 and 2020 was discussed 
among the experts involved in the study genera-
tion process in the course of workshops carried 
out in Beijing in June 2013. In addition, the preva-
lence of market elements in 2012 and the targeted 
prevalence of market elements in 2020 were also 
discussed. In a first step, the experts agreed on the 
power system components and market elements 
that are relevant in China’s current electric power 
system as well as on the corresponding compo-
nents and elements in 2020 (see . Fig. C.1 for a 
definition of the power system components and 
market elements).
In a second step, the experts developed a com-
mon understanding of the extent to which each sin-
gle power system component is currently integrated 
in China’s electric power grid. In other words, they 
examined whether the components are physically 
connected to the grid, remotely monitorable, re-
motely controllable, or autonomously controllable/
self-healing (see . Table C.1 for a definition of in-
tegration levels). The targeted integration levels of 
the power systems components for 2020 were also 
discussed. 
After the Beijing workshops, an evaluation was 
made of the extent to which the market elements 
are currently used and will be used in 2020, rang-
ing from demonstrational level to national level (see 
. Table C.2 for a definition of these values). . Fig-
ure C.2 shows China’s current power grid integration 
as of 2012. The main findings are:- In the area of power generation, it can be seen that monitoring and control technologies are 
common in conventional power plants but are 
rather seldom used with RES. More particu-
larly, currently installed rooftop PV instal-
lations and biomass power plants are only 
physically connected to the grid, without the 
possibility of remote monitoring or any control 
functionalities.
- In the area of power logistics, China’s trans-mission grids, the associated transformer 
substations, and the pumped storage power 
plants are currently already remotely control-
lable by the grid operator. On the distribution 
grid level, however, the various components’ 
system integration levels are significantly lower 
– most of the components are not equipped 
with monitoring and control technologies. - China’s end consumers of electricity are for the most part physically connected to the power 
grid. Early examples of remote monitoring 
technologies are used only at industrial and 
commercial levels and for large-scale urban 
buildings.- With respect to the prevalence of market ele-ments, it can be stated that only few of these 
elements are currently used in China’s power 
system: early demonstration projects for spot 
markets have been implemented by the grid op-
erators and time-of-use pricing for residential 
consumers is being tested in the provinces. For 
the most part, China’s electricity is still being 
traded at governmentally fixed prices. Elements 
such as futures markets, balancing markets, or 
capacity markets used in other countries have 
not yet been implemented in China.
The following advances are planned until 2020 (see 
. Fig. C.3):- In the power generation area, various energy sources are projected to have a place in the 
Chinese power system of 2020. All of them 
will be fully integrated in the power grid and 
most of them will reach the highest integra-
tion level so that they can autonomously react 
to grid and/or market conditions. A com-
parison with the present situation reveals that 
especially RES are likely to make a big leap 
forward. While a considerable part of RES is 






























































 . Fig. C.1 Power system components and market elements in the Chinese power system model
 . Table C.1 Definition of system integration levels of power system components
System integration levels of power system components
0 – untapped This power system component is principally ready for operation. However, it is 
not yet physically connected to the power grid. Therefore, it is not able to feed in, 
transport, distribute, store, or consume electricity.
1 – physically connected This power system component is principally ready for operation and physically con-
nected to the power grid. It is therefore able to feed in, transport, distribute, store, 
or consume electricity.
2 – remotely monitorable In addition to being physically connected to the grid, this power system compo-
nent is remotely monitorable by grid operators or other actors within the power 
system. Authorized actors are able to supervise the current status of power flows, 
power frequencies, outages, etc.
3 – remotely controllable In addition to being remotely monitorable, this power system component can be 
controlled remotely. In other words, grid operators or other authorized actors of 
the power system are able to remotely control specific functions of the component 
allowing very quick reactions to critical grid conditions.
4 – autonomous/self-healing In addition to being remotely controllable, this power system component can 
autonomously react to specific grid and market conditions via incorporated ICT 
agent functionality.
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cess of RES will have become plug-and-play by 
2020. - In the area of power logistics, all voltage levels above 35-kV will have reached the highest 
level of system integration by 2020. Power 
grids and transformer substations at these 
voltage levels are projected to be enhanced 
with a large amount of control and monitoring 
devices so that they can react almost autono-
mously to unforeseen events. The distribution 
grids (voltage levels below 35-kV) and their 
associated local substations are projected to be 
either remotely monitorable or remotely con-





























 . Fig. C.2 System integration levels in China in 2012
 . Table C.2 Definition of the prevalence of market elements
Prevalence of market elements
A – Demonstrational level This market element is being tested in (small) demonstration projects.
B – City/district level This market element is being used in one or in some individual cities or districts. 
However, it is not used extensively in one entire province.
C – Provincial level This market element is used in one or in more provinces. However, it is not used 
nationwide in all Chinese provinces.
D – National level This market element is principally used nationwide. This means that with the even-
tual exemption of some special economic zones or single provinces, the organiza-
tional component is applied in all Chinese provinces.
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implies a significant improvement compared 
to their current system integration. - With regard to power storage, hydro-pumped storage plants will be autonomously control-
lable and, compared to the situation of today, 
new power storage technologies will be devel-
oped and integrated in the grid. Smart meters 
will be widely used and reach higher integra-
tion values than today. - In the power consumption area, industrial and commercial users – China’s major power con-
sumers – will be either remotely monitorable 
or remotely controllable in 2020. This means 
that grid operators and other players will be 
well informed with regard to their power con-
sumption and have the opportunity to directly 
control some customers’ loads. City dwellers 
residing in large buildings are expected to 
be fully integrated into the power grid with 
remote control activities by the grid opera-
tor. However, remote control activities are not 
planned for smaller, rural households. But 
even these customers will be remotely moni-
torable by means of smart meters. Advances 
are also projected to be made with regard to 
smart home technologies such as intelligent 
household devices and electric mobility being 
monitorable for grid operators.- In the power trade and retail area many new types of markets are envisaged for 2020. 
Whereas today governmental price regulation 
leads to low penetration with market elements, 
spot markets (including futures markets), 
OTC, and balancing markets prominent in 
other countries will be used in China’s power 
system of 2020. Also, carbon markets, capacity 
markets, and market-related elements such as 
virtual power plants (VPP), time-of-use tariffs, 
and smart products are expected to be part of 







































 . Fig. C.3 System integration levels in China 2020
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Appendix D – Germany’s smart grid vision according 
to the study Future Energy Grid 
Using the three system layers presented in . Fig. 4.3 
and eight different domains of the power sector rep-
resenting particular sub-fields of the power sector 
supply chain, nineteen relevant smart grid technol-
ogy areas were identified [1], [2]. The set of these 
technology areas, their individual maturity levels, 
and development stages describe Germany’s smart 
grid vision. The respective maturity levels help to as-
sess the speed of development of different smart grid 
technologies in Germany. The different technology 
areas are shown in . Fig. 4.4 and are described in 
more detail in the remainder of this section.
Smart grid technologies of the closed system 
layer The closed system layer requires a high level 
of security as well as the capability of real-time 
communication since it is supposed to ensure the 
stability of the power system. Only few actors are 
granted with controlling access of this system layer. 
ICT components used within this system layer ad-
dress the operation of the grid infrastructure and 
large-scale power stations. These components are 
classified into the following technology areas:- Asset management systems (AMS) for grid components are employed to plan the usage of 
electrical equipment following technical and 
commercial constraints. Their focus is on grid 
infrastructure components and components of 
large conventional power stations. Today, AMS 
are mostly used for central assets managing 
static data. Automation of this process is only 
done for core components.- Grid control systems are used for monitoring and controlling electrical transmission and dis-
tribution grids, or bulk generation units. Grid 
control systems are mainly deployed in trans-
mission grids and distribution grids of 20-kV 
or 10-kV but rather seldom below.- Wide area monitoring systems (WAMS) sub-sume technologies to measure, transfer, store, 
and visualize time-synchronized values with 
high temporal resolution. WAMS are currently 
used in some selected areas of transmission 
grids. The application within the distribution 
grids is evaluated in single pilot projects.- Grid automation refers to ICT components at the substation or field level processing data 
from grid components, measuring transduc-
ers, and giving control signals. Germany’s 
high voltage segment is currently already 
automated. In medium and low voltage grids, 
automation solutions are subject to evaluation 
in a variety of field tests.- Flexible control and AC transmission systems (FACTS) represent power electronic control 
systems which are used to affect the power 
flows or voltage levels in the electricity grids. 
Currently, FACTS are occasionally used only 
in the transmission grids.
Smart grid technologies of the ICT infrastructure 
layer The ICT infrastructure layer accounts for the 
communication between the closed and the net-
worked system layer. The technology area associ-
ated with this layer therefore deals with the interface 
functionality required for the realization of smart 
grids:- ICT connectivity refers to the prerequisites regarding the communication infrastructure 
and the amount and scope of the information 
exchange used in the power system. Thereby, 
the ICT connectivity accounts for the quality-
of-service level regarding the discovery and 
accessibility of services. The transmission grids 
are currently equipped with ICT infrastruc-
tures using point-to-point connections and 
proprietary interfaces. In contrast to that, the 
distribution grid is normally not yet equipped 
with ICT infrastructures.
Smart grid technologies of the networked system 
layer The networked system layer is distinct regard-
ing the high amount of heterogeneous stakehold-
ers and power system components it is supposed 
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to connect. It is expected that this system layer will 
gain more and more importance in the future, es-
pecially with respect to the rising amount of renew-
able generation. Therefore, this layer is expected to 
become system-critical in the process of develop-
ing robust smart grids and smart markets. The layer 
subsumes the following technology areas:- Asset management for distributed energy resources refers to the processing of opera-
tional and commercial data regarding power 
system assets. Distributed energy resources 
are referred separately because currently no 
end-to-end asset management systems exist 
for medium and small generation units which 
are expected to be of high importance for the 
development of smart grids in Germany.- Regional energy marketplaces are established to enable market participation for industrial, 
commercial and domestic customers, thereby 
taking requirements regarding grid operation, 
especially for the distribution grids, into ac-
count. First demonstrators of regional energy 
market places were evaluated in pilot projects, 
e. g. the E-Energy model regions.- Trade control systems support the analysis of relevant data and the subsequent planning and 
execution of energy trading activities. Cur-
rent systems support trading on the spot and 
day-ahead markets, as well as energy portfolio 
management.- Forecasting systems compute state estimations of various measurement parameters. Examples 
for this are forecasts regarding electricity 
generation subject to weather conditions or the 
price elasticity of electricity demand.- Business services comprise technologies con-cerning the efficient use of resources, low costs, 
high availability and reliability in the context 
of important business processes of the energy 
sector. Main challenges in this area address 
the extension of service offerings for custom-
ers, handling of big data, cloud computing and 
the optimization of the supply chain across 
enterprise boundaries. Currently, processes 
prescribed by laws and regulations are fully 
supported. Additional services address basic 
customer management functions and the bill-
ing of electricity consumption. 
- Virtual power plant (VPP) systems aggregate power generation, storage and consumption 
units. This way the provision of effective and 
balancing power as well as system services is 
optimized. Today, VPP are used to provide 
balancing power. The installations are hetero-
geneous. - Plant communication and control modules refer to embedded systems, similar to grid 
automation components, providing access to 
distributed generation, storage or consumption 
units for data reading and control signal pro-
cessing. Today, the communication interfaces 
of distributed energy resources are mostly 
proprietary. Their main function is disconnec-
tion from the grid. - The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) provides remote access to energy consumption 
data. In later development stages, this shall 
lead to advanced smart meter processes, e. g. 
for calculation of grid conditions. Standardiza-
tion, security, and mass data processing are 
key capabilities in this area. Today, there are 
no large-scale installations in Germany due to 
missing regulatory action. Functionalities and 
interfaces are proprietary.- Smart appliances refer to equipment in house-holds, buildings or small enterprises possess-
ing communication and control capabilities. 
The provision of a standardized infrastructure 
is currently one of the main challenges within 
this area. While smart appliances may not be 
essential regarding the technical smart grid in-
frastructure itself, they are expected to have a 
high market potential in the future. Currently, 
energy management systems (e. g. in the areas 
of lighting and heating) operate independently 
from the grid. Energy-related apps (e. g. for us-
age on smart phones or tablet computers) are 
developed and offered in the context of pilot 
projects.- Industrial demand side management/demand response subsumes the integration between 
the requirements of the electrical infrastruc-
ture with those of industrial processes. This 
includes the possibility to take influence on 
industrial assets from outside the enterprises. 
DSM is motivated by pricing of electrical 
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energy: the industrial enterprise tries to match 
its operations to the development of market 
prices. The enterprise may also agree to manu-
ally reduce their load on request of the grid 
operator. Automatic load shedding possibilities 
are partially realized in the context of indus-
trial operations.
Cross-cutting technologies Beyond the sixteen 
functional technology areas introduced above, 
there are three key issues regarding quality aspects 
of the future smart grid vision in Germany. They 
are regarded as cross-cutting issues which have to 
be separately considered in context of each func-
tional area.- Integration technologies address the aspect of interoperability being of critical importance 
for smart grids as ICT-based systems.- Management of data refers to procedures regarding structuring, aggregation, analysis, 
processing, and storage of high amounts of 
distributed and heterogeneous data.- Security, in terms of information security, pro-vides procedures to protect the stakeholders of 
the power systems as well as the infrastructure. 
Key requirements refer to the aspects of avail-
ability, confidentiality, and integrity.
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where applicable, its interconnections with other 
systems, and for ensuring the long-term ability 
of the system to meet reasonable demands for 
the transmission of electricity”. Moreover, the 
TSO is responsible for connection of all grid users 
at the transmission level and connection of the 
DSOs within the TSO control area.- Distribution System Operator (DSO): accord-ing to the Article 2.6 of the Directive: “a natural 
or legal person responsible for operating, 
ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, 
developing the distribution system in a given 
area and, where applicable, its interconnec-
tions with other systems and for ensuring 
the long-term ability of the system to meet 
reasonable demands for the distribution of 
electricity”. Moreover, the DSO is responsible for 
regional grid access and grid stability, integra-
tion of renewables at the distribution level and 
regional load balancing.- Generator: Generating electricity, contributing actively to voltage and reactive power control, 
required to provide the relevant data (infor-
mation on outages, forecast, actual produc-
tion) to the energy marketplace (see also the 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Directive).- Electricity Installer/Contractor: Electrical con-tractors design, install and maintain intelligent 
systems for all kinds of industrial, commercial 
and domestic purposes. Alongside the power 
and lighting applications, they equally install 
ICT and telecommunications, public street light-
ing, high medium and low voltage lines, control 
and energy management systems, access, fire 
and security control equipment, lightning pro-
tection systems, advertising and identification 
signs, emergency power generating systems 
and renewable energy systems.- Industrial customer: A large consumer of elec-tricity in an industrial/manufacturing industry. 
May be involved in contract based Demand/
Response.
Appendix E – Extracts from specific laws
Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 37
“Energy regulators should have the power to issue 
binding decisions in relation to electricity under-
takings and to impose effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties on electricity undertak-
ings which fail to comply with their obligations or 
to propose that a competent court impose such 
penalties on them. Energy regulators should also 
be granted the power to decide, irrespective of the 
application of competition rules, on appropriate 
measures ensuring customer benefits through the 
promotion of effective competition necessary for 
the proper functioning of the internal market in 
electricity. […]
Energy regulators should also be granted the 
power to contribute to ensuring high standards 
of universal and public service in compliance with 
market opening, to the protection of vulner-
able customers, and to the full effectiveness of 
consumer protection measures. Those provisions 
should be without prejudice to both the Com-
mission’s powers concerning the application of 
competition rules including the examination of 
mergers with a Community dimension, and the 
rules on the internal market such as the free move-
ment of capital. The independent body to which a 
party affected by the decision of a national regula-
tor has a right to appeal could be a court or other 
tribunal empowered to conduct a judicial review.”
Source: Wording from The European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union [1]
Roles and Responsibilities of smart grid 
actors according to SGTF- “Transmission System Operator (TSO): accord-ing to the Article 2.4 of the Electricity Direc-
tive 2009/72/EC (Directive): “a natural or legal 
person responsible for operating, ensuring the 
maintenance of and, if necessary, developing 
the transmission system in a given area and, 
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- Supplier [in the areas of energy market places]: Has a contractual agreement with 
end customer relating to the supply of elec-
tricity.- Aggregator: offers services to aggregate energy production from different sources 
(generators) and acts towards the grid as 
one entity, including local aggregation of 
demand (Demand Response management) 
and supply (generation management). In 
cases where the aggregator is not a supplier, 
it maintains a contract with the supplier.- Electric Power Grid Equipment vendors- Ancillary Services providers- Metering operator: the entity which offers services to provide, install and maintain 
metering equipment related to a supply. 
In most EU Member States the DSO is also 
metering operator. In case of a specific 
contractual basis, the contract is mostly with 
the network operator, or may be with the 
customer or the supplier. The meter may be 
rented to, or exceptionally owned by, the 
customer.- Information & Communication Technology (ICT) service providers- Grid communications network providers Plan, build and maintain the communica-
tions systems that enable the data commu-
nication required to maintain grid stability, 
load balancing and fault protection systems 
by a TSO or DSO. This function is mostly 
executed by the TSO or the DSO, or may be 
performed by an independent actor but 
the overall responsibility and ownership of 
information remains with TSO and DSO. Grid 
communications network provider ensures 
compliance with the agreed service levels 
(Service Level Agreements including quality 
of service, data security and privacy) and 
compliance with any national and/or inter-
national regulations as necessary.- Home Appliances vendors- Building Energy Management Systems (BEMS) providers, delivering the systems 
- Transportation customer: A consumer of electricity providing transport systems. May be 
involved in contract based Demand/Response.- Buildings: A consumer of electricity which is a private or business building, may also be 
involved in contract-based Demand/Response.- Home customer: A residential consumer of electricity (including also agriculture users) 
may also be involved in contract-based De-
mand/Response.- Supplier [in the area of grid users]: A grid user who has a grid connection and access 
contract with the TSO or DSO. Moreover, 
suppliers are those actors which will provide 
new services, real-time information, energy 
efficiency services and dynamic energy pricing 
concepts with Time-of-Use (ToU). The suppliers 
also provide local aggregation of demand and 
supply, in order to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the electricity supply at all 
voltage levels (including low/medium voltage 
levels).- Retailer: Entity selling electrical energy to consumers – could also be a grid user who has 
a grid connection and access contract with the 
TSO or DSO.- Power Exchange: Provides a market place for trading physical and financial (capacity/
energy and derivates) contracts for capacity 
allocation by implicit auctions within the 
defined country, region or cross border.- Balance Responsible Party: Ensures that the supply of electricity corresponds to the an-
ticipated consumption of electricity during 
a given time period and financially regulates 
for any imbalance that arises.- Clearing & Settlement Agent: Assumes li-ability for clearing and/or settlement of con-
tracts and provides contractual counterparty 
within a Power Exchange and for over-the-
counter (OTC) contracts.- Trader: A person or entity that buys and sells energy goods and services in an organized 
electricity market (Power Exchange) or over-
the-counter.
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EEG – paragraphs 1–3 of part 2, chapter 2, 
section 11
1) Notwithstanding their obligation in accor-
dance with section 9, grid system operators 
shall be entitled, by way of exception, to take 
technical control over installations con-
nected to their grid system with a capacity 
of over 100 kilowatts for the generation of 
electricity from renewable energy sources, 
combined heat and power generation or mine 
gas, if
a) the grid capacity in the respective grid 
system area would otherwise be overloaded 
on account of that electricity,
b) they have ensured that the largest possible 
quantity of electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources and from combined heat and 
power generation is being purchased, and
c) they have called up the data on the current 
feed-in situation in the relevant region of the 
grid system.
Taking technical control over installations in 
accordance with the first sentence above shall 
only be permitted for a transitional period until 
measures referred to in section 9 are concluded.
2) The rights under section 13(1) and sec-
tion 14(1) of the Energy Industry Act of 
7 July 2005 shall continue to apply vis-à-vis the 
operators of installations for the generation 
of electricity from renewable energy sources, 
combined heat and power generation or from 
mine gas where the measures in accordance 
with subsection (1)
3) Grid system operators shall, upon the request 
of those installation operators whose instal-
lations were affected by measures referred to 
in subsection (1) above, provide verification, 
within four weeks, for the need for the mea-
sure. The verification must enable a qualified 
third party to fully understand the need for the 
measures without any additional information; 
particularly the data ascertained in accor-
dance with subsection (1) first sentence no. 3 
above shall serve that purpose.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [3]
which facilitate management and control 
of building facilities, realizing energy saving 
and increasing comfortability of users of 
buildings and making full use of the state-of-
the-art Information Technology.- Electric Transportation/Vehicle Solutions providers- Grid User/Customer/Consumer: Entity or person being delivered electricity. How a 
customer perceives the value received from 
other actors in the electricity supply chain 
has a substantial influence on the economic 
viability of the grid in general and on the 
overall acceptance of how the electricity 
supply chain performs.- Regulator: Independent body responsible for the definition of framework (market 
rules), for setting up of system charges 
(tariffs), monitoring of the functioning 
and performance of energy markets and 
undertaking any necessary measures to 
ensure effective and efficient market, non-
discriminative treatment of all actors and 
transparency and involvement of all affected 
stakeholders.- Standardization bodies: Responsible for standardization of all relevant elements and 
components within the electricity supply 
chain, which in turn leads to harmonization of 
relevant services, support towards removing 
barriers to trade, creating new market oppor-
tunities and reducing manufacturing costs.- EU and national legislation authorities: Entities are in charge of defining legislation 
and metrics for areas such as environmen-
tal policy, social policy, energy policy and 
economic policy. They are also responsible 
for the authorization needed to develop the 
electricity grid infrastructure.- Financial Sector undertakings: Provide capital to other actors or invest themselves 
into the projects within the electricity supply 
chain (grid, generation, etc.).”
Source: Wording from the EU Commission Task 
Force for Smart Grids, Expert Group 3 [2]
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EEG – paragraphs 1–3 of part 2, chapter 2, 
section 12 
1) The grid system operator whose grid system 
gives rise to the need for the assumption of 
technical control under section 11(1) shall 
compensate those installation operators 
who, on account of the measures under sec-
tion 11(1), were not able to feed-in electricity to 
the extent agreed upon. Where no agreement 
has been reached, the lost tariffs and revenues 
from the use of heat less the expenses saved 
shall be paid.
2) The grid system operator may, when determin-
ing the charges for use of the grid system, add 
any charges arising on account of subsection 
(1) above if the measure was necessary and he 
bears no responsibility for it. The grid system 
operator shall, in particular, bear responsibil-
ity if he did not exhaust all the options for 
optimizing, boosting and expanding the grid 
system.
3) Claims for compensation made by installation 
operators against the grid system operator 
shall remain unaffected.
Source: Wording from the BMUB [3]
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Appendix F – Further results from the European 
Mandate M/490
. Figure F.1 outlines the application process of these 
use cases with reference to the SGAM (WG RA), 
the results of the WG SGIS and the set of standards 
compiled by the WG FSS.
The objective of WG SGIS was to support the 
analyses regarding information security for smart 
grids (see [1]). The group identified pertinent stan-
dards and assigned them to the needs of the stake-
holders. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
were considered as the key requirements regard-
ing information security in this context. The SGIS 
methodology supports the assignment of weights 
regarding these aspects.
Structural elements of the approach were used in 
form of a security view assigned to the SGAM, the 
SGIS security levels as well as the smart grid data 
protection classes. Starting with the collection of use 
cases, the assessment process (referenced as the SGIS 
toolbox shown in . Fig. F.2) includes the assessment 
of risk impact levels (1–5) for the assets in context of 
scenarios addressing the key requirements of confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability. The combina-
tion of these impact levels with their likelihood leads 
to the assignment of an overall security level. Appro-
priate standards are afterwards assigned as counter-
measures appropriate to the individual security level.
The first iteration of Mandate M/490 was com-
pleted in November 2012. A second iteration for 
2013 to 2014 is currently ongoing, its main focus 
being the implementation and further refinement of 
the methodologies of the first iteration and develop-
ment of a second set of standards as well as system 
interoperability testing methods and a conformance 
testing map.
 . Fig. F.1 Process to apply use cases as the basis for a standardization gap analysis under consideration of functional and 
security-related requirements, taken from [2]
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 . Fig. F.2 Overview on the smart grid security assessment proposed by WG SGIS, taken from [1]
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